The People’s Liberation Army
General Political Department

Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics

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INTRODUCTION

Political warfare is a critical component of Chinese security strategy and foreign policy. All nation-states seek to influence policies of others to varying degrees in order to secure their respective national interests. Political warfare seeks to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to one’s own political-military objectives. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rely on political warfare as a means to shape and define the discourse of international relations.

Chinese political warfare, or liaison work in contemporary PLA lexicon, has a rich tradition built upon centuries of military history. During the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang; KMT), enemy and liaison work were critical means of undermining enemy morale and building domestic and international support. Since establishment of a subordinate Enemy Work Section in 1939, GPD has attempted to engineer the final political resolution of the Chinese civil war on CCP terms. The Republic of China (ROC; Taiwan) remains the primary target of PLA political warfare. Taiwan’s democratic system of government – an alternative to mainland China’s authoritarian model – presents an existential challenge to CCP political authority. With political legitimacy across the Taiwan Strait viewed as a zero-sum game within the international arena, authorities in Beijing have long sought the political subordination of the ROC to the PRC under a “One Country, Two Systems” principle. The GPD/LD plays a critical role in a coercive persuasion campaign intended to manipulate international perceptions of “One China” and undermine Taiwan’s international legitimacy.

The object of CCP political warfare has extended beyond Taiwan. Guided by the doctrinal principle of “uniting with friends and disintegrating enemies,” political warfare adopts active measures to promote the rise of China within a new international order and defend against perceived threats to state security. Political warfare employs strategic psychological operations as a means of leading international discourse and influencing policies of friends and foes alike. Propaganda, carried out both during peacetime and in armed conflict, amplifies or attenuates the political effects of the military instrument of national power.

A number of party and state organizations engage in political warfare. Under the leadership of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC), however, the PLA General Political Department (GPD) Liaison Department (GPD/LD; 总政治部联络部) is the PLA’s principle political warfare command. GPD liaison work augments traditional state diplomacy and formal military-to-military relations, which are normally considered to be the most important aspects of international relations. For the PLA, however, traditional diplomacy is only one means of influence, and perhaps not the most significant.
Informed by a long tradition of “people’s diplomacy,” GPD/LD leverages a diverse set of non-governmental platforms in performing its mission. At least two appear under direct GPD/LD authority, one responsible for international friendly contact and the other for cross-Straits exchanges. Other platforms with GPD links are more opaque. For example, an extreme anti-American platform – the Dongfang Yi Cultural Expansion Association – appears to support GPD in development of concepts associated with “Three Warfares” – the integrated application of strategic psychological warfare, overt and covert media manipulation, and use of law in political warfare.

GPD/LD functions as an interlocking directorate that operates at the nexus of politics, finance, military operations, and intelligence. GPD/LD and associated platforms are windows connecting elites from around the world with the CMC, and indirectly, the CCP Political Bureau Standing Committee, and an informal yet powerful political group referred to as “princelings.” Its leadership engages across a complex network of personalized relationships and implied associations. GPD/LD also appears to leverage relationships with institutional and personal executive assistants, or mishu, supporting senior civilian and military cadre.

GPD/LD has few analogous counterparts in modern democratic societies. It often is cast as a member of China’s intelligence community. Indeed, an historical review reveals the co-evolution of CCP political warfare and clandestine intelligence operations. However, viewing liaison work exclusively in intelligence terms diminishes its relevance to U.S. political and military leaders and counterparts around the world. GPD/LD functions as a member of China’s broader political-military intelligence system. Its scope, however, appears limited to intelligence that may directly support political warfare, including development of psychological and social profiles of elites best positioned to influence foreign and defense policies.

This monograph traces a complex network designed to influence policies of the U.S., Taiwan, and others around the world. Public information on GPD/LD has been limited, and assessing any country’s strategic influence operations can be a speculative endeavor. An examination of the organization, its history, missions, and relationships with other systems within the CCP bureaucracy may provide an initial framework within which to evaluate the PLA’s capacity for political warfare.

**UNIVERSAL POLITICAL WARFARE THEORY**

Contemporary PLA liaison work is influenced by Marxist-Leninist theory, tempered by traditional Chinese strategic culture, and informed by careful study of foreign political warfare experiences since World War II. While relatively significant in its scope and capabilities, political warfare is not unique to China. Political warfare seeks to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to one’s own objectives.
Political warfare should be distinguished from public diplomacy. Put simply, public diplomacy is international political advocacy carried out in a transparent manner through routine media channels and public engagements. Political warfare differs from public diplomacy in terms of target and intent. While public diplomacy seeks to influence opinions of mass audiences, political warfare involves a calculated manipulation of an opposing side’s strategies, defense policies, and broader international norms. As Michael Waller from the Institute of World Politics notes, political warfare is needed “when public relations statements and gentle, public diplomacy-style persuasion - the policies of “soft power” - fail to win the needed sentiments and actions.”

Political warfare employs coercive persuasion to weaken an opponent’s political will and compel a course of action favorable to one’s own interests. Policymakers, both civilian and military, are influenced through perceptions and psychological conditioning, and thinking may be affected by the words and actions of a potential adversary. In his classic National Defense University treatise published in 1989, Paul Smith defines the issue:

*Political war is the use of political means to compel an opponent to do one's will, political being understood to describe purposeful intercourse between peoples and governments affecting national survival and relative advantage. Political war may be combined with violence, economic pressure, subversion, and diplomacy, but its chief aspect is the use of words, images, and ideas, commonly known, according to context, as propaganda and psychological warfare.*

Political warfare also has been defined as “the art of heartening friends and disheartening enemies, of gaining help for one’s cause and causing the abandonment of the enemies.” Strategic influence may be expanded by exacerbating existing tensions or creating new friction within an opponent’s political system or among coalition partners. For the purposes of this study, political warfare, influence operations, liaison work, and perception management are used interchangeably. Perception management is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as:

*Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.*

Perception management manipulates pre-existing beliefs, conditions a target audience toward a belief by presenting information bit-by-bit, and presenting parts of the truth while holding others in reserve. Perception management requires overall design of timing and flow of information, measures of effectiveness, and consideration of second-order effects.

Political warfare tools include psychological operations and propaganda, among others. The phrase *psychological warfare* is reported to have first entered the English language in 1941 as a translated mutation of the German term *Weltanschauungskrieg*, or literally, “worldview warfare” – the scientific application of propaganda, coercion, and socio-cultural manipulation as a means of securing an ideological victory over one’s enemies. As one leading authority notes:
Propaganda—that is, political advocacy aimed abroad with hostile intent—is usually but not always deployed in conjunction with some form of political organization. The organizational weapon, often clandestine in some measure, is essentially hostile to the constitutional structure of the existing state in the target area.

German propaganda theory during World War II stressed a number of principles, such as the centrality of intelligence. Sources today could include communications intelligence and cyber espionage. Intelligence tailored for propaganda, and political warfare more broadly, should be targeted, sustained, well-funded and staffed, and appropriately subordinated within the command structure. Generally, propaganda theory stressed the need for a single planning and execution authority, issuing directives, explaining directives to important officials, and cognizance over other entities’ activities that could have propaganda consequences. Propaganda specialists could be non-uniformed personnel, either senior non-government civilians or clandestine operators. Political warfare can integrate a significant percentage of disciplined volunteers who are comfortable with a structure command and control system. Stressing targeted psychological effects, propaganda was integrated into all stages of military planning.

Propaganda theory also stresses themes. For example, inevitable victory and bandwagon appeals seek to persuade an audience to embark on a course of action that “everyone else is taking” in order to reinforce a natural desire to be on the winning side. Inevitable victory calls upon those not already on the bandwagon to join those already on the road to certain victory. Appeals to authority cite elite figures as a means to support a position, idea, argument, or course of action. Political warfare specialists use glittering generalities—intensely emotion-laden words linked with highly valued concepts and beliefs, such as desire for peace, patriotism, cultural unity, and ethnicity, which carry conviction without supporting information or reason. Political warfare also presents false choices, reflecting a deliberate attempt to eliminate the middle ground on an issue.

The former Soviet Union waged political warfare through a program known as active measures. Active measures involved manipulative use of slogans, distorted arguments, disinformation, and carefully selected true information in order to influence the attitudes and actions of foreign publics and governments. The KGB was responsible for “black,” or covert active measures, which employed agents of influence, covert media manipulation, and forgeries in order to shape foreign public perception and attitudes of senior leaders. “Gray” active measures leveraged united front entities, think tanks, institutes, and other non-governmental organizations that enabled an ostensibly independent line from the Soviet party-state. Gray propaganda offered plausible deniability as required. Attributable statements of the Communist Party Propaganda Department were referred to as white or overt propaganda.

GPD LIAISON DEPARTMENT HISTORY

A preliminary understanding of how the PLA is organized for political warfare begins with an overview of its unique historical context. While influenced by traditional strategic culture, contemporary Chinese political warfare is rooted in the formative years of the CCP.
Inspired by Marxism-Leninist ideology and the Moscow-led Communist International (Comintern), underground political work was segmented into multiple systems. An Urban Work Department, which evolved in the United Front Work Department (UFWD), focused on ordinary citizens, minorities, students, factory workers, and urban residents. The Social Work Department, which was established in February 1939 as an operational arm of the Central Special Work Committee, concentrated on the upper social elite of enemy civilian authorities, security of senior CCP leaders, and Comintern liaison.\textsuperscript{15}

A newly established third underground work community was responsible for political warfare against opposing military forces.\textsuperscript{16} Under the leadership of GPD Director Wang Jiaxiang (王稼祥; 1906-1974) and Deputy Director Tan Zheng (谭政; 1906-1988), GPD’s underground system consisted of enemy work and liaison work. The GPD Enemy Work Section was established in October 1937. Its expansion to a second-level department in 1940 reflected the growing importance of enemy work in the struggle against Japanese occupation.\textsuperscript{17}

Enemy work departments were formed under GPD and within the Political Departments of the PLA’s two principle corps – the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army.\textsuperscript{18} A Japan-educated Marxist theorist, Wang Xuewen (王学文; 1895-1995), was appointed to head the new department, and remained in the position until the Japanese surrender in August 1945. Wang Shiyin (王世英; 1905-1968), who had managed enemy work operations in northern China, succeeded Wang Xuewen. Lin Zhifu (林植夫; 1891-1965), a Japan-educated native of Fujian Province, directed the New Fourth Army Enemy Work Department. He was replaced by Liu Guanyi (刘贯一; 1908-1991) in January 1941.\textsuperscript{19} Basic training was carried out at the Enemy Work Cadre School. The GPD Enemy Work Department also established a school in Yan’an for psychological reprogramming of Japanese prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{20}

In addition to enemy work departments, GPD formed a Liaison Department and similar staff organizations under the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army in November 1938. The GPD Liaison Department was responsible for coordinating with KMT military leaders in fighting the Japanese under the Second United Front. The GPD Liaison Department director, Wang Ruofei (王若飞; 1896-1946), was dual hatted as Eight Route Army deputy chief of staff. Before assuming this position, he had been secretary general of GPD, director of the CCP United Front Work Department, and secretary general of the Central Committee General Office. The director of the GPD Liaison Department oversaw at least two subordinate sections – the Liaison Section and the Friendly Work Section. Zou Dapeng (邹大鹏; 1907-1967), who eventually emerged as a senior figure within the state security apparatus, directed the GPD Liaison Department’s Liaison Section.\textsuperscript{21}

The three basic liaison and enemy work missions were: 1) build and sustain a united front with friendly, sympathetic military figures; 2) undermine the cohesion and morale of the senior enemy leaders and create tensions between officer and enlisted ranks; and 3) win over (争取; or 拉拢) and incite (策反) defection among those in the middle. “Anti-imperialist” instigation relied on psychological and ideological conditioning of senior enemy defense authorities in order to weaken national will, generate sympathy for CCP strategic goals, and develop
clandestine sources of military intelligence. Tactics used include financial incentives, shame, and promises of leniency.22

**Taiwan Liberation Movement**

The Japanese surrender in August 1945 marked a new phase in the Chinese Civil War. Having preserved its strength during the united front between the CCP-KMT against Japanese occupation, CCP enemy work shifted focused toward the central Chinese government and repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war. For a brief period after a negotiated settlement involving mutual recognition of both parties’ legitimacy in October 1945, the Enemy Work Department changed its designation to the Nationalist Military Work Department. In 1948, the designation reverted back to the Enemy Work Department.23

In May 1946, the CCP established a Taiwan Provincial Work Committee, which was responsible for integrated political-military operations to subvert ROC forces on Taiwan. A native of Taiwan's Changhua County, Cai Xiaoqian (蔡孝乾; 1908-1982), was assigned as the committee’s secretary general.24 Cai had left Taiwan in 1924 to study at Shanghai University's Sociology Department. He was an original Standing Committee member of the Taiwanese branch of the Japanese Communist Party when it was formed in 1928. Cai was appointed as director of Enemy Work Department under the Eighth Route Army (Field) Political Department in 1938. In 1946, Cai Xiaoqian deployed to Taiwan to carry out united front political work in preparation for physical occupation of the island.25 Cai Xiao (蔡啸; 1919-1990), another native of Taiwan and future GPD/LD deputy director, was responsible for training of enemy work operatives. Intensified PLA political warfare operations on Taiwan began after the fall of Shanghai in May 1949, when the CCP began deliberate planning for an amphibious invasion that was anticipated in April 1950.26

In January 1950, the ROC's counterintelligence system discovered and disrupted the CCP clandestine operation. Cai Xiaoqian was arrested and recruited by the KMT, and helped neutralize more than 400 CCP operatives on Taiwan, including a senior defense ministry official, Wu Shi. Other CCP operatives on the island fled to Hong Kong where they joined the newly formed Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, a CCP-approved pro-unification party that still exists until today.27

Following the PRC’s entry into the Korean War in October 1950, Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) Political Department enemy work operations had primary responsibility for political warfare against United Nations forces. The CPVA Enemy Work Department, directed by Zhang Zizhen (张梓桢; 1913-1982), was responsible for management of enemy POWs, propaganda, misinformation, and other tasks. Born in Shanxi’s
Lingshi County, Zhang Zizhen (张梓桢; 1913-1982) had joined the PLA and CCP in 1936. Under the leadership of Political Department Director Xiao Hua (肖华; 1916-1985), Zhang directed the Eighth Route Army’s 115th Division’s Enemy Work Department, which conducted operations in Shandong. Among his responsibilities was political indoctrination of Japanese POWs. During initial incursions onto the Korean peninsula, Zhang served as deputy director of the 50th Corps Political Department and subsequently director of the CPVA Political Department Enemy Work Department. His deputy director, Wang Xinggang (王兴纲; 1905-1993), had been a senior operative who clandestinely liaised with senior KMT officers, and succeeded in a number of major defections during the Civil War.28

Between 1949 and 1955, the CCP’s intelligence and state security system experienced significant flux. Influenced in part by Soviet advisors, Zhou Enlai dissolved the Social Work Department in 1949 and separated security and external intelligence functions through establishment of the Ministry of Public Security and the General Staff Department (GSD) Liaison Department. Authority over the GSD Liaison Department was exercised by both the CCP General Office and a short-lived CMC General Intelligence Department.29 In 1951, the CCP leadership recalled former GPD director Wang Jiaxiang from his posting as the first PRC ambassador to the Soviet Union in order to form the CCP International Liaison Department (CCP/ILD). Assisting Wang were a number of former GPD Enemy Work Department and Liaison Department officers.30

By July 1955, however, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai reassigned the GSD Liaison Department’s intelligence mission to the CCP Secretariat and its designation as the Central Investigation Department (CID).31 At the same time, the CCP changed the name of the GPD Enemy Work Department to the GPD Liaison Department. In 1955, Zhang Zizhen was awarded the rank of major general and appointed as GPD/LD director. Over the next two decades, GPD/LD’s primary mission was to undermine the legitimacy of the governing ROC authorities on Taiwan, manage territorial disputes, and counter “U.S. imperialism.” In 1956, the CCP established a Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG) and a standing office that was managed in large part by CID and GPD/LD officers.

During the late 1950’s, GPD and the state security carried out missions intended to sow distrust within Taiwan society and between Taiwan and the United States. An example of early CCP use of misinformation and forgery can found in a series of letters that were delivered to ROC President Chiang Kai-shek through his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, proposing direct peace talks, and a negotiated solution that would grant the authorities on Taiwan a high degree of autonomy. According to one assessment, CCP efforts were intended to undermine resolve on Taiwan and create mistrust between United States and Taiwan through planting misinformation through media outlets in Hong Kong and Singapore. An English-language media report published out of Singapore in 1962 asserted that Chiang Kai-shek’s inner circle had reached a secret agreement with the CPP after more than five years of negotiations. The report alleged that
Chiang had agreed to accept Taiwan’s status a self-governed autonomous region, but only after Chiang’s passing. Denied vigorously by political authorities on Taiwan, official U.S. reporting casted doubt on the article’s assertions and identified the source as Cao Juren (曹聚仁; 1900-1972), a Hong Kong-based reporter.\(^3\)

While Taiwan remained its central focus, GPD/LD turned to other contentious areas. MG Zhang Zizhen and a political warfare team that was forward deployed in Tibet managed the large number of Indian internees during the 1962 Indian-China border clashes, among other responsibilities. During the Cultural Revolution, GPD/LD operations were severely curtailed. Following the PLA’s absorption of the Central Committee’s civilian intelligence service in March 1967, Zhang was assigned as secretary general of GPD in June 1967, where he served until October 1968. By November 1969, the Liaison Department was incorporated in the GPD Mass Works Department.\(^3\)

**Ye Jianying and the Third United Front Campaign**

GPD/LD was reconstituted at the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution and renewed its Taiwan-focused political warfare operations. MG Yang Side (杨斯德; b. 1921) directed PLA liaison work from 1975 to 1985. MG Yang was an experienced enemy work specialist.\(^3\) He is often viewed as a protégé of Marshal Ye Jianying (叶剑英; 1897-1986) and Yang Shangkun (杨尚昆; 1907-1998).\(^3\) After U.S. normalization of relations with the PRC in January 1979, the late patriarch Deng Xiaoping announced preparations for a “Third CCP-KMT United Front” on December 15, 1979, which granted the UFWD a prominent role in cross-Strait policy within the party-state policymaking bureaucracy.\(^3\) He also outlined a preliminary concept for promoting a “China model” in place of the international communist movement. Up to that point, the Taiwan policy staff work was dominated by the Central Investigation Department (CID), which was eventually folded into the MSS.\(^3\) To be sure, the united front, state security, and liaison work systems had worked closely together as underground work entities during the Chinese Civil War era.\(^3\) When the Sino-Vietnamese war broke out in 1979, GPD/LD carried out political warfare operations. However, the effectiveness of these PLA campaigns is difficult to ascertain.\(^3\)

Backed by a reinvigorated TALSG, Marshal Ye Jianying, then chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, expanded upon the “One Country, Two Systems” concept. On September 30, 1981, Ye outlined a nine-point proposal that called for unification talks between the CCP and KMT on an equal footing, initiation of cross-Strait trade and other functional exchanges, and consultative positions for representatives from Taiwan. Beyond subordinating Taiwan as a local area under central CCP authority, Ye’s nine-point proposal was viewed as targeting U.S. security support for Taiwan. The ROC rejected the “One Country,
Two Systems” proposal, and called for unification under a democratic, free, and non-communist system.40

**Ye Xuanning and Establishment of GPD/LD Platforms**

Hong Kong was a test-bed for the “One Country, Two Systems” formula and a key theater for CCP political warfare. Indeed, CCP intelligence and united front work had been carried out in Hong Kong for decades.41 The establishment of two GPD-managed enterprises that supported PLA political operations subsequently followed the signing of the Sino-British Declaration on Hong Kong on December 19, 1984.

First, the CMC institutionalized a new GPD/LD platform for expanding military liaison work out to elites within the broader international community through the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC). Three days after the signing of the Sino-British Hong Kong declaration, CAIFC held its opening ceremony. Attendees included CMC Vice Chairman Yang Shangkun, GPD Director Yu Qiuli (余秋里; 1914-1999); CCP Secretariat member Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋; 1913-2002); and director of the Hong Kong/Macau Affairs Office Ji Pengfei (姬鹏飞; 1910-2000).42

Since its formation in 1984, the GPD/LD-managed CAIFC platform has emerged as an important channel of access to CCP princelings – the descendants of the first generation of communist revolutionaries who populated senior party, state, and military positions after 1949. CAIFC’s first generation leadership not only included prominent honorary figures, such as Huang Hua (黄华; 1913-2010), but also sons and daughters of Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Wang Zhen, and Yang Shangkun. Ye Jianying’s son, Ye Xuanning, was commissioned onto active duty in 1984, assigned as deputy director of GPD/LD, and concurrently as one of four CAIFC deputy directors.43

One of Ye’s first tasks was leveraging CAIFC’s network to send next generation princelings abroad for education.44 Because of his central and early role in setting up institutional structures that support and link elite offspring of the CCP’s first generation revolutionary heroes, Ye Xuanning became known as the “spiritual leader” of the princelings.45 Ye’s political status was also visibly displayed when he served as an intermediary in the heated dispute between Hu Yaobang’s prospective successor Zhao Ziyang and hardline conservative Wang Zhen during the summer months before the 13th Party Congress in 1987.46

In addition to CAIFC, Deng Xiaoping collaborated with cadres Ye Jianying, Wang Zhen, and Rong Yiren to exploit the change in Hong Kong’s status and establish GSD and GPD commercial enterprises in the special administrative region. Large PLA-managed enterprises could ostensibly support the missions of GPD and GSD by expanding the CCP’s global and regional influence. Commercial outlets offered a legitimate GPD presence in Hong Kong for conducting liaison work, and also to attract Taiwanese and overseas Chinese investment into China. The two largest such enterprise groups were Poly Technologies and Carrie Enterprises.47
Reflective of his expanding portfolio, GPD/LD Deputy Director Ye Xuanning was appointed to oversee the newly established Carrie Enterprise Corporation in 1984. Carrie Enterprises began initially as a trading company, and then expanded into real estate, construction, manufacturing, mining, and international investment. Over time, the group incorporated at least 56 subsidiaries located in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Fuzhou, and Nanjing among other locations. As many as 20 Carrie subsidiaries operating out of Hong Kong conducted operations against Taiwan.48

GPD/LD and Special Channel for Cross-Strait Dialogue

With Carrie Enterprise Corporation and CAIFC established, GPD/LD expanded its position within the party-military bureaucracy over the following decade. In 1985, MG Yang Side – Ye Jianying’s protégé – replaced a career state security officer, Yang Yindong, as secretary general of the TALSG and director of the TALSG Office. Yang Yindong was assigned to form the Huangpu Alumni Association, a new UFWD organization to help promote cross-Strait unification under the “One Country, Two Systems” formulation.49 Yang Side offered continuity within the Taiwan affairs system with the transition in TALSG leadership in 1987.50 In this position, MG Yang Side was responsible for day to day TALSG operations.51

The transition of the GPD/LD director to TALSG secretary general is significant. It signaled the prominent position of political warfare in the development of CCP policy toward Taiwan.52 Yang Side’s replacement as GPD/LD director, MG Jin Li (金黎; 1927-1990), was an ethnic Korean, and Japan specialist.53 In his new TALSG Office role, MG Yang Side’s priority was to open a special cross-Strait channel of communication to draw the ROC leaders into political negotiations. Despite previous failed attempts, the opening for dialogue came with the defection of a China Airlines (Taiwan) pilot who flew to Guangzhou in mid-1986. Yang Side and GPD/LD Deputy Director Ye Xuanning led a small delegation to Hong Kong to negotiate the return of pilot Wang Hsi-chueh (王锡爵; b. 1929), and the China Airlines plane. The incident and subsequent negotiations marked the first time CCP and KMT authorities carried out direct talks since the Civil War. By November 1987, the ROC lifted its ban on Taiwanese visits to the mainland. Applications to visit relatives on the mainland were managed by the Red Cross.54

With the passing of ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, Yang Shangkun directed Yang Side to establish a dialogue with Chiang’s successor, Lee Teng-hui. The conduit was a neo-Confucian scholar, Nan Huajin (南怀瑾; 1918-2012), who enjoyed connections on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Yang Side solicited the support of a representative from the UFWD community, Jia Yibin (賈亦斌; 1912-2012), to engage in the dialogues. Jia was chairman of the UFWD’s KMT Revolutionary Committee and a Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Standing Committee member.
Yang Side and Jia approached Nan in April 1988 to explore the possibility of creating a liaison channel between Yang and Lee.55

After MG Jin Li passed away in 1990, the deputy director of GPD/LD, MG Ye Xuanning, was promoted to replace him. With establishment of the National Unification Council, President Lee Teng-hui authorized representatives to meet with former GPD/LD Director Yang Side, Jia Yibin, and others at Nan Huai-jin’s Hong Kong residence in December 1990. By early 1993, discussions began on confidence building measures (CBMs). A Hong Kong-based report of unknown reliability asserts that Taiwan and an unidentified Nanjing MR office established a defense telephone link, or “hotline,” in the mid-1990s. Twenty-six meetings between the secret emissaries took place between 1990 and 1995.56

**Jiang Zemin and Diminishment of GPD/LD Influence**

The CCP top leadership transition to Jiang Zemin and China’s third generation leadership resulted in a relative diminishment of GPD/LD’s footprint within the CCP’s formal Taiwan policy community. Jiang began asserting authority over the military and state security systems as Deng Xiaoping gradually faded from day to day management of party affairs. Yang Side stepped down as TALSG Office director, and was replaced by a united front system specialist, Wang Zhaoguo (王兆国; b. 1941).57 In 1993, Deng Xiaoping – in part on Jiang’s behalf – initiated a purge of senior PLA officers, including former CMC Vice Chairman Yang Shangkun and his half-brother, GPD Director Yang Baibing (杨白冰; 1920-2013). Jiang Zemin replaced Yang Shangkun as director of the TALSG in April 1993, and assigned a close ally, Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红; b. 1939), to serve as his representative in the special cross-Strait talks.58

Responding to calls from senior PLA leaders for a greater role in Taiwan affairs, Jiang Zemin appointed a Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCOGS), LTG Xiong Guangkai (熊光楷; b. 1939), to replace Wang Zhaoguo as secretary general of the TALSG in February 1996. Jiang further advocated in favor of Xiong’s appointment to head the Ministry of State Security.59 By 2002, CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian was assigned as a second PLA member of the TALSG.60 Another member of the GSD intelligence community, MG Wang Zaixi, was assigned to a key billet within the TALSG Office.61

Jiang Zemin’s consolidation of power coincided with two scandals linked with the PLA. In the first case, a prominent entrepreneur based in Xiamen leveraged connections with the provincial government, Ministry of Public Security, GSD Intelligence Department (also known as the Second Department), and GPD/LD officials in order to skirt as much as U.S. $10 billion in import duties. Among those prosecuted for corruption was GSD Second Department Director MG Ji Shengde (姬胜德), the son of senior diplomat Ji Pengfei. Former Fujian provincial party chief and Politburo Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin was also implicated in the scandal.62 In the second case, another local entrepreneur issued counterfeit stock under the name of a Fujian-based GPD/LD Carrie Group subsidiary, Minfa Securities. Established in May 1988, Carrie’s Minfa Securities extended a minor stake to local entrepreneur, Wu Yonghong (吴永红). Zhang Xiaowei (张晓伟; b. 1954), Minfa’s general manager since 1996, was arrested by Shenzhen authorities in 2004, and Wu Yonghong fled to Hong Kong.63
In July 1998, Jiang Zemin directed the PLA to divest of its monopolistic enterprises. China Carrie Enterprise Group and China Tiancheng Group were subordinated under State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) China Real Estate Development Group in 1999. According to Tai Ming Cheung, a leading authority on PLA enterprises, Carrie operations in southern China were merged with the China Huaneng Group. Carrie’s Hong Kong-registered subsidiary, Po Wing Kwan, was transferred to China Strategic Holdings in 2000.

Shortly after Jiang directed the financial decoupling of military and civilian businesses in 1998, Ye Xuanning stepped down as head of GPD/LD, yet maintained a seat on the CPPCC. An assistant to GPD Director General (GEN) Yu Yongbo (于永波; b. 1931) – Liang Hongchang (梁宏昌; b. 1947) – was appointed acting director of GPD/LD. Born in Shenyang, Liang previously served as deputy director of the GPD Mass Works Department from April 1991 to December 1994. As a newly promoted major general, Liang was subsequently assigned as deputy director of the GPD General Office in December 1994. In December 1999, Liang began directing GPD/LD full time and remained in that position until 2007.

By Taiwan’s second direct presidential election in 2000, the PLA’s warfighting community had become well entrenched within the TALSG. However, GPD/LD maintained a prominent if not leading role in more subtle united front operations. In June 2001, the CMC directed the establishment of the China Association for Promotion of Chinese Culture (CAPCC) as a principle GPD/LD platform for cross-Strait political warfare operations. MG Liang Hongchang was appointed as the organization’s first director.

Military liaison work operates at the nexus of politics, finance, military operations, and intelligence to amplify or attenuate the political effect of the military instrument of national power. In a 2001 study of Chinese foreign policy behavior, one prominent U.S. authority on influence operations noted that “the Chinese campaign bears all the hallmarks of a Soviet-era "active-measures" operation except that it is far more sophisticated and likely to have a higher degree of success.” He added:

In an orchestrated campaign of good cop/bad cop, Chinese officials have gone directly to U.S. public opinion, trying to appeal to sentimental feelings of cooperation and partnership while literally threatening war. The operation is aimed at five levels: the American public at large, journalists who influence the public and decision makers, business elites, Congress and the president and his inner circle.

Leveraging specialized intelligence collection and analysis, liaison work creates and exploits divisions within an opposing leadership’s defense establishment; develops and sustains rapport with foreign defense elites through exchanges (友好交往); influences perceptions on Taiwan and other external audiences through propaganda (对外宣传 and 对台宣传); strategic, operational, and tactical-level psychological operations; and countering an opponent’s efforts to
shape perceptions within China. According to revised Military Political Work Guidelines issued in 2003, PLA liaison work entails:

*Establishing military liaison work policies and regulations, organizing and executing Taiwan work; researching and studying foreign military situations; leading All-Army enemy disintegration work; in conjunction with relevant General Departments, organizing and leading psychological warfare education and training, and technology and equipment development; guiding and executing border negotiation political work and external military propaganda work; assuming responsibility for relevant International Red Cross liaison and military-related overseas Chinese work.*

Specific tasks under Article 13 include:

*Carrying out work of disintegrating the enemy and uniting with friendly military (elements); researching and studying foreign militaries, enemy militaries, and capability and situation of foreign and domestic forces engaging in ethnic splitist activities; and leading unit psychological operations studies and training.*

Investigation and research (调查研究) is a fundamental component of liaison work. Investigation and research supports the development of plans and programs, and is the basis for measuring operational effectiveness of a political warfare campaign. Individuals and organizations in the U.S., Taiwan, or elsewhere are targeted, researched, and classified as friend, enemy, or middle roaders who could be won over as friends. Political warfare intelligence requirements include historical, geographic, political, social, economic, and cultural attributes that shape the outlook of defense policymakers and military leaders. Cognitive mapping entails a detailed understanding of the political, ethnic, economic, and cultural contradictions within a society, and a defense establishment more specifically. Psychological assessments of elite figures examine leaders assess an individual’s career, level of culture, motivation, values, political orientation and factional affiliation, social status, family, and professional competency. Intelligence collection and analysis on foreign defense and military elite must be objective, and meet both near real-time and long term requirements.

International friendly contact, or the establishment and sustainment of personal rapport with foreign defense-related elites, is another critical aspect of liaison work. In coordination with the foreign affairs community, international friendly contact fosters sympathy, glosses over differences, stresses shared values, and expands influence among elites positioned to influence defense policies. Rapport with selected opinion leaders is a critical element of effective propaganda. Targeted elites may include retired senior military officers, former members of Congress and other legislators, prominent defense academics, among others.

Subversion is the flip side of friendly contact work. Ideological subversion, referred to as disintegration work (分化瓦解敌军), targets political cohesion of coalitions, societies, and defense establishments. Augmenting the hard aspects of military operations, political subversion work includes educating and training domestic civil and military authorities on the value of disintegration operations. The planning process involves targeting of individuals or groups, and establishment of goals, requirements, channels, and methodologies. Working closely with military warfighters, liaison work units are responsible for exploiting political and psychological vulnerabilities, as well as managing prisoners of war in an actual conflict.
perceptions serving as the “battlespace,” liaison work can magnify or hide true military capabilities. Leveraging propaganda and other means, disintegration work seeks to undermine an opponent’s national will through targeting of ideology, psychology, and morale. Liaison work also entails identifying, evaluating, and recruiting potential intelligence sources.75

Propaganda manipulates perceptions of selected audiences. General themes outlined in liaison work doctrine include CCP economic, cultural, technological, and military achievements in order to present an image of political stability, peace, ethnic harmony, and economic prosperity. Propaganda helps legitimize the CCP through positive, selective presentation of party policies and principles. The CCP is cast as the sole legitimate inheritor of China’s long history and traditional culture, and has made an outstanding contribution to prosperity, peace, and human progress. The people of China enjoy a long tradition of friendship with peace loving people throughout the world, and its leaders are worthy of trust.76 The optimal means of projecting a positive image of China, the CCP, and its policies is through a doctrinal principle of “using foreign strength to propagandize for China” (利用外力为我宣传).77

PLA liaison work also seeks to counter external political warfare. In such efforts, the focus is placed on countering adversarial strategies that seek to Westernize and weaken party control through peaceful evolution and promotion of universal values. As a result, investment into psychological defense and ideological education of military officers and men is imperative, as is guarding against enemy subversive activities.78 Defensive operations also entail internet monitoring and restricting media access. For example, Chinese security directives in 1999 restricted reception of foreign satellite broadcasting to foreign invested enterprises, specified hotels, and higher level work units on a need to know basis.79

In sum, liaison work involves the development and execution of political warfare strategies intended to influence foreign defense policies and Taiwan-related perceptions. While the general themes are strikingly similar, Chinese political warfare appears to differ from the Soviet model in terms of organization and approaches, including black propaganda. Limited information is available regarding methodologies such as covert media placement, drafting and dissemination of forged documents, and clandestine recruitment and exploitation of agents of influence. Chinese political warfare appears to rely largely upon media manipulation through gray platforms that offer a moderate level of plausible deniability. One recent Xinhua article advocated in favor of greater transparency of military-related platforms.80

GPD ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The PLA is the political-military arm of the CCP, which exercises control over political warfare through the Political Bureau (Politburo) and its seven-member Standing Committee. As of 2013, the CMC chairman and two vice chairmen are among the Politburo’s 25 members. The CCP Secretariat manages the Politburo’s daily operations and coordinates the implementation of central directives. Leading small groups also play a role in coordinating across the party and
The Politburo Standing Committee, Secretariat, and leading small groups rely heavily on the Central General Office for administration and oversight.81

The Politburo exercises control over the military through the CMC and GPD-managed political work system. CMC management of military operations, political work, logistics, and acquisition and technology is exercised by four first level departments (一级部): GSD, GPD, General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Armaments Department (GAD). The administrative PLA organizational structure offers a high degree of uniformity and specialization across these four general departments, seven military regions, the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force.

### PLA GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT LEADERSHIP

**GEN Zhang Yang**

张阳  
Director  
12/ 2012 – Present  
b. 1951

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**GEN Jia Ting’an**

贾延安  
Deputy Director  
1/ 2008 – Present  
b. 1952

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**GEN Du Jincai**

杜金才  
Deputy Director/CMC Discipline Inspection Committee Secretary  
12/ 2009 – Present  
b. 1952

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**GEN Wu Changde**

吴昌德  
Deputy Director  
6/2011 – Present  
b. 1952

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**Lieutenant General (LTG) Yin Fanglong**

殷方龙  
Deputy Director  
10/2012 – Present  
b. 1953

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**LTG Cui Changjun**

崔昌军  
Assistant to the Director  
12/2012 – Present  
b. 1953

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**VADM Cen Xu**

岑旭  
Assistant to the Director  
12/2012 – Present  
b. 1953

Although ranking second in protocol order, GPD’s power stems from the PLA’s status as a party army, its political position within the Communist Party, and its role in ideological
indoctrination. GPD also exercises control over PLA’s domestic security through its exclusive representation on the CCP Political and Legal Committee. Representatives of the PLA political work system often are members of provincial, municipal, and county level party committees. As the executive agent of the CCP for political loyalty and ideological discipline within the military, GPD also has been represented on party-state policy coordination bodies. Over the decades, GPD officers have filled senior CMC executive staff billets, particularly within the CMC General Office.

The GPD leadership oversees functional organizations, referred to as second level departments (二级部), which are directed by an officer with a grade equivalent to a corps leader. PLA officers, and the billets to which they are assigned, have both a rank and grade. The latter is more important than rank in assessing the protocol position of an officer and his organization within the party, state, and military bureaucracy. The civilian party-state apparatus has a parallel grade structure that is used to judge relative positions. Chinese political culture is characterized by consciousness of ranks or grades that earmark the relative standing of individuals, bureaucratic organizations, state-owned corporations across party, state, and military boundaries. The grade system determines chain of command within GPD, as well as horizontal relationships with other PLA general departments, services, Second Artillery Force, and civilian party-state organs. Comparative civil-military grades are particularly relevant in the case of the GPD liaison work system, which appears to assign officers to civilian departments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GPD Grade and Rank Structure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC Member (军委委员)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR Leader (正大军区职)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR Deputy Leader (副大军区职)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corps Leader (正军职)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corps Deputy Leader (副军职)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Division Leader (正师职)</td>
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Overview of the General Political Department

The GPD is managed by a director, four deputy directors, and two assistants to the director. The former commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, GEN Zhang Yang, has directed the GPD and served as a member of the CMC since 2012. The four GPD deputy directors have a grade equivalent to a military region leader. GPD also oversees political academies located in Nanjing and Xian. Assistants to the GPD Director have a grade equivalent
to a military region deputy leader.91 Each deputy director is assigned a portfolio involving oversight of two or three of the 11 GPD’s second-level departments.

- **The General Office** provides executive support for the GPD leadership. A secretary-general and a deputy secretary-general oversee General Office affairs, including a Foreign Affairs Bureau that is responsible for managing direct exchanges between GPD elements and counterpart organizations, including participation in international law conferences and other events.92

- **The Cadre Department** oversees officer personnel management, including policy and planning, evaluations, approval of promotions, retirements, and other personnel actions. In line with its responsibilities, the Cadre Department maintains files on each officer in the PLA.

- **The Organization Department** is tasked with the management of political work and party affairs system of the PLA. The department plays a significant role in personnel management and coordination with party committees that exist throughout the PLA. Former Organization Department Director, MG Qin Shengxiang (秦生祥; b. 1957), directs the CMC General Office, which provides executive support to the CMC leadership, including CMC Chairman and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping (习近平; b. 1953).93

- **The Propaganda Department** carries out domestic political education work, and manages overt propaganda in support of military diplomacy. The GPD Propaganda Department External Propaganda Bureau, also referred to as the MND International Communications Bureau, was formed in 2006.94

- **The Security Department** has law enforcement responsibilities, including crime prevention, criminal investigation, counterintelligence, personnel background investigations, political reliability assessments, and safeguarding of classified military information. In addition to performing staff functions related to the CMC/GSD Central Guards Bureau, the Security Department also oversees the PLA’s prison and re-education system.95 According to one Taiwan-sourced report, GPD/LD also has a limited counterintelligence function, with some overlap with the GPD Security Department.96

- **The Subordinate Work Department.** The Subordinate Work Department oversees GPD-subordinate corporate enterprises and a number of miscellaneous organizations. These include the Military Museum, PLA Art Academy, August 1st (Bayi) Studio, PLA Publishing House, PLA Pictorial Magazine, PLA Daily, PLA Literary Art Publishing House, PLA Song and Dance Troop, PLA Opera Ensemble, PLA Play Ensemble, PLA Band, PLA Bayi Sports Team, Xinhua News Agency (PLA detachment), China Central Television (CCTV) Military Department, and China National Radio Military Department.

- **Legal Oversight Organizations.** Three other organizations are responsible for discipline and military law. The Discipline Inspection Department functions as inspector general, and supports the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission in investigating corruption and other improprieties. PLA Military Court and Military Procuratorate manage the PLA’s justice
system. The PLA Military Court is said to play an important role in an evolving concept referred to as legal warfare.97

**General Political Department Organizational Chart**

**GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT**

- General Office
- Cadre Department
- Organization Department
- Propaganda Department
- Liaison Department
- Security Department
- Discipline Inspection Department
- Subordinate Work Department
- Military Court
- Military Procuratorate

**GPD/LD Leadership**

The GPD/LD chain of command runs up through the GPD Director to the CMC chairman and chairman. One of three or four GPD deputy directors likely is assigned liaison work as part of his portfolio. GPD/LD is organized in a similar manner as other second level departments within the PLA. The department consists of multiple bureaus, which in turn consist of multiple staff divisions. On behalf of the CMC and Politburo, GPD/LD exercises executive authority over selected platforms cross-Strait dialogue and international exchanges.98 The GPD/LD leadership includes a director, between three and six deputy directors, bureau directors, and an advisory group.99

*MG Xing Yuming* (邢运明; b. 1955) has served as GPD/LD Director since 2007.100 With roots in Shandong’s Shanxian County, MG Xing’s official biography indicates previous assignments within various government bureaucracies. Based on a preliminary survey, the assignment of GPD officers to civilian billets appears routine. He was first anchored in 1976 within Nanjing City and Jiangsu Province Foreign Affairs Offices, before being transferred to Beijing in 1987. In the mid-1990s, Xing Yuming allegedly served as an executive assistant (*mishu*) to a senior GPD/LD officer.101 He was subsequently promoted to serve as director of the Liaison Department First Bureau.102 In 2003, MG Xing was appointed as CEO of the Jingwei Information Technology Company, a key outlet for cross-Strait propaganda.103 MG Xing is also a member of the CPPCC External Friendship Sub-Committee.104

*MG Li Xiaohua* (李晓华; b. 1957) has served as GPD Liaison Department deputy director since at least 2011. He is dual hatted as a CAIFC deputy director. A native of Shanxi Province, he attended undergraduate student at Jilin University School of Economics between 1977 and 1981, then attended graduate school at the Institute of Economic of Shanxi Academy of Social Sciences in. He earned a masters degree from Jilin University’s Department of Economics
in 1983. In 1986, he was dual hatted as a lecturer of Central University of Finance and Economics.105

Between 1990 and 1996, Li Xiaohua was embedded with the Guangdong Economic and Trade Commission, most likely as an analyst. In 1996, he was assigned to the State Planning Commission General Office, where he was section chief and vice director. In 2003, he worked within a bureau within the State Council Research Office.106 In 2008, he was identified as a GPD/LD bureau director and as CAIFC deputy director.107 In 2011, he was named deputy director of the Chinese Association for South Asian Studies. He also served as deputy director of the China White Jade Seminar and deputy director of the White Jade Research Association.108

MG Chen Zuming (陈祖明; 1956) is a former director of the GPD Liaison Department Liaison Bureau and CAIFC secretary general in the 2006-2010 timeframe. He has a background in Russian affairs.109 After graduation from Beijing University’s Russian language department and Moscow Technical University, he was embedded with the State Council International Exchange Center, and managed Eastern Europe and Central Asian issues. Chen Zuming is also deputy director of the China Association of Southeast Asian Studies and China Painting Academy for Friendly Contact (CPAFC; 中国友联画院).110

MG Xin Qi (辛旗; b. 1961) has served as GPD/LD deputy director since at least 2011. With roots in Beijing, Xin Qi is one of China’s foremost authorities on Taiwan and one of the few active duty PLA general officers to have visited the island.111 He most likely replaced MG Shen Weiping (沈卫平; b. 1952) upon his retirement.112 In 1985, he began his Taiwan-related career and has worked under four directors, starting with Yang Side. Under the leadership of Yang Side and Ye Xuanning, Xin Qi was a supporting staff officer during low key cross-Strait exchanges in the early 1990s.113 Early in his career, Xin Qi produced a detailed analysis that postulated civilization, rather than ideology, as a root of future global conflict. Published in 1991, the book predated a similar work by Samuel Huntington. In an international environment characterized by clashes of culture and civilization, Xin Qi is a leading proponent of Taiwan’s integration with China under a “One Country, Two Systems” framework.114

Xin Qi maintains a multitude of formal affiliations. In addition to his deputy director position with GPD/LD, he is a senior director of the PLA’s principle platform for unofficial cross-Strait exchanges, the China Association for Promotion of Chinese Culture (CAPCC). Xin Qi is a deputy director of CAIFC. He also has research fellowships with the Peace and Development Research Center and National Society of Taiwan Studies, China Painting Academy for Friendly Contact (CPAFC), and Tsinghua University’s International Broadcasting Research Center.115
Emphasizing shared culture, MG Xin Qi has been a leading figure promoting early initiation of peace accord negotiations and unification talks in the Taiwan Strait. For example, Xin Qi has proposed the notion of the two sides forming “Cross-Strait Peace and Development Committees” to augment the unofficial SEF-ARATS channel. He has advocated cross-Strait cooperation in asserting Chinese maritime sovereignty.

**GPD/LD Organization**

GPD/LD leaders oversee at least four bureaus. Bureau directors are equal in grade to a PLA division leader, with a rank of either senior colonel (SCOL) or major general. Bureaus consist of a number of subordinate offices (处). Liaison work personnel may be temporarily assigned or anchored (挂职) to offices within the CMC staff, PLA departments, State Council organs, and/or provincial/municipal-level offices. Civilian positions to which officers are assigned presumably would be equal to or one half grade higher than the officer’s most recent position.

The precise designations of subordinate bureaus under the GPD/LD and their scope of operations cannot be confirmed based on existing information. However, a preliminary working hypothesis is that GPD/LD is comprised of four bureaus: 1) a liaison bureau responsible for clandestine Taiwan-focused operations; 2) an investigation and research bureau responsible for international security analysis and friendly contact; 3) external propaganda bureau responsible for disintegration operations, including psychological operations, development of propaganda themes, and legal analysis; and 4) a border defense bureau responsible for managing border negotiations and agreements. Bureaus may administer non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that function as platforms for synchronizing operations with other elements within the party-state system. Bureau directors carry a grade equal to a division leader.

**Liaison Bureau**

The GPD/LD Liaison Bureau (First Bureau) most likely has responsibility for Taiwan. As in its early “enemy work” days, GPD liaison work seeks to create and exploit political, cultural, and social contradictions within Taiwan, and undermine trust between political-military authorities on Taiwan and policymakers in Washington. Uniting with friendly military (elements) and subverting enemy military (elements), GPD/LD appears to foster internal friction within the pan-Green and the pan-Blue coalition. The Liaison Bureau director has often been dual-hatted as one of three GPD/LD Deputy Directors. The GPD/LD Liaison Bureau appears to manage sub-bureaus in Guangzhou and Shanghai, and possibly in other locations.

- **Guangzhou Liaison Sub-Bureau.** GPD/LD Liaison Bureau operations are centered in Guangzhou City. The Guangzhou operations most likely focus not only on Taiwan, but Hong Kong and Macau as well. Past GPD/LD Deputy Directors, such as Yang Side and Shen Chen, have been dual-hatted as Guangzhou Liaison Bureau director. CAIFC consultant MG (ret.) Lan Xiaoshi also has been cited as a former Guangzhou Liaison Bureau leader. One 2011 local Shenzhen City report refers to the GPD/LD entity as the Southern Bureau. The bureau also appears to manage a Taiwan-related association for Track 1.5 exchanges, the
Taiwan Strait Harmonious Development Foundation, which was established in November 2007.\textsuperscript{124}

- **Shanghai Liaison Sub-Bureau.** The Shanghai Liaison Sub-Bureau appears to focus on political-military intelligence and propaganda work. The bureau allegedly maintains a database on ROC military officers and presumably other foreign military personnel at the rank of colonel (O-6) and above. Profiles, updated on a semi-monthly basis, include basic data such as date and place of birth, education, personal habits, family, and current location.\textsuperscript{125} The Shanghai bureau most likely leverages platforms such as the Shanghai Association for International Friendly Contact, and possibly the Shanghai Center for RimPac Strategic and International Studies.\textsuperscript{126}

The GPD/LD Liaison Bureau, perhaps through its entities in Guangzhou and Shanghai, appears to manage field offices, referred to as work stations, in selected locations. The GPD/LD Fujian Work Station is also known as the Fujian Provincial Government Fourth Office.\textsuperscript{127} One focus area is promotion of the Western Taiwan Strait Zone project.\textsuperscript{128} The Fujian Work Station’s subordination within the Liaison Bureau and relationship with the GPD 311 Base are unknown at this time. A GPD/LD office also reportedly is embedded within the Hubei Party Committee External Liaison Office.\textsuperscript{129}

The principle GPD/LD-managed platform for Taiwan-focused political work is the China Association for Promotion of Chinese Culture (CAPCC). Established in June 2001 as a vehicle for propaganda and cross-Strait liaison, CAPCC’s Taiwan focus suggests that GPD/LD Liaison Bureau manages its day-to-day operations. The first CAPCC director was former GPD/LD director, LTG (ret) Liang Hongchang. CAPCC is currently chaired by Professor Xu Jialu (许嘉璐; b. 1937), who is also a senior CAIFC adviser (see discussion below). GPD/LD Director MG Xing Yunming and Deputy Director MG Xin Qi also serve in senior CAPCC positions.\textsuperscript{130} CAPCC Secretary General Zheng Jian (郑剑; b. 1965) manages the organization’s day-to-day affairs and is a prominent public opinion leader on Taiwan issues.\textsuperscript{131} Ministry of National Defense and TALSG Office representatives have highlighted the role CAPCC plays in establishing a cross-Strait trust building mechanism.\textsuperscript{132}
CAPCC oversees subordinate departments responsible for academic research, exchanges, and other functions. It also manages at least two commercial enterprises, the Huayi Audio-Visual Company and Huayi Publishing.\textsuperscript{133} Huayi Audio Visual Company has cooperated with counterparts on Taiwan for movie production, student exchanges, and an exhibition in Tainan regarding the life of Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong).\textsuperscript{134} In addition to participating in regular cross-Strait trade and cultural forums since at least 2006, CAPCC has a close working relationship with the Hong Kong-based \textit{China Review News}.\textsuperscript{135} As an aside, the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS) appears to have a close working relationship with CAPCC.\textsuperscript{136}

\textit{Investigation and Research Bureau}

The GPD/LD Investigation and Research Bureau appears responsible for international security analysis and friendly contact.\textsuperscript{137} The China Association for Friendly International Contact (CAIFC) is a flagship GPD/LD platform that is most likely administered by a specific bureau under the GPD/LD. In his landmark study on the role of Chinese think tanks in foreign policy, George Washington University professor David Shambaugh assessed that CAIFC may be subordinate to the GPD/LD intelligence bureau, which is likely synonymous with the investigation and research bureau.

Established in December 1984, CAIFC facilitates influence operations through PRC foreign affairs, state security, united front, propaganda systems, and military systems.\textsuperscript{138} CAIFC’s main function is establishing and maintaining rapport with senior foreign defense and security community elites, including retired senior military officers and legislators. As a service, CAIFC serves as a window to China’s broader business community. According to a reliable source with direct access, GPD/LD officers have, at least in one instance, explicitly required a retired senior non-U.S. military officer to agree to publish editorials supporting China position and criticize U.S. regional policy in exchange for business development support in China.\textsuperscript{139}

CAIFC’s structure since its inception in 1984 offers insights into GPD/LD leadership and nature of the institutionalized relationships within the party-state bureaucracy. CAIFC operational influence centers upon senior and mid-level active duty GPD/LD officers, but also leverages across the board of stakeholders. An honorary chairman, three senior advisors, and a director are at the top of the protocol order. All are semi-retired second line authorities representing the foreign affairs, state security, united front, or propaganda systems. The structure consists of an executive deputy director, six deputy directors, assistants to the director, a secretary general, three deputy secretary generals, standing members, and consultants.

A speculative working hypothesis is that the CAIFC secretary general may be dual-hatted as director of the GPD/LD Investigation and Research Bureau. The CAIFC secretary general manages the organization’s day to day operations and is assisted by three-five deputy secretaries general and a number of regional division directors, perhaps corresponding to divisions within the Investigation and Research Bureau’s organization structure.\textsuperscript{140}
The serving director of GPD/LD has traditionally filled the CAIFC executive deputy director position.\textsuperscript{141} MG Xing Yunming has served as CAIFC executive deputy director since December 2006. The CAIFC honorary chairman and director usually are semi-retired second line authorities from the foreign affairs system.\textsuperscript{142} Three of CAIFC’s six deputy directors appear to be dual-hatted active duty GPD/LD deputy directors.\textsuperscript{143} One of the three civilian deputy directors, Deng Rong (邓榕; b. 1950), is a daughter of Deng Xiaoping and has been with CAIFC for almost 20 years.\textsuperscript{144}

Platforms such CAIFC rely not only on senior GPD/LD leaders, but also prominent authorities from foreign affairs, state security, united front, and other systems. A prominent supporting authority is former National People’s Congress (NPC) Vice Chairman, Xu Jialu.\textsuperscript{145} Professor Xu Jialu is one of China’s most prominent intellectual leaders engaged in the promotion of Chinese political, social, and cultural values in the Taiwan Strait and around the world.\textsuperscript{146} He has been known to hold a softer line approach to promoting CCP goals, such as unifying the two sides of the Taiwan Strait culturally.\textsuperscript{147} Xu Jialu also is the honorary chairman of the China Council for Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPR) and chairman of the International Society for Chinese Language Teaching. He also is affiliated with the CCP political-legal security community.\textsuperscript{148}

Prominent CAIFC board members and consultants include Wang Boming (王波明 b. 1955), son of former Vice Foreign Minister Wang Bingnan, president of the Stock Exchange Executive Council (SEEC), and editor-in-chief of Caijing magazine; MG Zhu Chenghu (朱成虎; b. 1952), grandson of Marshal Zhu De; Chen Haosu, son of Chen Yi and former Vice Minister of Culture; and Mao Xinyu, grandson of Mao Zedong.\textsuperscript{149} Authorities of note also include Guo Zhenyuan, who is a member of the GPD/LD advisory committee, senior academic with the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), member of the board for China Review News, and an instructor at GPD’s Xian Political Academy.\textsuperscript{150}

CAIFC maintains close relationship with other associations, such as the Hong Kong-based China-U.S. Exchange Foundation (CUSEF). CUSEF is chaired by CPPCC Vice Chairman C.H. Tung and includes Phoenix Television CEO and CPPCC National Committee member Liu Changle (刘长乐; b. 1951) among its most prominent board members.\textsuperscript{151} CAIFC appears to exercise administrative oversight of a network of associations for international friendly contact (AIFC) within selected provinces and municipalities. In at least some cases, the provincial AIFC executive deputy director concurrently directs Military Region (MR) Political Department Liaison Department (see section on MR liaison work).
The Center for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS) functions as the principle GPD/LD think tank. Formed in parallel with CAIFC in 1984, CPDS is an analytical organization that appears to support CAIFC, GPD/LD, as well as the MSS. Supporting research fellows cut across the PLA and Taiwan affairs community.¹⁵²

Senior GPD/LD authorities are also prominent in international cultural, philanthropy, financial dialogues, and public diplomacy forums. One of the most prominent is the Nishan Forum on World Civilizations, which was established in 2008 as a response to the United Nations resolution on a global agenda for dialogue among world civilizations. Nishan Forum organization overlaps with GPD/LD, CAIFC, China Energy Fund Committee, and other cultural associations. For example, Xu Jialu chairs the Nishan Forum Organization Committee. GPD/LD Director MG Xing Yunming serves as the committee’s vice chairman. GPD/LD deputy director, MG Chen Zuming, functions as the forum’s executive director.¹⁵³ Nishan’s principle mission is to enhance promote Confucian values and enhance understanding among different civilizations, and enjoys a close affiliation with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization (UNESCO).¹⁵⁴

Another initiative, perhaps reflecting a cooperative relationship between GPD propaganda authorities and one of China’s most respected media outlets, is the China Philanthropy Forum. The forum was established in November 2012 as a joint CAIFC-Caijing Magazine initiative to expand international contact and solidify China’s public charity community. MG Xing Yunming serves as executive chairman, and Song Enlei as secretary general.¹⁵⁵ Similar to the China Philanthropy Forum, the Sanya International Finance Forum is a joint CAIFC-Caijing initiative to bring together financial and political elites to address a range of global issues.¹⁵⁶

Another political warfare platform affiliated with GPD and the CCP propaganda and ideology system is the China Energy Fund Committee (CEFC). According to its website, CEFC is a “nonprofit, non-governmental think tank devoted to public diplomacy and research on strategic issues with emphasis on energy and culture.”¹⁵⁷ An administrative subsidiary of the China Huaxin Energy Company, CEFC has a distinct energy, maritime security, and cultural propaganda mission. Sponsored events provide an indication of its relative importance, particularly in light of China’s presumed priority on understanding sources of energy and security of supply.¹⁵⁸

Ye Jianming (叶简明; b. 1977) serves as CEFC chairman. He was deputy secretary general of CAIFC, or possibly CAIFC’s Shanghai branch, from 2003 to 2005. In 2006, Ye Jianming was announced as CEO of a number of companies affiliated with Huaxin Energy Company. Chen Qiutu (陈秋途; b. 1975) serves as the chairman’s executive representative, party committee secretary, and also is a senior Nishan Committee member. Both Ye Jianming and Chen Qiutu have roots in Fujian Province. Professor Xu Jialu chairs CEFC’s advisory committee, in addition to his CAIFC, CAPCC, Nishan Forum positions. He also presides over CEFC’s China Institute of Culture.¹⁵⁹
CEFC maintains branches in Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, the United States, and Canada. Dai Xu, a PLAAF professor affiliated with the PLA National Defense University, is affiliated with CEFC’s Beijing branch. He also heads a new organization, the Hainan-based Maritime Security and Cooperation Academy. Zhuang Jianzhong is affiliated with CEFC’s Shanghai branch, as well as the Center for RimPac Strategic and International Studies and the Center for National Strategic Studies within Shanghai’s Jiaotong University. Zhang Wu has been affiliated with CEFC’s representative office in the United States and CAIFC’s Americas Division. He also serves as deputy secretary general of the Nishan Forum Organizing Committee. Technically a non-governmental organization, CEFC was granted “special consultative status” by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in February 2011. CEFC has a cooperative relationship with GPD-related organizations, such as the Nishan Forum and the GPD 311 Base (see below).

External Propaganda Bureau

The GPD/LD External Propaganda Bureau (对外宣传局) appears to function as the PLA’s principle staff directorate for applied psychological operations and propaganda. Based on guidelines released in December 2003, GPD codified an integrated civil-military approach to political warfare that integrates psychological operations (心理战), public opinion or media warfare (舆论战), and legal warfare (法律战). Referred to as the “Three Warfares” (三战), the integrated approach seeks to expand China’s influence within the international community and strengthen resistance to internal and external challenges to CCP political authority.

Public opinion warfare directs propaganda against mass audiences in order to weaken morale, inspire ideological splits within foreign communities viewed as adversarial in nature. Targeted groups include not only defense establishments, but also civilian diplomatic, cultural, religious, and business organizations. Seeking to counter a perceived Western monopoly on international media outlets, propaganda channels include civilian and military newspapers, magazines, television, movies, radio stations, and increasingly internet. During crises, public opinion warfare is intended to mislead opposing military commanders into errors in judgment. Propaganda also targets domestic audiences in order to strengthen ideological determinism and promote unity between civilian and military societies. Military propaganda activities ostensibly seek to promote a positive image of the PLA both within China and among foreigners. However, defense academics who promote hard line, nationalist perspectives also support the propaganda system.

Taiwan is a principle target of Chinese public opinion warfare. GPD/LD appears to work closely with a variety of Taiwan-focused media platforms. With over 70 percent of Taiwan’s population having internet access, Chinese writings stress use of cyberspace as a medium,
including manipulation of bulletin board sites and chat rooms. GPD/LD may leverage gray propaganda outlets in Hong Kong to promote the perception of a united front between KMT and CCP on territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. United front propaganda themes target bilateral relations between Taiwan, the U.S., and other coalition partners in the region. Among various methodologies and likely targeting public audiences on Taiwan, *ad hominem* attacks seek to discredit selected Americans who highlight U.S. national interests in Taiwan, or openly critical of CCP policies.

During peacetime, psychological operations identify and exploit divisions within an enemy’s political establishment and deter an adversary from taking actions inimical to Chinese interests. They also are intended to ensure that PRC policies and military operations are cast in the proper light. Psychological operations also are targeted against an adversary’s value concepts. Psychological operations seek to force divisions in alliances and coalitions and reduce confidence in an enemy’s economy. Professor Ma Zhong, one of the PLA’s most prominent psychological warfare theorists, highlights psychological conditioning through foreign media channels that create “primacy,” “insiders,” “cry wolf,” and “snake bite” effects. The internet is viewed as an increasingly important channel for strategic psychological operations. Legal warfare leverages international law to promote CCP legitimacy, support territorial and sovereignty interests, and constrain a potential adversary.

An important platform for development of concepts associated with the *Three Warfares* is the Dongfang Yi Cultural Expansion Association (东方毅拓展文化协会). Dongfang Yi is representative of a neo-Maoist group promoting anti-American principles. In 2009, it established a Future Media Warfare Research Lab at Tsinghua University’s School of Journalism and Communication as a means of competing for world public opinion. An active proponent of redefining the international rules of the game through legal warfare, Dongfang Yi established a Military Law Research Center within the China Political Law University’s International Exchange Center. Dongfang Yi has co-sponsored at least one conference with CEFC and the Maritime Security and Cooperation Academy.
Former GPD/LD deputy director and CAIFC consultant, MG (ret) Du Rubo (杜汝波; b. 1953), manages Dongfang Yi’s day-to-day activities. Du Rubo was a key player in formulating modern PLA psychological operations theory. He also serves as honorary chairman of the China Red Cultural Institute and has been a member of the United Front Theory Research Association. Dongfang Yi highlights the significant contributions of a number of active and semi-retired PLA officers, including MG (ret) Luo Yuan.

At the forefront of applied psychological operations and propaganda directed against Taiwan is the GPD 311 Base (61716 Unit). Headquartered in Fujian provincial city of Fuzhou, the GPD 311 Base is a corps deputy leader grade organization that functions as an operational PLA political warfare command. Base leaders appear to support the CCP Taiwan Propaganda Leading Small Group, GPD/LD, and the TALSG Office Propaganda Bureau. The 311 Base oversees at least six regiments responsible for psychological warfare and propaganda targeting public opinion on Taiwan. A network propaganda center appears to have a computer network operations mission. Other units manage television, audio visual production, and radio broadcasting.

The 311 Base’s commercial persona is the China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (CHBC). A principle GPD 311 Base channel is the Voice of the Taiwan Strait (VTS). The commander of the 311 Base is dual hatted as CHBC CEO, and the VTS director also serves as CHBC general manager. In 2013, 311 Base officers reportedly visited Taiwan for initial discussions with counterparts on joint broadcasting and film production. The 311 Base is supported by the Huaxin Training Center (华信培训中心), which is affiliated and collated with a subsidiary of the China Huaxin Energy Company – the Fujian Huaxin Holding Company. The general manager of the CEFC Fujian Holding Company is Lan Huasheng (兰华升; b. 1971). Lan concurrently serves as CEFC deputy secretary general and executive director of the China Institute of Culture.

**Border Defense Bureau**

The GPD/LD Border Defense Bureau (边防局) plays a role in influencing border negotiations and agreements. China’s border areas are home to ethnic minorities who, from Beijing’s perspective, are a potential source of domestic and international unrest. China’s has a land boundary of 22,000 kilometers with 14 states, including Russia, North Korea, India, Burma, and Vietnam. Political work appears to include management of a system of at least 60 border meeting sites (边防会晤站) around the PRC border. Responsibilities include cross-border liaison, intelligence, propaganda, and emergency management of border incidents.
Military Region Liaison Departments

Military Region (MR) Political Departments oversee subordinate organizations responsible for liaison work. Personnel appear to be embedded within selected provincial/municipal-level international friendly contact associations and government offices. For example:

- **The Nanjing MR Political Department Liaison Department** most likely focuses on Taiwan, the United States, and Japan. Its platforms include the Jiangsu Association for International Friendly Contact (JAIFC) and the JAIFC Asia-Pacific Research Center. JAIFC’s research center has co-hosted an annual conference on U.S. regional strategy and implications for Chinese security along with CAIFC.

- **The Guangzhou MR Political Department Liaison Department** most likely focuses on Taiwan, the United States, and Southeast Asia. Its platforms include the Guangdong Province Association for International Friendly Contact (GAIFC) and the GAIFC Asia-Pacific Region Development Research Center. One prominent figure with experience in the Guangzhou MR Liaison Department is Qi Qiaoqiao (齐桥桥; b. 1949), daughter of Xi Zhongxun and sister of Xi Jinping. The relative importance of Guangzhou MR liaison work likely grew in the 1990s along with growing investment from Taiwan and Hong Kong into the Pearl River Delta.

- **The Chengdu MR Political Department Liaison Department** most likely focuses on India and the rest of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Tibet. Its platforms include the Sichuan Association for International Friendly Contact and its South and Southeast Asia Research Center.

- **Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, and Jinan MR Political Department Liaison Departments** most likely focus on Russia, Central Asia, Korea, and Japan. Each likely leverages a provincial AIFC as a platform. For example, Executive Deputy Director of the Liaoning AIFC, Yang Junqiang, served in the Shenyang MR Political Department General Office. Deputy director of the Beijing Association for International Friendly Contact (BAIFC), SCOL Bao Liangming, directed the Beijing MR Political Department Liaison Department in the 2012 timeframe.

PLA Air Force and Navy Liaison Work

PLAAF and presumably PLAN Political Department directors oversee subordinate Liaison Departments. The PLAAF Political Department Liaison Department likely analyzes psychological effects of long range precision strike, among other tasks. Prominent PLAAF authorities who have emerged from the liaison work system include GEN Liu Yazhou (刘亚洲; b. 1952), the relatively liberal-minded political commissar of the PLA National Defense University (NDU). Current 15th Airborne Corps Political Department Director Luo Yichang formerly directed the PLAAF Liaison Department.

Liaison Training and Education
The PLA trains and educates its military liaison work cadre at two GPD professional military educational institutions: the Nanjing Political Academy and the Xian Political Academy. In addition to its training and education missile, the Xian Political Academy oversees a Psychological Warfare Research Institute, which was established in the late 1990s in conjunction with a test and evaluation unit in the Shenyang Military Region. The Nanjing Political Academy also oversees a branch school in Shanghai that manages research institutes specializing in psychological warfare, as well as information management and foreign military political work. GPD/LD has sponsored at least one conference in conjunction with the Nanjing Political Academy Shanghai Branch regarding political work toward the U.S. The PLA National Defense University also hosts a Three Warfare Research Center. The PLA Navy also manages a Psychological Test and Evaluation Center within the Dalian Naval Academy. Selected GPD liaison work officers appear to receive training at the PLA Institute of International Relations in Nanjing, alongside officers serving in the GSD Second Department. GPD/LD establishes psychological operations training requirements and materials in coordination with the GSD Training Department.

MILITARY LIAISON WORK AND CCP SYSTEMS

The CCP exercises control over the PRC state and armed forces, including the finance and economic systems, religious organizations, professional associations, non-governmental organizations, major media channels, academic institutions, trade unions. GPD/LD appears to synchronize efforts of the various party, state, and military communities. However, it does not enjoy a monopoly over political warfare. GPD/LD supports, and/or cooperates or competes with entities within the party’s united front, propaganda and education, foreign affairs, and state security systems.

Internal PLA Relations

As its title implies, liaison work entails coordination not only with civilian bureaucracies, but also with a broad array of organizations within the PLA. In some cases, cooperation may be mixed with elements of competition. Liaison work amplifies or attenuates political effects of military power. In other words, GPD political warfare seeks to manipulate perceptions of actual warfighting capabilities. Some formal mechanism likely exists to coordinate GPD liaison work with GSD, Air Force, Navy, Second Artillery, and military regional commands.

In terms of direct chain of command, the CMC exercises authority over political warfare through the GPD director, who also is a CMC member. Other CMC members include the Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff; directors of the General Logistics Department and General Armaments Department; and commanders of the Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery Force. These eight members report to the CMC chairman through two vice-chairmen, who are currently GEN Fan Changlong and Xu Qiliang.
CMC staff organizations may coordinate aspects of political warfare within the CMC itself, and with the PLA’s warfighting community. First, the CMC General Office, currently headed by former GPD Organization Department Director MG Qin Shengxiang, wields considerable influence through management of day-to-day affairs of the CMC. Within the CMC General Office, the Comprehensive Investigation and Research Bureau (综合调研局) has enjoyed a traditionally close relationship with GPD/LD. The CMC Legal Affairs Bureau (法制局) participates in development of legal warfare theory.207

As a side note, the CMC appears to manage its own platform for external political work. The China International Cultural Communication Center (CICCC) was established under CMC guidance in 1984, the same year as CAIFC, and has carried out a broad range of international and domestic initiatives. Its honorary leaders are retired military region-level political commissars and public security authorities.208 The center’s executive director, Long Yuxiang (龙宇翔; b. 1962) is a member of the CCPCC Foreign Relations Committee and Friendly Contact Sub-Committee.209

GPD/LD’s association with the Ministry of National Defense (MND) is unclear. MND is under the dual leadership of the CMC and State Council, and functions as an external relations liaison platform with organizations both within the Chinese government and the international community. The Minister of Defense is a CMC member with a State Councilor grade. The MND Foreign Affairs Office (MND/FAO) mission is “military diplomacy.” It functions as the foreign affairs office of both the CMC and GSD. Unofficial GPD/LD-managed exchanges augment official FAO-managed military-to-military relationships. Beyond this, some formal mechanism, such as a PLA foreign affairs leading small group, likely exists to coordinate all facets of official and unofficial external affairs.210

GSD is responsible for day to day joint operations, intelligence, strategic planning and operational requirements, training, and mobilization. In addition to its role in military diplomacy and security of senior party and state leadership, GSD concurrently functions as a ground force headquarters staff.211 GSD includes two major components of the PLA intelligence system: the GSD Intelligence Department (GSD Second Department) and the GSD Technical Reconnaissance Department (GSD Third Department), which is responsible for signals intelligence and cyber reconnaissance. The GSD Second Department, currently directed by MG Chen Youyi (陈友谊; b. 1954), is responsible for traditional collection and analysis, indications and warning, and order of battle.212

Like any two organizations with some overlap in their missions, the relationship between GPD/LD and GSD Second Department is probably characterized by cooperation and competition. GPD second level departments, such as GPD/LD, are equal in grade to corps leader-level GSD counterparts, such as the GSD Operations Department (First Department), GSD Second Department, and GSD Third Department. Both GPD/LD and GSD Second Department appear to carry out clandestine human intelligence collection. However, the Second Department’s collection
priority may be information most relevant to military operations. GPD/LD likely prioritizes information that supports its political warfare mission. GSD Second Department, GPD/LD, as well as MSS, likely overlap to some extent.\textsuperscript{213}

GSD academic platforms include the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS; 中国国际战略学会) and possibly the China Foundation for International Strategic Studies (FISS; 中国国际战略研究基金会). Formed in 1979, CIISS has traditionally been directed by the DCOGS with the intelligence and foreign affairs portfolio. FISS was established in 1989. Its honorary chairmen include Cheng Siwei (成思危; 1935), other former senior NPC and CPPCC authorities, and former DCOGS Xiong Guangkai. Similar to counterparts in AMS and NDU, CIISS and FISS are primarily policy research and analysis organizations, with people's diplomacy a secondary mission. CAIFC, military region AIFCs, and CAPCC appear to execute policies. CPDS and similar centers subordinate to PLA military regions support GPD and CAIFC in their political warfare mission. In conducting foreign exchanges, CIISS and FISS likely adhere to political guidelines established by the CMC and the GPD-managed political work system.\textsuperscript{214}

**United Front System**

Among all the CCP communities, GPD/LD appears most closely aligned with the united front system. Drawing on the historical legacy of CCP successes in exploiting collaboration with ROC authorities in the 1920s and 1930s, GPD/LD political warfare appears integrated with united front work in order to win and sustain friends in support of a common cause.

The CCPPC is the highest level entity overseeing the united front system. The CCPPC is a senior consultative body that exercises “democratic supervision” over non-CCP parties, mass organizations, and prominent personalities. It promotes political unity and social stability through controlled representation in China’s political, economic, social and cultural lives. The chairman of the CCPPC, currently Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声; b. 1945), is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and serves as TALSG deputy director. Twenty-three CCPPC vice chairmen represent CCP-approved parties, Hong Kong, Macau, autonomous regions, CCP International Department, and other organizations.\textsuperscript{215}

The CCP United Front Work Department (UFWD) manages day-to-day tasks of the united front system. UFWD is currently directed by former CCP General Office director, Ling Jihua (令计划; b. 1956). UFWD’s five deputy directors have grades equal to a minister.\textsuperscript{216} UFWD consists of functional bureaus responsible for strategy development, liaison with approved political parties, minorities and approved religious organizations, and Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao issues. The united front system also includes offices within provincial/municipal party
committees. In at least one case, a GPD/LD officer appears to have been assigned as a division director within a provincial-level united front office.\textsuperscript{217}

CPPCC sub-committees are an important means of coordinating within the united front system. The directors of at least three key PLA organizations – GPD/LD, GSD Second Department, and MND/FAO – coordinate foreign influence operations with civilian counterparts through the CPPCC External Friendship Sub-Committee.\textsuperscript{218} Representatives from GPD/LD-affiliated associations at the provincial/municipal-level serve as provincial/municipal CPPCC members. UFWD also plays a role in providing guidance to the Office of Chinese Language Council International (\textit{Hanban}), which manages Confucian Institutes around the world.\textsuperscript{219}

GPD/LD works closely with eight CCP-approved democratic parties, and semi-retired “second line” authorities within the united front system.\textsuperscript{220} According to a recent work report, non-CCP parties play a critical role in subordination of Taiwan to CCP authority. Perhaps most prominent are:

- The \textit{China Democratic National Construction Association} (CDNCA), which Cheng Siwei chaired between December 1996 and 2007;
- The \textit{China Association for Promoting Democracy} (CAPD), which Xu Jialu chaired between 1997 and 2007.\textsuperscript{221}
- The \textit{KMT Revolutionary Committee}, which has the second highest number of seats in the CPPCC (30%).\textsuperscript{222}
- The \textit{Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League} (referred to as \textit{Taimeng}), which was formed in November 1947. The Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League has roots in the Taiwanese Communist Party, a chapter of the Communist Party of Japan that was formed in 1928. Headquartered in Shanghai, \textit{Taimeng} oversees the Cross-Strait Taiwanese Exchange Association.\textsuperscript{223}

CPPCC and UFWD also oversee a number of platforms for global outreach. One in particular that appears linked with GPD liaison work is the Chinese Council for Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPR), which was established in 1988. The chairman of the CPPCC is dual-hatted as the CCPPR director. Honorary chairmen include senior GPD/LD advisor Xu Jialu and Cheng Siwei. CCPPR deputy directors are vice-chairmen of the NPC Standing Committee and CPPCC. The CCPPR secretary general is dual hatted as UFWD deputy director.\textsuperscript{224} CCPPR maintains offices in the United States, Japan, and elsewhere. Senior GPD/LD officers regularly accompany senior CCPPR representatives in visits to the U.S.\textsuperscript{225} Other UFWD-affiliated platforms include:

- \textit{National Society of Taiwan Studies}. The National Society of Taiwan Studies (NSTS), currently chaired by a CCPPR Honorary Chairman Cheng Siwei, is an important entity that integrates some of China’s foremost Taiwan experts. NSTS supports the TALSG Office, UFWD, China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), MSS, and presumably GPD/LD.\textsuperscript{226}
• **Huangpu Military Academy Alumni Association.** Established along with CAIFC in 1984, Huangpu Association events have included senior GPD/LD representatives during events with retired ROC military officers since 1986.\(^{227}\)

• **All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots.** Established on December 22, 1981, the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots (*Tailian*) promotes unification among Taiwanese individuals and groups in China and abroad. *Tailian*, GPD/LD, and the TAO have cooperated on Taiwan-related propaganda efforts since 2002.\(^{228}\)

• **China Overseas Friendship Association.** The China Overseas Friendship Association (COFA), overseen by the UFWD director, is a platform for exchanges with overseas Chinese.\(^{229}\)

• **Council for Promotion of Chinese Strategic Culture.** A relatively new organization likely affiliated with the united front system is the Council for Promotion of Chinese Strategic Culture. Established January 2011, the Council’s director is Zheng Wantong (郑万通; b. 1941), who previously served as deputy director of UFWD and CPPCC vice chairman. MG (ret) Luo Yuan (罗援; b. 1950), a respected former senior authority of the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), is dual-hatted as the Council’s executive deputy director and secretary general.\(^{230}\)

As a final note, one other organization that appears to play a prominent role in Taiwan-related united front work is the Shanghai East Asian Institute. Formed six months after Jiang Zemin’s January 1995 Eight Point Proposal on cross-strait unification, the Shanghai East Asian Institute’s director, Zhang Nianchi (章念驰; b. 1942), is the grandson of Zhang Taiyan and is a former director of the Shanghai City Taiwan Research Institute. Scholars associated with the East Asian Institute appear to be linked with the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies and the Shanghai Society of Taiwan Studies. In addition to a research committee, subordinate offices under the Shanghai East Asian Institute include the Regional Security Research Lab (*区域安全研究室*) and Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau Youth Research Lab (*台港澳青少年研究室*), which carries out sociological studies.\(^{231}\)

**CCP Propaganda System**

As the PLA’s executive agent for psychological warfare, GPD/LD is part of the CCP’s propaganda and ideology system. Broad perception management policies are coordinated by the Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideological Work (CLGPIW). Under the direction of a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the CLGPIW consists of one or two deputy directors and between five and eight members.\(^{232}\)

The CCP Propaganda Department (CCP/PD) functions as the nerve center of the propaganda system. The propaganda system integrates the work of the PLA, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), People’s Daily (*Renmin Ribao*), New China News Agency (*Xinhua*), and the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT). As an example of overlap between the party and state, the
Minister of Culture, Minister of Education, and SARFT director are dual hatted as CCP/PD deputy directors.233

The CLGPIW and CCP/PD influence the perceptions of foreign audiences through the Central External Propaganda Office, which also functions as the State Council Information Office. The director of the External Propaganda Office is dual hatted as deputy director of the CCP/PD.234 As noted by George Washington University professor David Shambaugh, external propaganda work publicizes Chinese government policies and perspectives, promotes Chinese culture around the world, counters foreign criticism perceived as hostile (eg., the so-called “China Threat Theory”), and advances cross-Strait unification. External propaganda also is intimately linked with united front work (eg., CPPCC), non-governmental platforms such as CAIFC, and with programs managed by the Ministry of Education, such as Confucius Institutes.235 A CCP Taiwan Propaganda Leading Small Group reportedly coordinates Taiwan-specific perception management activities across relevant party, state, and military communities.236

A senior GPD officer traditionally has represented the PLA on the CLGPIW. As of October 2013, GPD Deputy Director GEN Du Jincai most likely fills this position. He also serves as the PLA representative on the CCP Political and Legal Committee. In addition, Du Jincai chairs the PLA External Propaganda Leading Small Group, which the CCP and CMC established in 2006 to coordinate across the military bureaucracy. The GPD Propaganda Department External Propaganda Bureau, which was formed in 2007, functions as the leading small group’s standing office. It also functions as the MND International Communication Bureau.237

The division of effort between the external propaganda bureaus of GPD Propaganda Department and GPD/LD remains unclear. Both appear to engage in “public opinion warfare.” One speculative hypothesis is that the GPD External Propaganda Bureau is responsible for “white” propaganda in the form of public diplomacy, including management of routine dissemination platforms and content. GPD/LD may be responsible for “gray,” “black,” and Taiwan-related propaganda. The GPD/LD Taiwan Bureau supports the Central External Propaganda Office through representation on a Taiwan-focused central broadcast program committee.238 GPD/LD also presents annual awards to PLA units excelling in Taiwan-related propaganda.239

External Affairs System

In addition to its propaganda mission, GPD supports the CCP’s external affairs system in a subdued yet important manner. “People’s diplomacy” and friendship associations augment traditional state-to-state diplomacy and military-to-to military relations. Foreign and national security policies are coordinated through the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), which is chaired by the CCP General Secretary. The FALSG operates in parallel with a National Security Small Leading Group, which is appears to consist of the same members. The FALSG Office is directed by a State Councilor-grade official. A CMC member – the Minister of Defense – has traditionally been an FALSG member. His CMC grade offers a status slightly higher than other FALSG members who carry a minister-level civil service grade. The DCOGS responsible for foreign affairs and intelligence has also represented the PLA on the FALSG. Other members
are believed to include the director of the CCP International (Liaison) Department, and leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, MSS, and Ministry of Public Security. \(^{240}\)

Senior GPD/LD officers coordinate with FALSG members, as well as serving and retired Ministry of Foreign Affairs cadre, via CAIFC and other associations. For example, retired senior MOFA officials, such as Huang Hua, Li Zhaoxing, Zhang Deguang, and Yang Zhenya have served in honorific positions of CAIFC. \(^{241}\) GPD/LD officers allegedly have been anchored with MOFA for embassy assignments. \(^{242}\) CAIFC, discussed above, is representative of the “people’s diplomacy” component of the external affairs system.

CAIFC was modeled upon the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC). CPAFFC is an outgrowth of the Chinese People’s Committee for Defending World Peace (Peace Committee) and the Chinese People’s Association for Cultural Exchange, which were established in 1949 and 1954 respectively. A senior PLA enemy work officer who played a critical role in the final phase of the Chinese Civil War, Liu Guanyi, served as an initial Peace Committee secretary general. \(^{243}\) Until the emergence of CAIFC and other platforms in the 1980s, the Peace Committee and CPAFFC dominated the people-to-people component of China’s foreign policy. \(^{244}\)

Today, CPAFFC is directed by Li Xiaolin (李小林; b. 1953), the bright and personable daughter of former PRC President Li Xiannian (李先念; 1909-1992) and wife of NDU Political Commissar GEN Liu Yazhou. \(^{245}\) CPAFFC oversees the China Friendship Foundation for Peace and Development (CFFPD), which has advocated greater emphasis on public diplomacy, presumably as an alternative to political warfare. \(^{246}\) CFFPD maintains an affiliation with Charhar Institute, a leading public diplomacy platform. Another organization likely supporting public diplomacy is the China International Public Relations Association (CIPRA). \(^{247}\)

GPD/LD plays a more pronounced in the execution of policies coordinated by the Taiwan affairs system. As previously discussed, GPD/LD has had a visible presence within the TALSG Office, although its relative degree of influence appears to have ebbed and flowed over the years. The TALSG, in large part on the CMC’s behalf, has been responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Politburo’s Taiwan policy. \(^{248}\) The government designation of the TALSG Office is the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). MG Yang Side was a dominant presence within the TALSG Office from the late 1970s to 1993. He departed along with Yang Shangkun and GPD Director Yang Baibing. The last known GPD/LD officer assigned to a senior TAO position was MG Li Qingzhou, allegedly a corps-leader grade officer serving as assistant to the director. In 1995, Li Qingzhou rotated out of the TAO and was assigned as mishu within the office of the Fujian provincial governor. \(^{249}\)

While its formal presence diminished in the 1990s, GPD/LD officers appear to maintain close links with the TALSG Office. For example, senior GPD/LD officers have accompanied TAO deputy director- and bureau-level authorities for conferences overseas, and frequently are highlighted as a keynote speaker alongside TAO counterparts. \(^{250}\) GPD/LD authorities also have been central players in cross-Strait academic and retired officer exchanges. In addition to
participating in TAO-affiliated events, GPD/LD is represented in an expert working group responsible for development of broad Taiwan-focused propaganda policies.251

GPD/LD also maintains an ambiguous affiliation with the CCP International Department, which is responsible for party-to-party relations around the world. Formed in 1951, the CCP International Liaison Department (CCP/ILD) was initially responsible for promoting Marxist-Leninist ideology and managing relations with Comintern members. During the Cultural Revolution, CCP/ILD was staffed in large part by the CID and PLA. Over the years, CCP/ILD expanded its scope to include interactions with a broad array of political parties and has played a leading role in China’s relations with North Korea. Prominent figures who have directed the CCP International Department include Geng Biao (1971-1979), Ji Pengfei (1979-1982), and Dai Bingguo (1997-2003). Its principle platform for exchanges is the China Association for International Understanding (CAFIU), which was formed in 1981.252

As a final note, implying a need to improve coordination among various components of the CCP external affairs system, Yang Jiechi argued in August 2013:253

To better coordinate the country's domestic and international agenda, the Party Central Committee attaches great importance to a holistic management of foreign affairs. It calls for balanced considerations, overall planning, unified command and coordinated implementation. It requires the central and local governments, non-governmental organizations and all foreign-related agencies to work together to form synergy, with each performing their respective functions. We should fully motivate all the parties involved and spark their creativity, and at the same time subject their activities to the unified management guided by national interests.

State Security System

GPD also appears to have a symbiotic relationship with the state security system. The state security system is managed by the Central Political-Legal Committee. In years past, the secretary of the Political-Legal Committee was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. In 2012, however, the secretary position was downgraded to Politburo member level. The deputy secretary carries a State Councilor rank and is dual hatted as Minister of Public Security. GPD Deputy Director GEN Du Jincai serves as the PLA representative on the Central Political Legal Committee. The commander of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) is also a member, as well as Minister of State Security and senior representatives of the justice system.254

Given common roots tracing back to the 1930s, GPD liaison work and MSS operations may sometimes be indistinguishable. The MSS was formed in June 1983 through the merger of the CID and counterintelligence elements of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).255 MSS collects, analyzes, and reports intelligence through overt and clandestine means. It promotes CCP ideals and policies. Before 1979, the CCP’s state security system also managed day to day Taiwan policy affairs.256

Like other foreign intelligence services, MSS may manipulate international perceptions, and discredit foreign government policies deemed threatening to Chinese interests.257 However, a preliminary review of publicly available data offers few indications of a dedicated influence operations organization within the MSS. One exception may be the MSS propaganda bureau,
which may engage in clandestine operations – although its scope of responsibility is uncertain. \(^{258}\) Advocates have proposed establishing an MSS bureau dedicated to active measures. MSS foreign exchange platforms include the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and the China International Culture Exchange Center (CICEC).\(^{259}\)
CONCLUSION

All governments seek to shape the international environment in accordance with national interests. Exercised when overt public diplomacy is insufficient by itself, political warfare is the employment of instruments of national power – short of war – to achieve foreign policy goals. Political warfare seeks to reframe perceptions of objective reality. The importance of political warfare in the PRC’s approach to foreign affairs international relations stems from the authoritarian nature of its political system. Chinese political warfare seeks to shore up legitimacy domestically, reframe international rules of the road, and promote alternatives to widely accepted universal values. This study offers a tentative baseline for understanding the potential role of organized political warfare in PRC security policy, its relevance in evaluating intentions and capabilities, and in assessing its effectiveness.

GPD/LD evolved from Civil War-era enemy work and liaison work, which sowed dissent among enemies, consolidated links with friends within a united front, and strived to win over those in the middle. Guided by the doctrinal principle of “aligning with friends and disintegrating enemies,” contemporary political warfare augments people-to-people, government-to-government, and party-to-party relations to promote CCP political legitimacy and defend against perceived threats to state security. GPD liaison work develops and sustains rapport with international elites, targets the integrity of coalitions and individuals perceived as inimical to PRC interests.

GPD/LD and affiliated platforms play critical roles in reframing broader concepts of world order and undermining the political legitimacy of elected leaders on Taiwan. At the strategic level, a core PLA political warfare mission is countering perceived political challenges that liberal democratic systems, universal values, and Western culture pose to CCP legitimacy within China itself and the broader international community. Contemporary CCP anxiety is rooted in part in former U.S. Secretary of State John Dulles’s promotion in 1953 for “peaceful evolution,” rather than military violence, to promote individual liberty around the world.260

As an example of recent anxiety, Hu Jintao warned in a January 2012 Qiushi editorial that international hostile forces are waging cultural and ideological warfare “to Westernize and divide China.”261 The United States in particular is singled out as an ideological adversary. A January 2013 Renmin Ribao editorial noted, “after the torch of Western civilization was passed to the United States, universal values have been used more frequently to ensure U.S. hegemony.”

As a result, CCP leaders undertake active measures to shape the international system in its image in order to ensure state security. The “China model” of authoritarian development is marketed as an alternative to the Western model of liberal democracy. As former Hudson Institute scholar Christopher Ford noted in an August 2013 presentation, Chinese analysts believe that the U.S. and Western countries have dictated the normative order of the
international system. Senior CCP leaders seek to reshape the global order in a manner more consistent with Chinese interests. Economic, cultural, political and military power, guided by doctrinal concepts such as the “Three Warfares,” is critical for expanding and strengthening PRC global influence and mitigating challenges to political legitimacy.\textsuperscript{263}

While the United States is viewed as an ideological adversary, Taiwan remains the central focus of PLA political warfare. GPD/LD is a principle combatant in a coercive persuasion campaign intended to reframe international perceptions of “One China” and undermine Taiwan’s legitimacy within the international community.

The objective reality is that Taiwan, under its current ROC constitutional framework, exists as an independent, sovereign state. The two equally legitimate governments – the PRC and ROC – are currently committed to One China principles, under which they exercise exclusive administrative jurisdiction over the territory under their respective control, with neither side subordinate to the other. In the context of the U.S. "One China" policy, a “One China, Two Governments” framework may serve as the most accurate representation of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

However, from Beijing’s perspective, Taiwan’s democratic government – an alternative to mainland China’s authoritarian model – presents an existential challenge to the CCP’s monopoly on domestic political power. With political legitimacy in the Taiwan Strait viewed as a zero-sum game, authorities in Beijing have long sought the political subordination of Taiwan under a “One Country, Two Systems” principle. The resolution of cross-Strait differences is constrained without broad acknowledgement if not recognition of the ROC’s legitimacy within the international community.\textsuperscript{264} In the near term, GPD/LD appears focused on creating the conditions for early initiation of cross-Strait political negotiations on terms favorable to the CCP.

GPD/LD functions as an interlocking directorate that synchronizes relevant party organs, state bureaucracies, military communities, commercial enterprises, and informal networks of prominent elites. In performing its mission, GPD/LD leverages a diverse set of non-governmental platforms in performing its mission. Organizations such as CAIFC and CAPCC appear under direct GPD/LD management. Other platforms with GPD links are more opaque. A stridently anti-American platform – the Dongfang Yi Cultural Expansion Association – appears to support GPD in development of concepts associated with “Three Warfares” and advance Chinese nationalism. Themes promoted by other platforms, such as the China Energy Fund Committee and Nishan Forum, include the de-ideologization of state-to-state relations and commonalities among the world’s civilizations and cultures. While all support GPD’s political warfare mission, themes propagated by associations such as Dongfang Yi stand in sharp contrast to other non-governmental organizations calling for cultural unity among the world’s civilizations.\textsuperscript{265}
Under the principle of “using foreign strength to propagandize for China,” GPD/LD seeks to build and sustain friendly relations with prominent opinion leaders who may be willing and capable of influencing public discourse in a manner conducive to Beijing’s political-military interests. GPD/LD leverages organic intelligence, and likely is a prominent consumer of intelligence produced by MSS, GSD Second Department, and GSD Third Department signals intelligence and cyber reconnaissance. Operating at a nexus of politics, finance, military operations, and intelligence, GPD/LD amplifies or attenuates the political effects of the military instrument of national power.

Based on preliminary social network analysis, senior personalities with no apparent formal party, government, or military position appear integral to the CCP’s political warfare strategy. For example, former NPC Vice Chairman Xu Jialu was a driving force behind establishment of Confucius Institutes around the world. Today, he serves as a senior CAIFC advisor and chairs the PLA’s principle cross-Strait platform – GPD/LD’s China Association for Promotion of Chinese Culture. He presides over the Nishan Forum on World Civilizations, and chairs the China Energy Fund Committee’s advisory board and Institute of Culture. He also is honorary chairman of the UFWD’s China Council for Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification. Xu Jialu is also known for being one of the first to advance the notion that generals on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese military officers.266

Because public information is limited, assessments regarding the effectiveness of PLA political warfare can be a speculative endeavor. Measures of effectiveness are inherently subjective. A detailed understanding of GPD/LD is complicated by extensive use of pseudonyms and multiple associations of its senior members. While its infrastructure targeting Taiwan appears expansive, at least one assessment noted the limited effectiveness of Chinese propaganda over the past several decades.267 Regardless, autocratic regimes, in comparison to democracies, may enjoy a relative advantage in the ability to mobilize and focus resources needed to manipulate perceptions and influence foreign policies.

PLA political warfare shares common roots with the former Soviet Union. Similar to the former Soviet Union, the CCP augments diplomacy with active measures in order to influence perceptions of foreign audiences and policies. A prominent characteristic of Soviet active measures program was centralization and integration under the KGB. By contrast, no single authority, with the exception of the Politburo Standing Committee, appears to enjoy an exclusive monopoly over political warfare. Civilian bureaucracies, such as the UFWD, External Propaganda Office, CCP/ID, and the MSS all appear to play a role.

GPD/LD’s ability to bridge various communities within China’s fragmented system should not be overestimated. The degree of control that GPD or other propaganda-related organizations exercise over domestic opinion leaders and bureaucracies remains uncertain. Absolute control over information and economic activity is neither possible nor necessary. GPD likely guides or manages relevant discourse, perhaps selectively suppressing or reshaping news and information as required. The system likely relies upon informal corporatist rules, where actors may operate with significant autonomy within set limits. Loyalty to the ruling party may be rewarded and those who contradict party lines may be punished.268
Finally, U.S. policy makers may find value in a reinvigorated capacity to counter those who promote visions for an international order that are contrary to American interests and ideals. Citing the stagnation of U.S. political warfare skills since the end of the Cold War, prominent opinion leaders have indeed advocated in favor of enhancing our ability to win hearts and minds in the Middle East context. China’s experience in political warfare may be instructive as well.269
Author Biographies

Mark A. Stokes is the Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute. A twenty-year U.S. Air Force veteran, Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Stokes served as Team Chief and Senior Country Director for the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He also was assistant air attaché at the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Beijing and served as a signals intelligence officer at Clark AB, Philippines and in West Berlin, Germany. Prior to co-founding Project 2049, he was Vice President and Taiwan Country Manager for Raytheon International. He has served as Executive Vice President of Laifu Trading Company, a subsidiary of the Rehfeldt Group; and was a member of the Board of Governors of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan. He holds a BA from Texas A&M University and graduate degrees in International Relations and Asian Studies from Boston University and the Naval Postgraduate School. He has working proficiency in Mandarin.

Russell Hsiao is a Non Resident Senior Fellow with the Project 2049 Institute. He was the Editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation from October 2007-July 2011. Prior to that, he served as a Special Associate/Program Officer in the International Cooperation Department at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy in Taipei, and a Researcher at The Heritage Foundation. Mr. Hsiao received his B.A in International Studies from the American University’s School of International Service and the University Honors Program. He is a member of the Young Leaders' Program of the Honolulu-based think tank Pacific Forum CSIS. Mr. Hsiao is proficient in Mandarin Chinese and learning Korean.
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ENDNOTES

1 The authors wish to thank John Corbett and other reviewers who offered useful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. All errors are the responsibility of the authors alone.


3 In accordance with the PRC’s 1982 constitution, a state CMC also exists under the authority of the National People’s Congress (NPC) that is equal in status to the State Council. In reality and like many similar organs in China’s party-state system, the party CMC and state CMC are the same organization with two signs (一个机构, 两个牌子) with the CMC party status carrying the most weight.


5 Among various sources, see J. Michael Waller, Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare (Wash DC: Institute of World Politics Press, 2008).


17 Another second level department, the GPD Traitor Elimination Department (锄奸部), theoretically could be considered to have engaged in covert underground work. The organization was responsible for rooting out intelligence operatives and other security risks. The Traitor Elimination Department evolved into the GPD Security Department. See K. M. Lawson, “The Enemy and Puppet Work Bureau in Shandong,” at http://www.froginawell.net/china/2012/06/winning-over-the-puppets-intro/. Chinese for Enemy Work Section is 敌军工作科.

18 For an excellent historical account of enemy work and the Enemy Work Department (敌军工作部; or 敌工部 for short), see K. M. Lawson, Winning Over and Reforming the Puppet Armies of Shandong, China, 1937-1947; Dai Yuyang (戴玉刚), Secret War in the Taihang Mountains (太行山上的秘密战), undated, at http://bz.cctd.com.cn/shtml/szbz1/20121218/157827.shtml; Xu Zehao, From Captives to Comrades: Commemorating Enemy Work of the Eight Route Army and New Fourth Army (从俘虏到战友：记八路军 新四军的敌军工作) (Hefei: Anhui People’s Press, 2005), at http://book.ln.chaoxing.com/ebook/detail_11531096.html; Zhang Yanzuo, (抗战前八路军对日军的宣传战研究), China-Japan Network, August 10, 2011, at http://www.sjhistory.net/site/newsh/vjzt8-3mb_a2011081042171.htm; and Edward C. O'Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War (New York: Routledge Press, 2007), pp. 22-23. Major Eighth Route Army units included the 115th, 120th, and 129th Divisions. After 1941, the New Fourth Army included the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions. Wang Hongqin (汪洪清; 1911-1990) had briefly directed the New Fourth Army Enemy Work Department. In 1937, Pan Zhenwu (潘振武; 1908-1988) directed the 115th Division Enemy Work Department and was succeeded by Wang Liren (王立人; 1910-1941) and Shi Xinan (石新安; 1907-1978). Zhang Zizhen directed the 115th Division Enemy Work Department by 1943, and continued in the position after its conversion to the Shandong MR Enemy Work Department. Deng Xiaoping was political commissar of the 129th Division. Directors of the 129th Enemy Work Department included Zeng Chuanliu (曾传六; 1904-1983); Xiang Benli (项本立; 1911-1964); and Zhang Xiangshan (张香山; 1904-1999). Zhang Xiangshan eventually became deputy director of the Eight Route Army (Field) Enemy Work Department. Under leadership of Gan Siqi (甘泗淇; 甘泗奇; 1903-1964), 120th Division Enemy Work Department directors included: Wu Xi (吴西; 1900-2005), Chen Zhong (陈钟; 1903-1982), and He Hui (何辉; 1911-1996). Xie Zhenhua (谢振华; 1916-2011) was a GPD Enemy Work Department deputy director.

19 Liu Guanli eventually became East China Military Region Political Department Enemy Work Department director. For reference to Li Zhihu, see “Li Zhihu: Making Enemy Work the First Line Against the Japanese” (林植夫：把敌军工作做到对日作战第一线), CCP News Network, October 26, 2012, at http://www.haijiangzx.com/2012/celebrity_1026/30666.html. Qi Kechang (漆克昌; 1910-1988), was also educated in Japan, directed the Eighth Route Army (Field) Enemy Work Department, and the Second Field Army’s political work department after 1949. Yang Songqing (杨松青; 1903-1977) was Second Field Army Political Department Enemy Work Department director.

Among various sources, see Wang Jianying, “Structure and Change in Eighth Route Army and CMC Political Work” (八路军和中共中央军委政治工作机构的演变), Studies on the Anti-Japanese War, February 1994, pp. 109-120, at http://jds.cass.cn/UploadFiles/zyk/2010/12/201012141650291802.pdf; “Eighth Route Army History, November 1938” (八路军简史, 1938年11月), Eight Route Army Taihang Memorial Hall website, March 23, 2010, at http://www.balujiun.org/blsh/bljs/1610.html. Also see “Central Committee Instructions Regarding Expanding Friendships with Friendly Militaries” (中央关于扩大交朋友工作的指示), Theoretical Political Learning, August 19, 1940, at http://202.198.141.1/lstd/lstdview.asp?id=18078. Liu Jian (刘建; 1906-1981), who initially directed the Enemy Work Section, took over the GPD Liaison Department Friendly Military Section. In 1940, Tan Zheng replaced Wang Ruofei upon the latter’s assignment to direct the CCP Secretariat. Wang Ruofei was part of a team negotiating a political settlement with KMT leaders in April 1946. Wang, along with Ye Ting (叶挺; 1896-1946), Bo Gu (博古; 1907-1946), Deng Fa (邓发; 1906-1946), and others, died in a plane crash while flying from Chungqing to Yan’an. After establishment of the CCP Northeast Bureau in August 1945, Zou Dapeng had become director of a Liaison Department under bureau’s cognizance.


Cai Xiaoqian (蔡孝乾; 蔡孝干; 1908-1982) used Cai Qian (蔡乾/蔡前) and Yang Ming (杨明) as pseudonyms. Among multiple sources referencing the Taiwan Work Committee, see “Communist China’s ‘Taiwan Provincial Committee’ Incident” (中共‘台湾省工委’事件), Huaxia Jingwei, June 5, 2003, at http://www.huaxia.com/lasd/tzwzl/zzsj/2003/06/472547.html.

The PLA Third Field Army’s Ninth Corps had primary responsibility for deliberate planning. Wu Xian (吴宪; 1915-2001), father of PLA Navy Commander ADM Wu Shengli, was deputy director of the New Fourth Army Fourth Division Enemy Work Department. He then directed the Third Field Army Political Department Enemy Work/Liaison Department. Chen Zesheng (陈泽生) and Hong Youqiao (洪幼樵; or 刘志敬) served as CCP Taiwan Work Committee deputy secretary generals. For a detailed summary of CCP underground operations on Taiwan, see Tseng Chien-yuan, “Communist Underground on Taiwan” (中共地下党在台湾), Beijing Spring, November 1, 2009, at http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=3458.

Cai Xiao was born in Tainan, and became involved in Chinese underground work during the civil war. In November 1949, Cai Xiao was given the responsibility for forming the PLA Third Field Army Ninth Corps Taiwan Cadre Training Regiment (台湾干部训练团). The training unit formally began instruction on April 8, 1950. After serving in the PLA Air Force education and training system, he was jailed for nine years during the Cultural Revolution. Afterwards, he was assigned to the GPD Mass Works Department and then GPD/LD deputy director in 1975. He retired from active duty, and then became chairman of the Taiwanese Alliance (台湾民主自治同盟) in 1978. Among various sources, see 蔡啸, 1919-1990, CCP News, at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/7302326.html. Other key players included Zhang Bingyu (张秉玉; 1919-1989); Wang Xiulan (王秀兰), who conducted in operations on Taiwan between 1946 and 1949; and Wang Guanmin (王冠民; b. 1915), who had been sent to Taiwan in early 1947.

In addition to Deputy Minister of Defense Wu Shi (吴石; 1894-1950), other senior operatives who were arrested included Nie Xi (聂曦; 1917-1950), Chen Baocang (陈宝仓; 1900-1950) of the KMT Revolutionary Committee, and Zhu Feng (朱锋; also known as Zhu Chengzhi). In the aftermath, the CMC established the General Intelligence Department on December 10, 1950 and consisted of three second level departments: the Intelligence Department (情报部), Technical Department (技术部), and Liaison Department. In February 1953, the General Intelligence Department staff was disbanded.

After serving under Zhang Zizhen as GPD/LD deputy director and promotion to major general in 1955, Wang Xinggang eventually became deputy director of the CMC General Office under Xiao Xiangrong (萧向荣; 1910～1976) until 1965. He was replaced by Pan Zhenwu, a former enemy work specialist and defense attaché in Moscow. Pan also was MND Foreign Affairs Bureau director. Among various sources, see (周恩来秘书领导段伯宇周郁于国民党上层人物之间), CCP News Network, January 21, 2010, at http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/146570/180163/10814313.html.
Another prominent enemy work officer was Huang Yuan (黄远; 1911-1992), served simultaneously as deputy director of the Third Field Army Liaison Department and Propaganda Department.

\[29\] The General Intelligence Department was established in December 1950. It oversaw three second level departments: the Intelligence Department, the Technical Department, and the Liaison Department. At least one account asserts that the GSD Intelligence Department and GSD Liaison Department were used to refer to the same organization. Liu Kenong was dual-hatted as director of the General Intelligence Department and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Liu Shaowen (刘少文; 1905-1987; also known as 刘国章), who had previously been assigned to the Eighth Route Army's Shanghai Liaison Office, directed the GSD Intelligence Department from 1954 to 1967.

\[30\] Wang Jiaxiang was dual-hatted as director of GPD and director of the Eighth Route Army Political Department. He was appointed as ambassador to the USSR in 1949. He returned to form the CCP International Liaison Department (ILD) in 1951. Former director of the 129th Division Enemy Work Department, Zhang Xiangshan, served as Wang Jiaxiang’s mishu and eventually ILD deputy director. Feng Xuan (冯铉; 1915-1986), who emerged from the Social Work Department, was another ILD deputy director. GPD Enemy Work Department deputy director Li Chuli (李初黎; 李楚离 1900-1995; also known as 李祚利) also played a critical role in CCP/ILD’s establishment. The core of the newly established ILD was the UFWD’s Second Office (中央统战部二处). See (中联部前部长朱良：试析指导党的对外工作战略思想的变化), CCP/ID website, October 17, 2010, at http://www.idcpc.org.cn/ziliao/tbtj/100917.htm.

\[31\] Working closely with CCP General Office Director Yang Shangkun, Li Kenong was assigned as the first CID director. Former Eighth Route Army Liaison Department officer Zou Dapeng (邹大鹏; 1907-1967) served as CID deputy director.


\[33\] At roughly the same time, CID was resubordinated under the GSD Second Department. See Dr. David Ian Chambers, The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography, *Studies in Intelligence* Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 31-46; and Xuezhi Guo, China’s Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 16.

\[34\] After joining the CCP in 1936, Yang Side directed enemy work operations in his native Shandong Province with the Eighth Route Army’s 115th Division, and became political commissar of the 34th Army’s 101st Division, which consisted of a combined force of KMT defectors and communists. His pseudonym was Li Yiming (李一明). Yang was promoted to major general and assigned as GPD/LD Deputy Director in 1964. He concurrently managed Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao operations as GPD/LD Guangzhou Liaison Bureau. MG Yang Side was appointed as GPD/LD Director in July 1975. Other prominent figures during this period included Shen Chen (沈辰; b. 1922), also known as Li Jiadian (李家田) who directed operations from Guangzhou from 1972 onward (he was Mass Works Department deputy director). He retired as a consultant in 1987. For other background on Yang Side, see “Subversion” General Yang Side” (“策反”将军杨斯德), Shandong Archival Information Network, March 30, 2012, at http://www.sdab.gov.cn/daj/daby/daldgs/webinfo/2012/03/113269152704077714.htm.

\[35\] Ye Jianying (叶剑英; 1897-1986) was born in Guangdong’s Meixian Hakka community, and was a critical player in the transfer of power to Hua Guofeng in the wake of Mao’s death in 1976. He succeeded Lin Biao as Minister of Defense in 1976. Yang Shangkun was a CMC member after the Cultural Revolution, and appointed to the Politburo in 1982. He served in Guangdong, along with Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun.

\[36\] See You Ji and Daniel Alderman, “Changing Civil-Military Relations in China,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (eds), The PLA At Home And Abroad: Assessing The Operational Capabilities Of China’s Military, pp. 166-167.

For a discussion of the China model (中国模式) and the international communist movement, see "Exploratory Road of the CCP and the International Communist Movement" (中共与国际共运的探索之路), Xinhua, June 21, 2011, [link](http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2011-06/21/c_13933387.htm).


Huang Hua (黄华); also known as Wang Rumei was Ye Jianying’s mishu, and adopted a clear foreign affairs portfolio.

For an excellent summary, see Christine Loh, *Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), p. 94-144.

Xi Zhongxun is the father of CCP General Secretary and CMC Chairman Xi Jinping. Ji Pengfei is father of then-GSD Second Department Director, MG Ji Shengde. A PLA veteran and oil industry authority, Yu Qiuli replaced General Wei Guoxing as GPD Director in September 1982. Wei Guoxing was allegedly dismissed in the lead up to the 12th Party Congress for permitting the PLA Daily to publish an editorial that was critical of Deng Xiaoping’s reformist agenda, referring to his "bourgeois liberalism" and ideological laxness. The paper was forced to issue a retraction. See Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, “China’s Liberation Army,” *Christian Science Monitor*, July 25, 1983. See “CAIFC Established in Beijing” (中国国际友好联络会在京成立), *Renmin Ribao*, December 22, 1984. CAIFC’s first honorary chairman was hardline Politburo member, Wang Zhen.

Ye Xuanning is alleged to be a distant cousin of Yu Shengzheng (from his mother’s side). Ye used an alternate name of Yue Feng (岳枫) for CAIFC and other associations. For background, see “Ye Xuanning,” Guangdong Hakka Chamber of Commerce website, undated, at [link](http://www.zhhs.org/article.aspx?aid=269). For an excellent account, see Christine Loh, *Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), p. 94-144.


From 1982 to 1987, Wang Zhen (王震; b. 1908) directed the Central Party School, and became Vice-President in
Rong Yiren (荣毅仁; b. 1916), who represented one of the few wealthy families to remain in China after the CCP took power in 1949, was chairman of the China Unification Promotion Council and CPPCC Vice Chairman. Working closely with Deng Xiaoping’s inner circle, Rong Yiren established a flagship enterprise in January 1979 – the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). The Hong Kong agreement was followed in 1987 with the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macau signed by PRC and Portuguese representatives. Wang Zhen’s son, Wang Jun (王军), served as the initial CEO of Poly Technologies of behalf of GSD. Another PLA company was Xinshidai (New Era).

48 Among various sources discussing Carrie Enterprises Group (中国凯利实业有限公司), see Tai Ming Cheung, China's Entrepreneurial Army (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 140-145; and James C. Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 1978-1998 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 121-123. The Hong Kong listed company was Hong Kong Macau International Holdings, which changed its name to Po Wing Kwan in late 1997. Other Carrie-affiliated enterprises included Tiancheng (中国天诚集团), HMH Gold Mining in Australia, and Hong Kong Macau Holdings, which invested in luxury real estate development in Guangdong Province. One other subsidiary is said to include the China Jinqiao Travel Company (中国金桥旅游总公司), which was established in 1986. Another is the Beijing Fishing Supplies Company (北京碧海钓具有限公司), which was established by Jin Li in 1988. See its website at http://www.bjbhdj.com/webcontent/default.asp?pageID=4.

49 Since 1955, the TALSG Office had been staffed largely by officers from the Central Investigation Department (CID), the precursor of today’s Ministry of State Security (MSS). Luo Qingchang (罗青长; b. 1918), father of outspoken AMS authority, MG (ret) Luo Yuan, had been a central figure in the TAO until the Central Investigation Department’s reorganization and establishment of the MSS in 1983. Huangpu graduate Yang Yindong (杨荫东; b. 1922) retired in 1985, and served as deputy director and secretary general of the Huangpu Alumni Association. His son is said to be Yang Yuanyuan (杨元元; b. 1951), an PLAAF-trained pilot and prominent figure within the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). At least one report asserts that Yang Side was dual hatted as TALSG Office director and UFWD deputy director.

50 Zhou Enlai’s wife, Deng Yingchao (邓颖超; 1904-1992), directed the TALSG from 1978 to 1985, when she was replaced by Yang Shangkun. New members included Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Zheng Tuopin, Deputy Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen, Minister of State Security (MSS) Jia Chunwang, and Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and Zhao Fusian.

51 Among various sources, see David M. Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 299-300. Assisting Yang Side was UFWD Deputy Director Liao Chengzhi (廖承志; 1908-1983), a former head of the Xinhua News Agency who had risen through the ranks of the united front system. Born in Japan and with Hakka roots in Guangdong, Liao was a Taiwan expert who served as chief negotiator in talks with the UK on the future of Hong Kong. Liao Chengzhi’s son, Liao Hui (廖晖; b. 1942), is said to have begun his party career as a GPD/LD cadre, and subsequently assigned as deputy director of the Hong Kong Macau Affairs office in 1983. He was appointed director in 1984.

52 Deng Xiaoping initiated the “One Country, Two Systems” solution in 1979. Under the proposal, governing authorities on Taiwan would retain an autonomous political, economic, military, and legal system as a special administrative region under the PRC central government. In March 1981, ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo outlined pre-conditions for unification based upon Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People: democracy, freedom, and prosperity.

53 Jin Li was an ethnic Korean who directed GPD/LD from March 1985 to his passing in June 1990. He was a Japan specialist, and a member of the Chinese Red Cross (中国红十字会), Jin Li also was a member of the Foreign Affairs Association (外交学会), China-Japan Association for Friendly Contact (中日友协副秘书长), CAIFC executive deputy director, and China Diaoyu Association (中国钓鱼协会). For reference to his tenure as Executive Deputy Director of CAIFC, see http://www.caifc.org.cn/content.aspx?id=397. At least two GPD/LD deputy directors supported Jin Li during his tenure. One was MG Su Zhenxiang (苏祯祥; b. 1930), who headed the GPD/LD Liaison Bureau, and subsequently served as GPD/LD Deputy Director. He retired in 1988.

54 In the lead up to the 70th anniversary of the ROC founding, the CCP’s Ye Jianying issued an invitation to KMT leaders in 1981. In August 1981, CCK’s former mishu, Shen Cheng, accepted. Shen had moved to Hong Kong in 1980. See “Yang Side To Be Named Chief of Taiwan Affairs Office,” Hong Kong Standard, February 25, 1988, p. 6. Directing the TALSG from 1987 to 1992, Yang Shangkun became PRC president in 1988 and expanded the group’s membership.
His half-brother, Yang Baibing (杨白冰; 1920-2013), was appointed Director, General Political Department in 1987.


51 Among various sources, see Jing Huang and Xiaoting Li, p. 146. Meetings in Beijing involved CMC Vice Chairman Yang Shangkun, GPD/LD Director Ye Xuanning, another senior GPD/LD officer, MG Chang Yansheng (常燕生), as well as Taiwan-focused GPD specialists such as Shen Weiping and Xin Qi. Chang Yansheng had been labeled as GPD/LD “Taiwan Bureau” director (总政联络部对台局局长). See “Singing to Leap Across the Taiwan Strait” (长歌越海峡), Zhongguang Network, November 2, 2006, at http://www.cnr.cn/zhuanji//2005q/zgzy//200512/t20051227_504147176.html. The Taiwan Bureau most likely is an alternative reference to the GPD/LD Liaison Bureau. A Hong Kong-based report of unknown reliability asserts that Taiwan and an unidentified Nanjing MR office established a defense telephone link, or “hotline,” in the mid-1990s.

52 With roots in Hebei’s Fengrun County, Wang Zhaoguo was an engineer who graduated from the Harbin Institute of Technology. He worked in the automotive industry until 1982, when he caught the attention of Deng Xiaoping. He was assigned as China Communist Youth League (CCYL) First Secretary, served as assistant to Hu Jintao, and elected as a Central Committee member (the youngest on the committee). In 1985 and 1986, he served as mishu to CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang, a revolutionary hero and leading proponent of economic reforms, and Director, CCP Central Committee General Office. A decade after Hu stepped down as CCP Secretary General in January 1987, Wang Zhaoguo lost his Central Committee seat and was assigned as Fujian Provincial Party Committee Deputy Secretary and Governor. During this period, Xi Jinping was serving as Ningde County Party Committee Secretary and Jia Qinglin served as second Party Committee Secretary, directing the Party Committee Organization Department. Wang Zhaoguo was also served as UFWD Director from 1992-2002.

53 Lena Sun, “Deng Completes Major Army Purge,” New York Times, February 12, 1993. Former Nanjing MR Political Department Director, Yu Yongbo (于永波; b. 1939), was assigned as GPD Director in 1992. In January 1994, Jiang Zemin and his formal cross-Strait negotiator, Wang Daohan, opened a new back channel for communication. Central Committee General Office Director Zeng Qinghong, a protégé of former GPD Director Yu Qiuli and close associate of Jiang Zemin and Wang Daohan, reportedly led the efforts. On April 4, 1994, Lee Teng-hui’s office director first met with Zeng Qinghong. During the meeting in Zhuhai, Taiwan interlocutors had been authorized to raise a notional peace accord, which Zeng rebuffed as tantamount to a state-to-state agreement. In March 1995, he said to have been pre-briefed on the proposed travel of Lee to the Middle East and the United States. As an aside, Zeng Qinghong was mishu to Yu Qiuli when he directed the State Planning Commission in the late 1970s/early 1980s. This was the same period as Xi Jinping was supporting Geng Biao.

54 Xiong Guangkai became GSD Intelligence Department director in 1988, then promoted to assistant to the Chief of the General Staff in 1992. After promotion to LTG and election as an alternate Central Committee member in 1994, Xiong became DCGOS in January 1996. Despite Jiang’s support for Xiong, Xu Yongyue was appointed as director of MSS in March 1998. Xu served as mishu, or more specifically as office director, to Chen Yun between 1983 and 1993. Chen Yun was Central Discipline Commission Secretary between 1978 and 1987. Xu Yongyue also had served as deputy secretary general of the Central Advisory Commission. Among various sources, see Peter Mattis, “China’s Intelligence Reforms? The Diplomat, January 23, 2013, at http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-intelligence-reforms/.

Operating out of Xiamen, founder and chairman of Yuanhua Group (远华集团) Lai Changxing, imported foreign products such as cars, cigarettes, and petroleum products. An initial victim in the scandal was GSD Second Department Director, MG Ji Shengde (姬胜德). He was called to an enlarged CMC meeting at Beijing’s Yuquan Mountain in March 1999, and subsequently arrested. The following month, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (中纪委) established a task force, known as the 420 Program Office (四二 O 专题组), to investigate the Yuanhua case in further detail. Ji Shengde’s father, Ji Pengfei, was an esteemed foreign affairs figure. Ji Shengde was sentenced to death in August 1999. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 2002. Fleeing to Hong Kong in August 1999, and subsequently to Canada, Lai Changxing was extradited in July 2011. At the height of Lai’s corruption in the 1990s, the Fujian party chief was Jia Qinglin and Xi Jinping was the Fujian governor. In an interview, Lai Changxing (赖昌星) highlighted the role of a GPD case officer, Wu Dahu (吴大潮). Also see James Mulvenon, “To Get Rich Is Unprofessional: Chinese Military Corruption in the Jiang Era,” China Leadership Monitor 6 (2003): 21–35.


For reference to Carrie’s southern China operations merger with Huaneng, see Tai Ming Cheung, China’s Entrepreneurial Army (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 238-239. Po Wing Kwan International (Holdings) Ltd (宝荣坤国际控股有限公司) changed its name to China Land Group Ltd on May 23, 2000. Oei Hong Leong (黄鸿年) served as CEO. The transaction was facilitated by the China Strategic Holdings’ subsidiary, China WTO.com. China Strategic Holdings (CSH; 中策集团有限公司) was formerly known as China Internet Global Alliance Limited. For other background, see (负债不抵债 中国凯利实业 1元转让), China Securities News, March 15, 2010, at http://finance.ce.cn/rolling/20100315/t20100315_15606665.shtml. Carrie subsidiaries include Kaicheng International Engineering, Co (凯城国际工程公司). See http://company.stcn.com/content/2012-05/04/content_5538451_4.htm. Carrie Group today is managed by Ye Xuanning’s son, Ye Hong (叶弘). See http://www.carriefund.com/channel-10.html. After SASAC-owned companies were directed out of the real estate business in 2010, the Carrie Group and 13 subsidiaries began operating at a loss.

During Liang Hongchang’s tenure, at least three deputy directors of GPD/LD included MG Zeng Xiaodong (曾小东; b. 1948); MG Shen Yunliang (沈云良; b. 1951); and possibly Shi Chenglin (石成林; b. 1950). Zeng Xiaodong’s father is allegedly Zeng Xisheng (曾希圣; 1904-1968), one of the leading figures in establishment of the PLA’s intelligence community. Zeng Xiaodong was promoted to major general in 2002. With mandatory retirement age for a deputy corps leader being 55, and assuming a five year time in service requirement after promotion, Zeng likely retired in 2007. Born in Beijing and promoted to MG in July 2001, Shen Yunliang (also known as Luo Sunshan; 落孙山) was in the position in the 2000 timeframe, promoted to MG in 2001, and most likely retired in 2007. MG (ret) Du Rubo (杜


71 Ibid.


73 Yue Zhongqiang, pp. 139-140.


75 Yue Zhongqiang, pp. 137-139.

76 Ibid.


78 Yue Zhongqiang, pp. 140-141. For one outlet carrying commentary of officers who most likely are supporting ideological defense, see the “Strong Country Blog,” at http://qgblog.people.com.cn/military/.


81 For background on small leading groups (领导小组), see Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 26, at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM26AM.pdf.
Born in Henan’s Ye County, General Jia Ting’an began his professional career as a civilian in the electronics industry, and served as mishu to Jiang Zemin while Minister of Electronics. Jia accompanied Jiang to Shanghai in 1985, and served as his mishu between 1985 and 1989. Jia accompanied Jiang back to Beijing, and served as his mishu after the latter’s election as Secretary General. In 1994, Jia was assigned as deputy director of the CMC General Office. He was appointed as a member of the 420 Investigation Group, charged with investigating the Yuanhua case in the 1999-2000 timeframe. He was an alternate member of the 17th Central Committee and elected as a full member of the 18th Central Committee. He was promoted to LTG in July 2005, and to full general in July 2011.

Dual hatted as secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Committee (央军委纪律检查委员会书记), Du Jincai previously served as deputy director, Xinjiang MD Political Department; Political Commissar, 21st Group Army (2005), then Chengdu MR Political Department Director (2006), and Assistant to the Director, GPD (2007). Du Jincai replaced ADM Dong Shiping (童世平; b. 1947).

Born in November 1952, GEN Wu Changde is from Dayu, Jiangxi Province. He rose through the propaganda work system. In the 1990s, he was deputy director of the 31st Group Army, then Nanjing Military Region Political Department deputy director. From 2003 to 2007, Wu Changde directed the GPD Propaganda Department. In 2007, he was assigned as director of the Chengdu MR Political Department. He subsequently rotated to the GPD deputy director position in 2011. He was promoted to full general in August 2013.

LTG Yin Fanglong was assigned as GPD deputy director in October 2012. He had headed the Second Artillery Political Department since 2009. Before his Second Artillery assignment, he worked in GAD and within the 1st Group Army 3rd Tank Division. During his Second Artillery assignment, Yin accompanied GEN Xu Caihou on his 2009 U.S. visit, including to U.S. Strategic Command. Yin was promoted to LTG in July 2010.

LTG Cui Changjun has spent most of his career in the Chengdu Military Region. His most recent assignments include political commissar of the 13th Group Army and director of the Beijing Military Region Political Department. He replaced Wei Liang (魏亮), who was appointed as political commissar of the Guangzhou Military Region.

VADM Cen Xu, who spent part of his career in the Navy Equipment Department and East Sea Fleet, replaced LTG Nian Fucun (年福纯; b. 1949), who retired. He is a member of the CCP Discipline Inspection Commission.

Units spend between 20 and 30 percent of their total training time on political and ideological instruction. See Also see Dennis J. Blasko, *The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century* (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 201.


Born in Wuchang County (Hebei Province), GEN Zhang Yang (张阳; b. 1951) was a political officer within the Guangzhou MR artillery community and served as political commissar of the 55th Group Army’s 163rd Division from 1996 to 2000. He then served as 42nd Group Army Political Department director and PC. From December 2004 to September 2007, he directed the Guangzhou MR Political Department, and subsequently served as political commissar of the Guangzhou MR. The previous GPD director was General Li Jinai (李继耐; b. 1942), who was in the position in September 2004. Having served in senior billets within Guangzhou MR, Zhang Yang likely became familiar with Zhang Dejiang. Zhang was a Standing Committee member, son of a prominent PLA artillery officer, and secretary general of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee between 2002 and 2007.

Based on number of foreign meetings arranged through CAIFC, GPD Deputy Director LTG Wu Changde’s portfolio includes foreign affairs. He has a background in propaganda work. Former GPD deputy director, Tang Tianbiao, appears to have had a similar portfolio. Tang is now a member of the NPC’s Education, Science, Culture and Public Health Committee, and still active in CAIFC activities as a consultant to the Hainan AIFC. GPD Deputy Secretary General (总政副秘书长) Li Fengshang (李凤山) is the mishu most often associated with GPD/LD and MND/FAO. Li Fengshang previously directed the GPD General Office Secretariat Bureau (总政办公厅秘书长). Major General Zhang Gongxian (张贡献; b. 1960) formerly served as GPD General Office Director and mishu to former GPD Director, General Xu Caihou. He currently directs the Jinan Military Region Political Department.

Qin Shengxiang has been in the military organization/party affairs system for most of his career.

The Propaganda Department consists of a Propaganda Bureau (宣传局); News Publication Bureau (新闻出版局); Theory and Education Bureau (理论教育局); Culture and Sports Bureau (文化体育局); and External Propaganda Bureau (对外宣传局). It also manages the CCTV Military Propaganda Center (中央人民广播电台军事宣传中心), which appears to be a corps deputy leader-level organization. The Center is directed by Senior Colonel Li Zhen (李真). Li Zhen formerly served as GPD Propaganda Department Deputy Director and External Propaganda Department Deputy Director.

MG Yu Shanjun (于善军; b. 1953) has directed the GPD Security Department since 2010. The Security Department’s Security Bureau (保卫局) appears responsible for crime prevention, counter-subversion, protection of military secrets, and background investigations. The Reconnaissance Bureau (侦察局) appears responsible for counterintelligence. A separate bureau is responsible for criminal investigations (刑侦局).


Sports and athletes are an important aspect of military political work. For example, speed skater Ye Qiaobao (叶乔波; b. 1964) is a retired PLA officer now serving as a GPD/LD specialist.

For example, Deputy Director, NDU Military Science Research Department, MG Wu Guifu (武桂馥) is a member of the GPD/LD advisory group (总政治部联络部咨询专家组). He was formerly Deputy Secretary General, China Military Science Association (中国军事科学学会). He also was a fellow at the Peterson Institute in Wash DC and Columbia University in the early 1990s.


One speculative reference asserts Xing was mishu to GPD/LD Deputy Director Chen Hua. In 1994 and as late as 1997, Chen Hua was a deputy director of CAIFC. A Chen Hua (陈华) is listed as a CAIFC member. MG Xing’s official biography indicates he also served as CEO of China Excel Finance (Holding) Company (中国华扬财务集团有限公司), which was registered in Hong Kong in 1996.

A report of unknown reliability speculated that a senior Taiwan political figure met with representatives from the Central Committee General Office in the run-up to the March 2000 Presidential election. The report mentioned in passing the involvement of an individual named Xing Yunming, who reportedly was affiliated with the Central Committee General Office. In 2000, Xing appears to have directed the GPD/LD Liaison Bureau, which is probably responsible for Taiwan-focused political warfare operations. See “KMT Launches Libel Suit Against Author of New Book” (国民党以诽谤罪起诉新书作者), Voice of America, August 15, 2003, at http://www.voachinese.com/content/a-


103 For background on Huaxia Jingwei (华夏经纬信息科技有限公司), see http://www.huaxia.com/.

104 As a side note, Xing Yunnung has been openly critical of senior provincial and maniple-level cadre presenting a negative international image. See “Xing Yunnung: Strengthen Leading Cadre Model Management When Traveling Abroad” (邢运明：加强领导干部出国规范管理), CPPCC website, March 26, 2013, at http://cppcc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0326/c34948-20918291.html.


106 Other sources reflect Wei Liqun (魏礼群; b. 1944) as State Council Research Office director between 2001 and 2008.


108 During a dialogue with retired US military officers in 2009, Li Xiaohua served as secretary general for the Chinese side, with Xiong Guangkai as delegation leader.

109 For reference to Chen Zuming (陈祖明; b. 1956) serving as GPD/LD Liaison Bureau director, see (与总政联络局陈祖明局长（中）中国金融书协主席张铜彦（左二）、在中国金融出版社), Artists Daily (书画名家报), May 25, 2010, at http://www.shmjbj.com/detail.asp?id=92. For a broad survey of CCP cross-strait strategy, see 台湾大劫难.

110 “Chen Zuming Elected as China Association of Southeast Asian Studies” (陈祖明秘书长当选中国东南亚研究会副会长), CAIFC Press Release, January 6, 2011, at http://www.caifc.org.cn/content.aspx?id=363. One other possible GPD/LD deputy director may be Zhao Lubo (赵鲁渤), who ostensibly was promoted to major general in 2013.

111 During a dialogue with retired US military officers in 2009, Li Xiaohua served as secretary general for the Chinese side, with Xiong Guangkai as delegation leader.

112 MG (ret) Shen Weiping formerly worked within the PLAAF Political Department Liaison Department before transferring to GPD/LD. In 2007, Shen Weiping worked closely with counterparts within the TAO on united front activities. In November 2007, then GPD Deputy Director MG Shen Weiping, Ye Kedong (叶克冬; b. 1953), and Zhou Wenzhong chaired the Global Summit for Promotion of Chinese Peaceful Unification (全球促进中国和平统一高峰论坛) in Washington DC. Among various sources, see Han Yuanxiu,“Speech for Global Summit for China Peaceful Unification” (在全球促进中国和平统一高峰论坛) at http://www.huaxia.com/zt/zhwh/11-016/2387083.html.


114 For reference to Xin Qi’s association with the Tsinghua International Broadcasting Research Center (清华大学国际
First Bureau is alleged to oversee sub-Institute in 1977. Upon graduation, he was assigned to the 61156 Unit in Guangzhou where he served as a deputy bureau director, then bureau director (most likely should read sub-bureau in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other cities. A Guangzhou Liaison


117 For an initial reference to a GPD/LD Liaison Bureau (联络局), or First Bureau, with a Taiwan responsibility, see (我校园台区域研究中心策划编辑的《台湾文献汇刊》出版座谈会在北京人民大会堂隆重举行), Fujian Normal University website, January 24, 2005, at http://www3.fjnu.edu.cn/content/sdfky/sdfky_29.htm.


119 See “Fourth Board Meeting of the Guangzhou Overseas Friendship Association” (广州海外联谊会第四届理事会) at http://www.gzzh.org.cn/gzswtzh/News.shtml?op=113515, GPD Liaison Department Guangzhou Bureau (and/or GSD Second Department) staff officers may be assigned to the Guangdong Provincial External Liaison Office (广东省海外联络办公室). The Guangdong External Liaison Office (广东省海外联络办公室) is located at 8 Hequn Road (合群二马路 8号), which is also the address given for the GPD/LD Liaison Bureau (see http://www.youbian.com/shenghuo/guangzhou_93417/). The address is also listed as one of at least two belonging to the Guangdong Special Region Association for International Friendly Contact (广东特区国际友好联络会). Cao Quanxin (曹全新) was CAIFC deputy secretary general and deputy director of the Guangdong Foreign Liaison Office in the 2005 timeframe. In short, GPD/LD officers appear to be anchored within Guangzhou provincial party/government offices. The Guangdong Province Fifth Office (广东省人民政府第五办公室, now known as Guangdong MR GSD Second Department, and the Fourth Office possibly GSD Second Department. See http://space.aboluowang.com/15783/viewspace-8501; and http://www.chinacomments.org/index_7812.htm.

120 Zheng Jinpo (郑锦波; b. 1915) is another former Guangzhou Bureau director, as well as GPD Liaison Department deputy director.

121 GPD operational units are assigned military unit cover designations (MUCDs) in the GSD block (eg. 61001-61999). From Fujian’s Getian County (古田县), Lan Xiaoshi (蓝晓石) was the son of a revolutionary hero, Lan Changding (蓝长汀; 1915-1958; also known as 蓝田). See http://www.lovenudt.com/contestaff/waipin/xinqi.htm. He was a CAIFC executive board member, and as of 2011, Lan remained a consultant. See http://www.caicf.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=1089. Another unconfirmed Guangzhou Liaison Bureau Director is MG Cai Shimin (蔡世民; b. 1944). Cai was born in Jiangxi Province and graduated from the Nanjing Foreign Language Institute in 1977. Upon graduation, he was assigned to the 61156 Unit in Guangzhou where he served as a division/officer director, deputy bureau director, then bureau director (most likely should read sub-bureau vice bureau). Another prominent officer from the 61156 Unit is Pu Peiliang (浦培良). In April 1999, Cai was promoted to major general and assigned to a bureau command in Shanghai (61669 Unit). Some sources assert that Cai was GSD Intelligence Department, while others reflect him as GPD/LD Liaison Bureau. The GSD Intelligence Department First Bureau is alleged to oversee sub-bureaus in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other cities. A Guangzhou Liaison
Bureau political commissar is alleged to be Fu Jun (傅军). He has also been cited as Political Commissar of the Guangzhou People's Government Fifth Office (广东省人民政府第五办公室政委), and former Guangzhou MR Political Department Personnel Division Director (广州军区人事处处长). Fu Jun is also a CAIFC member. Huang Chong (黄冲) is said to direct the 61669 Unit Political Department (政治部).


124 The Taiwan Strait Harmonious Development Foundation (海峡两岸和谐发展基金会) director is Ren Anli (任安利; b. 1968). Between 1999 and 2007, Ren Anli was assigned to the GPD/LD Guangzhou Bureau. Presumably leveraging the significant growth in Taiwanese investment in Dongguan City, Ren Anli was assigned as Director, Cross-Strait Harmonious Development Association (海峡两岸和谐发展基金会) in 2007. A funding-related dispute erupted between Ren and a former Association secretary general, Zhou Tianyong (周天勇), who publicly accused Ren of fabricating his resume. His resume claimed that in addition to an assignment with the GPD/LD Guangzhou Liaison Bureau, Ren Anli had also served within the CMC Research and Investigation Bureau (中央军委调查局) and the China International Cultural Exchange Association (中国国际文化交流中心). See http://www.rhhh.org/. Liu Yanjun (刘延军) serves as the association’s secretary general. Other members include (严晓蒸), Nie Taisheng (聂台生), Zhang Ning (张宁), and He Wenming (何文明). At least two other staff officers within the bureau included Huang Biaoliang (黄标梁) and Liu Zhicheng (刘志成). Liu Zhicheng served as secretary general of the Cross-Strait Harmonious Development Association.

125 See Chen Donglong, “PLA GPD Liaison Department” (解放军总政治部), Dongsen News (台湾), December 2000, at http://www.nownews.com/2000/12/02/303-289746.htm. The Shanghai bureau may carry a cover unit designation of the 61669 Unit. Former director MG Cai Shimin (蔡世民; b. 1944) has been associated with both GPD/LD and the GSD Intelligence Department. In the 2000 timeframe, Cai Shimin was associated with the Shanghai City Government Fifth Office (上海市政府第五办公室), with the bureau 040—052. The 61669 Political Department Director is Huang Zhong (黄冲), who produced a PLA propaganda program in 2006, in partnership with the Shanghai branch of the Chinese Cultural Promotion Association. See (八一之夜•军人之声 - 经典军乐八一史诗音乐会), at http://www.shcmusic.edu.cn/html/zuzhi/zhouxiaoyangejuzhongxin/yanchuxinxi/59215792858.html. The unit is headquartered at 15A Wukang Road Lane 280 (武康路 280 号 15 号甲). (朱小超) serves as the Shanghai State Security Bureau Director, and member of the Shanghai Party Committee.

126 Shanghai Association for International Friendly Contact representative include Lu Dilong (陆迪龙) as deputy director, and Li Qiang (李强) as secretary general. Established in August 2000, Shanghai Center for RimPac Strategic and International Studies (CPSIS; 上海环太国际战略中心) is focused on a range of regional security issues. The CPSIS Director is Guo Longlong (郭隆隆). Guo is also Deputy Director of the Shanghai Association of International Relations (上海国际关系学会副会长) and Shanghai Public Relations Academy (上海公共关系研究院). Its Deputy Director is Wang Xiaowei, who was formerly dual hatted as director of CAIFC’s Asia Department. For an overview of the center, see its website: http://www.orientalsstrategy.com/Ojzl.php.

127 For reference to the GPD/LD Fujian Work Station (政委联络部福建工作站), see “Why Can’t the Wu Yonghong Case Be Solved?” (吴永红案为什么办不了?), Viewing China, May 30, 2005, at http://m.kanzhongguo.com/node/115739. Another source identifies Liu Jianzong (刘建宗) as serving concurrently as Director, Fujian Provincial Government Fourth Office (福建省人民政府第四办公室; 福建四办), and Deputy Director, Fujian Government General Office. See (省政府第四办公室向湖店中心小学捐赠 100 万元), at http://www.wuping.gov.cn/Item/32791.aspx. As of June 2012, the Fourth Office Director was Dong Yuhong (董玉洪), who is dual-hatted as Deputy Secretary General, Fujian Province Taiwan Studies Association. Yang Libo (杨历波) is Xiamen Association for International Friendly Contact (XAIFC) Deputy Director and assigned with the Xiamen City Government Fourth Office (厦门市政府四办).

background on Western Taiwan Strait Zone, see "State Council on Ideas to Support Fujian’s Hastening of the Western Taiwan Strait Economic Zone" (国务院关于支持福建省加快海峡西岸经济区建设的若干意见), at http://tzb.fjnu.edu.cn/s/47/t/88/oc/c6/info3270.htm. Dong Yuhong is also a Special Research Associate of the TAO Center for Taiwan Strait Studies (国台办海峡两岸研究中心特约研究员).


130 For background on CAPCC, see its website at http://www.chinaapc.org/wencuhuijianjie/2013-06-28/52.html. Also see “CAPCC Invites Xu Shiquan to Serve on Board of Directors” (中华文化发展促会聘请许世铨等为首批理事), China Taiwan Network, November 10, 2011, at http://www.taiwan.cn/tp/bwp/201111/t20111110_2147484.htm; and “Xu Shiquan and 22 Others Appointed as China Cultural Development Association Directors for First Time” (中华文化发展促会聘请许世铨等 22 人为首批理事), November 9, 2011, at http://www.chinanews.com/cul/2011-11-09/3449533.shtml. It was formerly known as the Chinese People’s Cultural Promotion Association (中华文化发展促进会). This organization should not be confused with another Chinese Cultural Promotion Society (中华文化促进会): see website at http://www.ccps.cn/ccps/index.html. Xu Jialu replaced Liang Shi (梁湜) as director of CAPCC (中华文化发展促进会). Liang Shi is likely a pseudonym for previous GPD/LD Director, LTG (ret) Liang Hongchang. For a summary of a cultural work meeting involving former TAO director Wang Yi, Xu Jialu, TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafu (孙亚夫; b. 1952), and GPD/LD Deputy Director MG Xin Qi, see “Six Programs for Pressing Consensus on Chinese Cultural Exchanges” (六项共识推进中华文化交流), CPPCC Conference Report, January 22, 2011, at http://220.231.14.244:8081/zxb/zxbdetail.jsp?channelid=75007&record=204180. The report highlights the central role of culture in developing a new common identity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. For another reference to the CAPCC leadership, see “CAPCC Deputy Secretary General Jia Chaowei Speech on China’s Cultural Renaissance” (中华文化发展促会副秘书长贾超伟在中华文化复兴出版工程发布会上的致辞), Hainan Publishing Press Release, April 24, 2013, at http://www.hnnews.cn/show-24-142-1.html. CAPCC is located in northern Beijing at 辛路朗月园 1 栋 8 号.

131 Zheng Jian formerly served as CAPCC Research Department Director in the 2005 timeframe. Originally from Qingdao, Zheng Jian is a member of CAIFC’s board of directors, a research fellow with the Peace and Development Center, a member of the National Society of Taiwan Studies, a special research associate with Cross-Strait Relations Research Center, and a director of the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association. See his brief bio on the CAPCC website at http://www.chinaapc.org/zuzhijiegou/mishuchang/2013-06-27/13.html. For an example of his published opinion pieces, see (郑剑：台海战争动因为和平须思考), China Review News, April 28, 2013, at http://www.chinanews.com/cn/yw/2013/04-28/52.html; and Shi Yongqi (石永奇; b. 1963) are deputy secretary generals. You Yueming was previously CAPCC Academic Research Department director. At least one 2013 reference cites Jia Chaowei as an active duty officer within GPD. He is dual hatted as director of the CAPCC Cultural Exchange Department. Shen Xuan is a deputy director of the Beijing Association for International Friendly Contact. In 2007, SCOL Shen Xuan was referenced as deputy secretary general of the Second Artillery Political Department. Shi Yongqi is a PLA Nanjing Political Academy graduate and is associated with Huayi. Huang Jiafa (黄加法) serves as CAPCC General Office Director. One source from 2007 affiliates Huang Jiafa and Fu Tao (付涛) with the GPD/LD Taiwan Bureau (a separate source lists Fu Tao as GPD/LD First Bureau). Su Baoming (宿保平) and He Quan (何传) serve as mishu to the CAPCC leadership. Wu Jiang (吴江) is affiliated with the CAPCC Research Department. Sun Jingbo (孙景波) and Cai Bin (蔡斌) are other senior CAPCC personalities. Among various sources, see “Xin Qi Talks with China Review News: Ma Ying-jeou Has Pressure, Action” (辛旗语中评社：马英九有压力有行动), China Review News, March 11, 2012, at http://www.zhglj.com/crn-wehapp/doc/docDetailCreate.jsp?coluid=18&kindid=3607&docid=102035246&page=6&mdate=0311001223.

For an interesting Taiwan proposal calling for an agreement on renunciation of use of force and other initiatives, see (傅慰孤提出“两岸军事安全机制协议草案”), China Review News, June 25, 2013, at http://www.zghpl.com/doc/1025/9/7/o/102597030.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=102597030. Cross-Straits military trust building mechanisms were the subject of a June 2013 conference in Beijing co-sponsored by CAPCC and Taiwan Cross-Straits Integration Association. Some concepts reportedly tabled by Taiwan participants are similar to ones outlined in Taiwan’s 2002 National Defense Report.


Prominent figures include AMS World Military Research Department (军事科学院世界军事研究部) Director MG Wang Weixing (王卫星), and AMS Center for Taiwan Strait Studies (军事科学院台海研究中心) Director Bai Guangwei (白光伟). Wang Weixing has directed the Center for Taiwan Strait Studies in the past and is sometimes still carried as the center’s director. For an example of Wang Weixing’s writings, see “Common Responsibility of Militaries on Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait” (海峡两岸军人的共同职责), Outlook Weekly, 2007 (Vol 50), at http://lw.xinhuanet.com/htm/content_2364.htm.


Among its many programs, CAIFC (中国国际友好联络会; 友联会) has hosted a dialogue with respected senior U.S. retired military officers since 2008. In the U.S. dialogue, media reporting cites former GSD Second Department Director Xiong Guangkai as leading the CAIFC delegation up until 2010, with MG Li Xiaohua serving as delegation secretary general. In addition to GPD/LD Director MG Xing Yuming, participants have included a former PLAAF commander, former Military Region commanders, former NDU Commandant, and a former East Sea Fleet commander. CAIFC also has engaged retired senior military officers from Western Europe, Japan, and other locations. For additional background into CAIFC and GPD/LD, see John Garnaut, “China Gets into the Business of Making Friends,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 25 2013, at http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-gets-into-the-business-of-making-friends-20130524-2k6q3.html?skin=text-only.

Two of the three CAIFC deputy secretary generals are: 1) Deng Wenqing (邓文庆), who was previously with
CAIFC's Asia Department; and 2) Chen Jun (陈军), who formerly directed CAIFC's Eastern Europe/Central Asia Division. A prominent assistant to the CAIFC director is Lu Wei (吕薇), who was formerly CAIFC's Americas Division Deputy Director in the 2001 timeframe.


143 Xu Kuangdi (徐匡迪; b. 1937) has served as an honorary director since at least 2009. Xu was mayor of Shanghai between 1995 and 2001 and subsequently a vice chairman of the CPPCC. He also chairs the China-U.S. People's Friendship Association (CUSPFA).

144 Deng Rong (邓榕; b. 1950) was a GPD/LD researcher. Her husband is said to be former Polytechnologies CEO He Ping (贺平).


146 http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/locality/content/2011-07/19/content_2800302.htm?node=30954. Xu Jialu served with the Office of Chinese Language Council International (中国国家汉语国际推广领导小组办公室; or 汉办), and has been a professor with the Beijing Normal University College of Chinese Language and Culture.


149 Chen Haosu (陈昊苏; b. 1942) also has served as chairman of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries.

150 Guo Zhenyuan (郭震远) is also a special research associate (特约研究员) with the Cross-Strait Relations Research Center (海峡两岸关系研究中心), which supports the TALSG Office.


152 Zhou Xinzheng (周新政) appears to have been appointed as director of the Center for Peace and Development Studies (和平与发展研究中心) in 2013, replacing Gao Yuan (高原). Previous Deputy Director Gan Suqing (甘苏庆; b. 1950; aka 甘露) was in place in the 2004 timeframe. Another former director is Gao Haikuan (高海宽). Zhou
Xinzheng and CPDS Deputy Director Wang Xiaowei (王霄巍) were previously dual hatted as CAIFC Asia Department directors. Current Asia Department director is Shao Hongwei (邵宏伟; b. 1966). Former director of CAIFC’s Korea Division, Li Chun (李春), is the Asia Department deputy director. The center has a relationship with the Jiangsu Province Association for Friendly Contact’s Asia-Pacific Research Center (友联会亚太研究中心) and Shanghai Center for RimPac Strategic and International Studies (CPSIS; 上海环太国际战略中心). Researchers include Du Rubo (杜汝波). Among various sources, see http://www.orientalstrategy.com/index.asp.


154 Among various sources, see “Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations,” UN General Assembly Resolution 56/6, November 2001, at http://www.un.org/documents/ares566e.pdf; and “Statement by Chinese Permanent Representative Ambassador Wang Guangya at UNGA 60th Session on Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations and Culture of Peace,” Permanent PRC Mission to the UN Press Release, October 20, 2005, at http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyvf/t217660.htm. Commemorating the birthplace of Confucius, the first Nishan Forum was held in Shandong’s Nishan in September 2010, with a theme of “Harmony with Diversity and the Harmonious World.” The second Nishan Forum was held in May 2012, and the third is scheduled to be held in Jinan in 2014. As a side note, the United States has reportedly provided as much as 20% of UNESCO’s funding. Support for UNESCO was frozen in 2011 after UNESCO’s recognition of Palestinian membership.

155 For background on the Philanthropy Forum (中国公益论坛), see http://www.caijing.com.cn/2012/ltlsh/

156 For background on the Sanya International Finance Forum (三亚财经国际论坛), see http://www.sanyaforum.org/.


158 China Huaxin (中国华信能源有限公司) senior advisory board members include a number of former PLA Navy East Sea Fleet political commissars, such as VADM (ret) Liu Weidong (刘卫东) and RADM (ret) Wei Liru (韦立汝). Also listed is RADM Liu Sumin (刘苏闽), political commissar of the East Sea Fleet as of June 2013; RADM (ret) Lu Dekang (陆德康), former PLA Naval Air Force political commissar, RADM (ret) Cui Tonghe (崔同贺); and MG (ret) Dai Changyou (戴长友; b. 1946), former political commissar of the PLA Shanghai Garrison. See “China Huaxin Party Committee Meeting on Establishment of Discipline Inspection Commission” (中国华信党委纪委成立大会), CEFC website, January 17, 2013, at http://www.cefc.co/news.php?id=276&te=01&type=2013. For reference to China Huaxin Party Committee and its relationship with the Shanghai City Party Committee, see http://www.cefc.co/news.php?id=276&te=01&type=2013.

For reference to the Hainan-based Maritime Security and Cooperation Academy (海洋安全与合作研究院), see (2013 年政治学与国际关系学学术共同体会议简讯), Tsinghua University website, May 31, at [http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/ijis/2013/20130603092153775194634.htm](http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/ijis/2013/20130603092153775194634.htm); and “Chinese Domestic Scholars Hold Conference: The World is Not Japan’s” (国内外学者在京召开研讨会：琉球不是日本的), *Military Express Network*, May 2, 2013, at [http://www.bxzh.net/sinwen/zhanluepingshu/2013/0522/8008.html](http://www.bxzh.net/sinwen/zhanluepingshu/2013/0522/8008.html). LTG (ret) Xu Genchu (徐根初; b. 1943) directs the Center for National Strategic Studies. Deng Zhenghui (邓峥晖) serves as Assistant to the Director (Zhuang Jianzhong; 庄建中; b. 1942), CEFC Shanghai Office. Other prominent CEFC figures include former Hong Kong Secretary for Home Affairs Patrick CP Ho (何志平; b. 1950), Zhang Ya (张雅), Gao Yonghong (高永红), and Andrew Lo (骆祥安), formerly CH Tung’s special assistant. CH Tung is said to have brought Andrew Lo from his shipping company over to serve in the HK government. See Christine Loh, *Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), p. 218. Zhang Ya (张雅) appeared to have been deputy director of CEFC’s U.S. division and has also directed CEFC’s Internal Research Department (内研部). In May 2011, CEFC established a subordinate Shanghai China-Trust Welfare Charity Foundation (上海华信公益基金会). For background, see its website at: [http://www.chinacwcf.org.cn/](http://www.chinacwcf.org.cn/). Other key figures include former State Administration for Religious Affairs Director Ye Xiaowen (叶小文; b. 1950); Phoenix TV’s Liu Changle; Confucius Institute Headquarters Director Xu Lin, and Zhang Jiyu (张继禹).


CEFC consultants include former NPC Vice Chairman and current Taiwan Studies Association Director Cheng Siwei; former director of the State Council Religious Affairs Bureau Ye Xiaowen; and Wang Zhenmin, a respected legal scholar specializing in Taiwan and Hong Kong constitutional law. CEFC has sponsored a series of U.S.-China conferences on strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Participants have included former U.S. senior military, intelligence, and security policy officials, and the most recent event included Japanese representatives. Participants on the Chinese side included Wang Xiangsui (王湘穗), one of the authors of the controversial book “Unrestricted Warfare.”


For background on Dongfang Yi, see the association’s website at: http://www.dongfangyi.org/.

commercial construction business.

175 “Chinese Domestic Scholars Hold Conference: The World is Not Japan’s” (国内外学者在京召开研讨会：琉球不是日本的), Military Express Network, May 2, 2013, at http://www.bxzh.net/xinwen/zhanluepingshu/2013/0522/8008.html. Dongfang Yi also has established the Research Center for Cultural Strategy within the Southwest University for Political Science and Law (西南政法大学东方毅文化战略研究中心); and an Ideological Expansion Research Center within the China University for International Relations (国际关系学院东方毅拓展思想研究中心).

176 Originally from Shandong Province, Du Rubo was a member of a team that published a basic modern psychological warfare operational theory text in 1990, and is believed to have contributed toward the development of the “Three Warfares.” His most recent study on psychological warfare was recognized by the All-China Philosophy and Social Science Planning Office. In the 1990s, he served as CAIFC deputy secretary general. He also had a tour as an instructor at the Shijiazhuang Military Academy. For reference to his psychological operations work, see Wen Jinquan, Du Rubo, and Zhou Min, Introduction to Psychological Warfare (心理战概论) (Beijing: NDU Press, 1990). MG (ret) Du Rubo became honorary chairman of the China Red Culture Institute (中国红色文化研究院) upon his retirement. He also goes by Du Bo (杜波). Working his way up the GPD/LD ladder, Du Rubo most likely replaced Zeng Xiaodong as GPD/LD Deputy Director upon her retirement from active duty in the 2007 timeframe. China Red Culture Institute was established in September 2009. Gen (ret) Chi Haotian (迟浩田) serves as a vice chairman. For background, see the China Red Culture Institute website at http://www.mzxl226.com/. Among other responsibilities, the All-China Philosophy and Social Science Planning Office (全国哲学社会科学规划办公室) grants funding for social science-related research.


178 Honorary Chairman Li Erping (李而炳; b. 1945) previously served as Xu Xiangqian’s personal mishu, was a senior staff member within the GSD Intelligence Department, and Political Commissar of the PLA International Relations Academy. Dongfang Yi Chairman, Guo Yi (过毅; b. 1962), appears to have been affiliated with the Academy of Military Sciences, and is an honorary faculty member of the PLA GSD Army Aviation Academy. MG (ret) Du Rubo (杜汝波; b. 1952) and MG (ret) Yang Chunchang (杨春长; b. 1949) are deputy directors. Among various sources, see Zhang Hongyun, “Be the Hawk Faction, Not Doves” (要鹰派 不要鸽派), Dongfang Yi, June 20, 2012, at http://www.dongfangyi.org/tuozhanwenhua/junjingzhushi/2012-06-20/10618.html. Also see http://xgb.lzu.edu.cn/WebSite/Head/Show.aspx?id=6567.

179 A base is a functional PLA organization. For purposes of comparison, commanders and political commissars of GAD and Second Artillery bases have grades equal to a corps leader or corps deputy leader. GAD bases, numbered 20 through 33, carry out satellite launch, space tracking, satellite control, and weapons testing. Second Artillery missile bases, numbered 51 through 56, consist of between three and eight launch brigades and at least five support regiments. For example, 52 Base oversees six conventionally-capable that are oriented against Taiwan.

180 Media reporting highlights 311 Base cooperation with figures such as ARATS Vice Chairman and Taiwan Propaganda Leading Small Group member Zhang Mingqing (张铭清), GPD/LD Deputy Director Xin Qi, GPD/LD (CAPCC secretary general) Zheng Jian, and TALSG Office Propaganda Bureau Director Yang Yi (杨毅). Yang Yi is dual hatted as the State Council TAO spokesperson. Zhang Mingqing was assistant to the director of the TALSG Office between 1993 and 2006, propaganda bureau director (and TAO spokesperson). In addition to his ARATS position, he heads Xiamen University’s School of Journalism and Communication (厦门大学新闻传播学院). Among various sources, see “Major Propaganda Event “The Story of Taiwanese Business Prosperity on the Mainland” Opens in Wenzhou” (大型宣传活动《大陆台商财富故事》今日温州收官), Huaguang Network, December 19, 2012, at http://www.chbenet.com/news/content/2012-12/19/content_445097.htm. For reporting on Xin Qi, 311 Base Commander Wang Shu, Zheng Jian, and others, see “Major Series of Xinhai Centennial Anniversary Events Opens in Wuhan” (“百年辛亥百年荣”大型系列活动在武汉正式启动), Huaguang Network, April 15, 2011, at http://www.chbenet.com/tg/2011-04/15/content_263694.htm.
The 311 Base (61716 Unit) has been referred to as the GPD Public Opinion, Psychological Operations, and Legal Warfare Base (舆论战心理战法律战基地). For reference to the 311 Base, see “Zhu Haihang” (宋海航), Xinhua, October 31, 2011, at http://www.zhixuinaixiam.com/2011-10/31/c_112722519.htm; and “Letter Submitted on Dual Use Work Situation” (关于报送双拥工作有关情况的函), China Financial Pension Network October 29, 2008, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/zt/201009/02/content_939878.htm. The 311 Base (61716 Unit) is directed by MG Wang Shu (王澍 or 汪澍 b. 1958). Since July 2011, the political commissar has been MG Yin Hongwen (尹洪文). Before his assignment with the 311 Base, Yin was director of the Nanjing MR Political Department Organization Department, and 1st Group Army 1st Division political commissar. He was promoted to MG in 2012. For linkage of Yin Hongwen with the 61716 Unit, see http://www.chs.cn/xjsw/jswmjs/wjhb/201103/t20110323_37491.htm. Deputy directors include You Yingqi (游英其) and Liu Fuzhang (刘福章). The base chief engineer (总工程师) is Zhang Hongwu (张红武).

The 313 Base Network Propaganda Center (网络宣传中心) appears to carry a military unit cover designation of the 61070 Unit. The center is directed by Zhu Leiming (朱磊明). A 2012 sports announcement reported a Zhu Leiming as affiliated with the 61716 Unit, which oversees the 61070 Unit: http://www.pingpang.info/bbs/IndivGroup_Disphbs.asp?GroupID=16&groupboardid=11&id=4040. For reference to Zhu Leiming as the 311 Base Network Center director, see (全省网络新闻宣传干部培训班连城开班), Minxi Daily, November 4, 2009, at http://www.mxrb.cn/zwpd/2009-11-04/content_610379.htm. In addition to leveraging the internet for propaganda, the unit may have a computer network operations mission. The 61070 Unit has produced studies associated with media access control (MAC) spoofing and an information push system (信息推送系统). See (基于可信平台和可信引擎的软件设计方法), Hebei S&T Department website (undated), at http://cg.hebstd.gov.cn/xssc/xxxmlb.aspx?xmbh=20134274. The 61070 Unit is headquartered in Fuzhou’s Gulou District, #3 Meifeng Road (梅峰路 3 号).

Other affiliated entities include the 61590 Unit, 61023 Unit, 61198 Unit, 61275 Unit, and 61839 Unit. The 61590 Unit is located in Fuzhou and appears to be linked with the Huayi Broadcasting Company’s Television Center. The center develops television programming for broadcast by CCTV, Phoenix TV, and other outlets. For linkage of CHBC, the television center, and 61716 Unit, see (福建省第六届百花文艺奖拟获奖作品名单公示公告), Dongnan Network, May 24, 2011, at http://www.fjsen.com/c/2011-05/24/content_4629778_4.htm. Also see “CHBC Television Center” (中国华艺广播公司电视中心), China Taiwan Network, September 2, 2010, at http://www.taiwan.cn/zt/jlzt/straits2010/xgzl/201009/t20100902_1512692.htm. Based on Fuzhou City, the 61023 Unit oversees editorial (编辑部) and technical departments (技术部) It also maintains offices in Beijing (北京记者站). The 61198 Unit appears to be collocated with the base headquarters compound in Fuzhou’s Gulou District (鼓楼区). The specific address is 77 Meizhu Road (梅竹路 77 号). Members of the unit have published studies on US psychological warfare, and may be affiliated with the 61716 Unit translation office. The 61275 Unit is likely a regimental-grade unit under VTS in the Gutian area. Located in Ningde’s Gutian County (古田县), the 61275 Unit was previously assigned a military cover designation of 73505, indicating the entity was subordinate to Nanjing MR at one time. Among various sources, see http://www.fjsen.com/c/2011-05/24/content_4629778_4.htm. The 61839 Unit is the VTS Xiamen Broadcasting Station (厦门之声广播电视台厦门宣传站). For reference to 61839 Unit and propaganda, see (精神文明建设先进集体、先进个人名单), Siming District website, December 30, 2010, at http://www.siming.gov.cn/smgk/jswmjs/wjhb/201103/t20110323_37491.htm. which located on 虎园路 5 号.

GPD incorporated CHBC in 1991. For background on China Huayi Broadcasting, see its website at http://www.chbcom.com/about/vs.htm. Formerly under the Nanjing MR, CHBC was subordinated to the 311 Base upon its establishment. Wang Shu is also listed as the CEO of CHBC. When referencing Wang Shu in his CHBC persona, the characters 汪澍 are used instead of 王澍. Another example is former 311 Base commander MG Deng Changyu (邓长宇; b. 1954), who commanded the 61716 Unit between 2005 and 2010. He has been also been reported as CEO of CHBC. See (第四届福州青岛啤酒节盛大开启举城狂欢), Tsingtao Southeast Company website, August 9, 2010, at http://www.tsingtao.com.cn/article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=1498. Song Haihang (宋海航) served as the first 311 Base political commissar. He is also reflected as CHBC CEO. For reference to Song Haihang as CHBC CEO, see “‘中华文化之旅’活动人员河南新郑拜谒黄帝”, Huaxia, June 2, 2010, at http://www.huxia.com/zt/zhwh/10-02/0193919.html.

VTS was previously known as the PLA Fujian Frontline Broadcasting Station (解放军福建前线广播电台), which was formed in August 1958. The unit was under the authority of GPD/LD. For background on VTS, see its website at: http://www.vos.com.cn/index.shtml. VTS may be affiliated with a military cover designation of the 61985 Unit. Liu Linlan (柳林岚) is dual hatted as the 61985 Unit commander and general manager of the Huayi Broadcasting Corporation. For reference to Liu as general manager of Huayi Broadcasting, see Dai Fang “Tianfuxi Treasure Island,


188 See Carla Freeman and Drew Thompson, China on the Edge (Wash DC: Policy Center for the National Interest and Johns Hopkins SAIS, 2011).


190 A work station commander appears to carry a grade of division deputy leader (副师职). In addition to a Fujian provincial-level station, Nanjing MR liaison work stations are located in Ningbo, Xiamen, and Fuzhou. The Ningbo work station commander is (郭化群). The Nanjing MR Political Department Liaison Department’s Fujian Work Station is the 73716 Unit. Subordinate elements are located in Shanghai, Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Quanzhou. Other affiliated units include the 73720 Unit.

191 You Zhongmin (尤众敏) directs the Nanjing MR Liaison Department (南京军区政治部联络部). He also serves as JAIFC executive deputy director, and directs the Jiangsu Province Liaison Office (江苏省政府联络办). He also manages the Nanjing Huayi Audio and Video Company (南京华艺音像公司). Yin Xiang (尹翔) is dual-hatted as JAIFC secretary general, and director of the JAIFC Asia-Pacific Research Center (江苏省友联会亚太研究中心). Among various sources, see CAIFC Hosts Seminar in Nanjing on ‘US Pacific Strategy and China Policy’ (友联会在北京举办 “美国亚太战略与对华政策”研讨会), at http://caific.org.cn/c2.aspx?id=434. Also see “Jiangsu International Friendly Contact Third Council held in Nanjing,” Jiangsu Foreign Affairs Office, August 4, 2007, at http://www.jsfao.gov.cn/Print.asp?NewsID=11454. Yang Yuhui (杨玉辉) is the Nanjing MR Liaison Department deputy director. He is a formal advisor to Taillian. For reference to Yang Yuhui and the Nanjing MR Liaison Department, see (摄制《江海明珠崇明岛》前后), Shanghai and Taiwan, July 16, 2013, at http://www.shanghai.
The GAIFC Asia-Pacific Region Development Research Center (广东省亚太地区发展研究中心) most recently formed the South Seas National Strategy Department (海南国家战略部). For background on GAIFC, see http://www.gaifc.org.cn/about.asp?id=1. Wang Weidong (王维栋; or 王卫东; b. 1963) directs the Liaison Department, which is subordinate to the Guangzhou MR Political Department. Originally from Jiangxi’s Jiangdu, Wang Weidong also serves as a GAIFC Executive Deputy Director and spent his career within the Guangzhou Military Region. GAIFC Deputy Director You Yaping (尤亚平; b. 1961) was listed as a Guangzhou MR Political Department office director in 2007. Zhao Haiming (赵海明), who was a lieutenant colonel within the Guangzhou MR Political Department Liaison Department in the 2001 timeframe, serves as GAIFC secretary general and deputy director of the GAIFC Asia-Pacific Region Development Research Center. Between 1995 and 2000, Zhao was a researcher with the Guangdong Asia-Pacific Region Social Development Institute (广东省亚太地区社会发展研究所). For reference to Wang Weidong, Zhao Haiming, and Asia-Pacific Region Development Research Center participation in a cross-Strait academic dialogue, see “Important Cross-Strait Experts (两岸三地重要专家深圳研讨和平发展), China Review News, December 4, 2010, at http://www.zhanghong.com.cn/newarticle.html?aid=1204225735. For reference to Wei Weidong and his association’s linkage with the Huangpu Alumni Association, see “Huangpu Alumni Association Hosts Visitors from Taiwan’s Political Warfare School Association” (黄埔军校同学会接待台湾政战校友会参访团), November 19, 2009, at http://www.huangpu.org.cn/hnhd/201206/t201206062_2726723.html. For coverage of a cross-Strait conference on maritime territorial disputes co-hosted with CAPCC, see (两岸战役将领和专家学者研讨共同维护中华民族领土主权和海洋权益), Renminwang, September 11, 2012, at http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/0911/c70731-18981449.html. Guangzhou MR oversees liaison work stations in Haikou, Shantou, Wuhan, and Shenzhen.

A Takungpao article noted that Qi Qiaoqiao was assigned to the Guangzhou MR after her father, Xi Zhongxun, became Guangdong governor. In this position as a junior officer, she facilitated the repatriation of Vietnamese prisoners of war in 1979. She rose to become a senior foreign affairs officer within the PAP. See “Xi Zhongxun’s Daughter Qi Qiaoqiao: Beautiful Transformation after the Cultural Revolution Ordeal” (习仲勋之女齐桥桥：历经文革磨难商海华丽转身), Takungpao, October 10, 2012, at http://www.takungpao.com/people/content/2012-10/10/content_1204442_3.htm.

GAIFC’s relationship with another organization – Southern Association for International Friendly Contact (南方国际友好联络会) – is unknown. Senior leaders include Lei Haimin (雷海敏), who was mishu for Ye Xuanning’s brother, Ye Xuanping (叶选平; b. 1924), during his time as Guangdong governor (1985-1991). A deputy director of the Southern AIFC is Chen Xinniang (陈心念), who is also deputy director of the Guangzhou Foreign Liaison Office. Chen Shangfeng (陈上风) is Southern AIFC secretary general and a division chief with the Guangzhou Foreign Liaison Office. Among various sources, see http://nanhai.hinews.cn/thread-4830518-1-1.html.

Fan Mingxing (范名兴), at least as of 2010, was a senior authority within the Chengdu MR Political Department Liaison Department, and SAIFC (四川省国际友好联络会) Research Center. See (第五届“四川藏界新春联谊会”会议纪要), at http://www.zangx.com/old/news/132.html. SAIFC may oversee the Sichuan International Peace and Development Research Center (四川国际和平与发展研究中心). SAIFC’s South and Southeast Asia Research Center (东南亚与东南亚研究中心) produces the journal South and Southeast Asia Studies (东南亚与东南亚研究).

In addition to Yang Junqiang (杨军强), Heilongjiang AIFC’s (吕占明) formerly served as Siping and Suihua Military Sub-District Political Department director. He is currently a member of Heilongjiang’s Taiwanese Compatriot Association. In addition to SCOL Bao Liangming (包良明), a previous Beijing MR Liaison Department director was (黄志辉). Jin Xin (金鑫) most likely is responsible for Beijing MR liaison work. He is executive deputy director of BAIFC. Dai Huaqian (戴怀宪) appears to be associated with the Beijing MR Liaison Department, and serves as BAIFC secretary general. Deputy secretary general of BAIFC, Li Hongxue (李洪学), appears focuses on Taiwan issues. BAIFC deputy director Wei Xueliang (韦学良) is believed to be a PLA Navy political officer. BAIFC Deputy Director Wang Wei (王巍) is dual hatted as deputy director of the Beijing Garrison Political Department. At least one platform possibly affiliated with Beijing MR liaison work is the Beijing MZY Culture and Media Company (北京木子雨文化传媒有限公司). A Jinan Military Region Liaison Work Station in Yantai (济南军区烟台联络工作站) has also been noted. Among various sources referencing BAIFC, see “CAIFC’s Li Xiaohua Meets Guests from Russia’s Buryatia” (李晓华副会长会见俄罗斯布里亚特客人), CAIFC Press Release, August 6, 2012, at http://www.caifc.org.cn/content.aspx?id=2706.
For authoritative reference to a Liaison Department under the PLAAF Political Department, see Luo Yichang (罗益昌) and Zhu Changsheng (朱长生), “Lessons and Implications of Soviet Communist Party Cadre Organizational Line” (苏共在组织干部路线的教训与启示), Nantong Party Building Magazine (南通党建杂志), 2008 (Vol 3), at http://www.ntdj.gov.cn/art/2011/6/art_32074_1039120.html. For a references to the existence of a PLAAF Political Department Liaison Department, see “Roster of General and Navy Officers” (海军军官名册), Hefei City Library, at http://opac.hflib.gov.cn/ lib/book/70299?GlobalSearchWay=title; and “Passing of Song Gan” (宋干同志逝世), CCP News, November 19, 2011, at http://ccp.people.com.cn/GB/64093/87393/16310205.html. According to one unconfirmed account, a number of sons and daughters of senior PLA revolutionaries were in the liaison work field in the late 1970s, including Ye Xuanning (岳枫); Liao Chengzhi’s son Liao Hui (廖晖); the daughter of Wang Dongxing (汪东兴), Wang Dayan (汪大燕); and Geng Biao’s son Geng Zhiyuan (耿志远). See “Seeing Liu Yanzhou Again” (又见刘亚洲), Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau Digest (港台澳文摘), Vol 2, No, 3, 2011, at http://lib.gddx.gov.cn/gdsqkx/study/tgawzsjk/articleshow.asp?articleid=2011032300010004. The author cites his affiliation with the PLA Navy Political Department Liaison Department at the time.

Wang Naitian (王乃天; 1909-2006) was one of the first PLAAF enemy/liaison work officers. He eventually became a senior CAAC official. See (王乃天同志生平), CAAC News, December 26, 2006, at http://editor.caacnews.com.cn/nhb/html/2006-12-26/content_2386.htm. For reference to Liu Yanzhou’s early assignment within the PLAAF Political Department Liaison Department, see “Former PLAAF Deputy Political Commissar Liu Yanzhou Moves to Become NDU Political Commissar” (空军原副政委刘亚洲调任国防大学政委), China Daily, January 26, 2010, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/2010-01/26/content_9376920.htm. More specifically, General Liu was assigned to the PLAAF Political Department Liaison Department 1st Division (1处) in 1979. See “Du Jincai, Liu Yanzhou, and Six Others Promoted to General” (杜金才、刘亚洲等6人晋升上将军衔警衔), Takungpao, July 30, 2012, at http://www.takungpao.com/mainland/content/2012-07/30/content_847925_4.htm. General Liu Yanzhou (刘亚洲; b. 1952) is a son of a prominent senior political officer within the Lanzhou Military Region, MG Liu Jiande (刘建德). General Liu is married to Li Xiaolin, the daughter of former President and CPPCC Chairman Li Xiannian. He spent a year at Stanford from May 1986. While assigned to Stanford, Gen Liu was alleged to have supported GD/LD Director Ye Xuanning on a special mission to South Korea in 1986, and later to Taiwan in 1991. He also was rumored to have been assigned to the CMC General Office (中央军委办公厅政治部) and in summer 1988 was assigned to the CMC General Office Political Department. In 1990, he was a political commissar within a GSD research institute. Among other sources of unknown reliability, see “Pro-Democracy General Could Help Shape Xi’s vision for China,” Want China Times, March 31, 2013, at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1601&MainCattID=16&id=20130331000064; and (邓正来：我对刘亚洲将军的评价), Boxun, July 17, 2008 at http://boxun.com/news/gb/pubvp/2008/07/200807171134.shtml.


The Nanjing Political Academy (南京政治学院; 南政) is a corps leader-level organization, while Xian Political Academy (西政) appears to be a deputy corps leader entity. At least one prominent legal warfare expert is MG Yu Zhengshan (俞正山).

In 2011, the Xian Political Academy Commandant was Qi Sanping (齐三平). He was assigned as director of the AMS Military Construction Research Department in 2012. Among various sources, see (中国组建心理战试验部队 目前仍属探索阶段), China Aviation News, August 9, 2010, at http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1012/5/3/101253907.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=101253907; and “MG Xu Yan: PLA Already Establishes Psychological Warfare Test and Evaluation Unit” (徐焰少将：人民解放军已经建立心理战实验部队), Renminwangan, April 2, 2010, at http://military.people.com.cn/GB/42969/58519/11287599.html. The test and evaluation unit may be a company under the 39th Group Army’s 115th Motorized Infantry Division 345 Regiment (65359 Unit). For further background on PSTDOS theory, see Ma Zhong (马忠), War Without Bloodshed: Psychological Warfare Studies (兵不血刃的战争:心理战研究) (Beijing: AMS Publishing, 1989). Ma Zhong formerly served as the director of the Xian Political Academy Psychological Operations Institute (西安政治学院心理战研究所).

The latter is the Foreign Military Political Work Research Institute (外军政治性工作研究所), Hao Weixue (郝唯学) is the chairman of the PSYOPS school and the Military Psychology Instruction and Research Center (军事心理学教研
Liu Zhifu (刘志富) directs the NDU Three Warfare Research Center (国防大学三战研究中心).


After his tenure as GPD/LD deputy director in the 1950s, MG Wang Xinggang transferred to the CMC General Office, establishing a precedent for selected successors. See (将军，来自没有硝烟的战场), at http://www.dbxww.com/xinghaiwan/content/2012-03-25/content_287340.htm. Another precedent of a GPD propaganda or liaison work specialist being assigned to the CMC General Office is Cheng Jianning (程建宁; b. 1932), who had served as GPD Political Department deputy director before assignment as CMC General Office director in the late 1980s. Jiang Shengsan (蒋省三; b. 1953) was dual hatted as mishu to Yang Shangkun, and GPD/LD staff officer between July 1985 and around 1993. Upon Yang Shangkun’s retirement, Jiang Shengsan was assigned as deputy director and subsequently director of the CMC General Office Comprehensive Investigation and Research Bureau (CIRB; 军委办公厅综合调研局). The CIRB director carries a grade of corps deputy leader (副军职), one half grade above a GPD or GSD bureau director. CIRB deputy directors are assigned a grade of division leader, equal to a GPD or GSD bureau director. GSD DCOGS, LTG Wang Guanzhong (王冠中; b. 1953), may serve as another example of the linkage between GPD and the CMC General Office CIRB. After six years working in the GPD Propaganda Department as a political warfare strategist, Wang Guanzhong was assigned as CIRB deputy director in June 1996. In July 2000, he became CIRB director. In February 2001, he became deputy director of the CMC General Office. By December 2007, he was assigned as director of the CMC General Office. In 2012, he crossed over to GSD to serve as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Yet another prominent career political work officer assigned to the CMC General Office CIRB is MG Zhang Jiajun (张家军; b. 1957). In addition to serving as CIRB director, MG Zhang headed the CMC General Office Executive Officer Bureau (中央军委办公厅秘书局). He currently serves as GLD Political Commissar.

Former Xinjiang party chairman and NPC Vice Chairman Ismail Tiliwaldi (司马义-铁力瓦尔地; b. 1944) serves as chairman. Former GPD Deputy Director Gen (ret) Tang Tianbiao (唐天标; b. 1940) is first vice chairman. Former Nanjing MR Political Commissar Gen (ret) Lei Mingqiu (雷鸣球; b. 1942); former PLA Navy Political Commissar ADM (ret) Hu Hanlin (胡彦林; b. 1943); propaganda authority and former NDU Political Commissar Gen (ret) Zhao Keming (赵可铭; b. 1942); former GLD Political Commissar Gen (ret) Sun Dafa (孙大发; b. 1943); former PAP and Lanzhou MR Political Commissar Gen (ret) Yu Linxiang (喻林祥; b. 1945); and former Deputy Minister of Public Security Zhao Yongji (赵永吉; b. 1945) are other senior authorities. Previous chairmen included former NPC Chairman Peng Zhen (彭真; 1902-1997); former CCP International Liaison Department Director and Minister of Defense Geng Biao (耿飚; 1909-2000); and prominent propaganda authority He Jingzhi (贺敬之; b. 1924).

Established in 1984, the China International Cultural Communications Center (中国国际文化传播中心) executive chairman is Long Yuxiang (龙宇翔; b. 1962). Honorary Vice Chairman Gen (ret) Zhang Li (张藜; b. 1943) is a propaganda specialist who served as mishu to Xiao Hua (肖华; 1916–1985) in the 1984-1985 timeframe and as DCOGS. As an aside, Xiao Hua’s son-in-law is Li Ruogu (b. 1951), chairman of the Export-Import Bank of China. Li Ruogu’s father, Li Zhuoran (李卓然), was a former deputy director of GPD.


22 The GSD Second Department political commissar is Yao Liyun (姚立云; b. 1954). Before his current assignment, Yao served as Second Department Political Political Department director and deputy political commissar of the PLA University of Science and Technology (解放军理工大学) in Nanjing.

23 Speculative assessments of friction between political and warfighting authorities emerged when Western media reported a verbal altercation between DCOGS GEN Zhang Qinsheng and senior CMC authorities. The reported altercation may have been related to a promotion issue rather indicative of a broader political debate. For coverage of the incident, see Edward Wong and Jonathan Ansfeld, “Party Bristles at Military’s Push for More Sway in China,” New York Times, August 7, 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/world/asia/chinas-military-seeks-more-sway-worrying-communist-party.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

24 DCOGS ADM Sun Jianguo (孙建国; b. 1952) appears to have replaced LTG Qi Jianguo as CISS director in 2013.

25 For an examination of Taiwan-related united front activities, see John Dotson, “Retired Taiwan Officer Exchanges Offer Insight into a Modern ‘United Front’,” China Brief, Vol. 11, Issue 19, October 14, 2011, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38525. The chairman of the CPPCC (中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会; 全国政协) is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the TALSG. He/she usually functions as the second senior-most party cadre providing Taiwan-related policy guidance and oversight. The CPPCC chairman is assisted by as many as 12 vice chairmen, a secretary-general, issue-specific committees, and parallel CPPCC organizations at the provincial/municipal level. Among these, the Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and Overseas Chinese Committee, and possibly the Friendly Relations sub-committee, coordinates Taiwan-related issues. The former is dual hatted as the ARATS chairman, and is supported by as many as 15 deputies. One of the most noteworthy CPPCC vice-chairmen is C.H Tung, chairman of the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation (CUSEF).

26 The UFWD deputy director with what appears to be the Taiwan portfolio is Lin Zhimin (林智敏; b. 1956), who replaced You Lantian (尤兰田; b. 1951) in 2012. Originally from Fujian, Lin Zhimin spent most of her career in the UFWD First and Sixth Bureaus. She is dual-hatted as CPPCC deputy secretary general. The specific entity within the UFWD responsible for Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao work is the Third Bureau (中央统战部三局), which is directed by Li Lu (李路; b. 1954). As a side note, former UFWD General Office Director Zhang Zhigong (张志功) served as Xi Jinping’s father’s mishu for 20 years. Among various sources on UFWD, see Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967); and Gerry Groot, Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism and Hegemony (Psychology Press, 2003). For reference to GDP’s linkage with the united front system, also see David M. Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 81-82. For an overview of United Front work in Hong Kong, see Holly Porceous, “Beijing’s United Front Strategy in Hong Kong,” Commentary, Summer 1998, at http://www.esis-scrs.gc.ca/plbctns/cmmntr/cm72-eng.asp.

27 Provincial media reflects Huang Biaoliang as a GPD/LD Guangzhou Bureau cadre, GAIFC secretary general, and a staff officer in the Guangzhou City Party Committee’s division handling Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao affairs (广州市委台港澳联络处正处调研员). A separate reference lists Huang Biaoliang as a staff officer within the Guangzhou City Party Committee United Front Department Liaison Division (广州市委统战部联络处调研员). Based on publicly available data, Huang Biaoliang is graduate of the PLA Foreign Language Academy and specializes in US economic issues. For reference Huang as assigned to the provincial United Front Department Liaison Office, see (第十一届“海外华侨商会”交流团走访广州南沙), China Daily, September 27, 2012, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hpil/zggc/2012-09-27/content_7126927.html. For a reference noting Huang Zhibiao’s association with GPD/LD, see (车侦人员或者冒充车侦人员任安利违法犯罪的举报), CICC Forum, November
220 The function of “second line” authorities (退居二线) was spelled out in a 1983 State Council regulation (国发 142 号) that provides a framework for cadre who have reached mandatory retirement age to continue serving in supporting positions. For an example of reporting on the role of CCP-approved democratic parties, see “Survey of Taiwan-Focused Work of Democratic Parties: Innovation, Products, and Cooperation” (各民主党派2012年对台工作扫描：创新, 品牌, 合作), CCP News Release, February 22, 2013, at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0222/c75372-20570826.html.

221 The current CAPD (中国民主建国会; 民建) chairperson is Yan Junqi (严隽琪; b. 1946). She is dual hatted as one of 13 vice chairmen of the NPC Standing Committee. Yan’s uncle is said to be former ROC President Yen Chia-kan.

222 A key China Democratic National Construction Association (CDNCA; 民进) authority who has supported GPD liaison work as a CAIFC advisor is Cheng Siwei (成思危; b. 1935). Cheng Siwei is a leading economic theorist and member of the China Soft Science Society (中国软科学研究会). Yan Jiaqi (严隽琪; b. 1946) is another prominent figure. Zhou Tiening (周铁农) currently chairs the KMT Revolutionary Committee (民革中央). See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/09/c_131180813.htm.

223 When the Japanese governor cracked down on Communist Party members on Taiwan, many fled to China. Taiwanese Communist Party members aligned with fugitives who escaped Taiwan after the 228 Incident, including Xie Xuehong (谢雪红; 1901-1970). A social activist from Changhua County, Xie and Cai Xiaoqian are said to have formed a militia group that took refuge in Nantou. On the eve of the resistance’s collapse, Xie fled to Hong Kong and was recruited into the CCP. She played an important role in China’s first Chinese People’s Consultative Conference, and in 1951 assigned a position within the East China Military and Administrative Committee, which included Taiwan within its jurisdiction. Among various sources addressing the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (台湾民主自治同盟; 台盟), see Yang Shu-mei, “Leftists Make Unsuccessful Attempts to Make a Mark in Taiwan,” Want China Times, November 15, 2010, at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=201011150000057&cid=1501. The Cross-Strait Taiwanese Exchange Foundation was established in 2006. Taimeng is currently directed by Lin Wenyi (林文漪; b. 1944).

224 Chinese Council for Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPR; 中国和平统一促进会; 中国统促会) was established in August 1988, and oversees at least three subordinate departments responsible for comprehensive planning (综合部), research (研究部), and liaison (联络部). As an example of how organizations within the united front system are connected, Hang Yuanxiang (杭元祥) wears at least three hats: UFWD executive deputy secretary general, CCPPR executive deputy secretary general, and secretary general of the Huangpu Association. Song Wei (宋为) is another CCPPR deputy secretary general.


226 CPPCC Friendly Relations Community (对外友好界) consists of a total of 41 members. Included on the list is Xu Lin, director of Hanban. See “12th CPPCC Member List (Friendly Relations Sub-Committee) (政协第十二届全国委员会委员名单 [对外友好界]), China Economic Network, February 1, 2013, at http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201302/25/t20130225_24141760.shtml.

For background on the National Society of Taiwan Studies (NSTS; 全国台湾研究会; or 全国台研会 for short), see its website at [http://cyh.chinataiwan.org/](http://cyh.chinataiwan.org/). Deputy directors include TALSG Office Deputy Director Sun Yafu; former CASS leader Zhu Jianyu (朱佳木; b. 1946); and former TAO Deputy Director Sun Xiaoyu (孙晓郁). Zhou Zhihuai (周志怀; b. 1956) serves as secretary general. CASS Taiwan Institute Deputy Director Cao Zhihui (曹治州) is NSTS executive deputy secretary general. Yang Zhijian (杨志坚) and Yang Lixian (杨立宪; b. 1954) are deputy secretaries generals. Among a long list of directors are Yu Keli (余克礼; 1952); former CASS Taiwan Institute Director Xu Shiquan (许世铨; b. 1942), and Xin Qi. Zheng Qingyong (郑庆勇; 1965) is NSTS Liaison Department director. For an example of a NSTS conference co-hosted with All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots and CASS, see “Symposium on Cross-Straits Relations Ends,” *China Daily*, July 25, 2008, at [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/25/content_6876949.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/25/content_6876949.htm). For a joint symposium with SIIS, see “No Need for Taiwan to Work with China on Diaoyutais: Scholar’s Commentary on ‘Beijing Tied the Knot, Beijing Must Unite It’,” *United Daily News*, June 9, 2010, at [http://www.udn.com/bd/20100607/20100607202455.htm](http://www.udn.com/bd/20100607/20100607202455.htm), for an example, see [http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crn/20100607/20100607202455.htm](http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crn/20100607/20100607202455.htm). Also see “Scholars Call for DPP Participation in Cross-Strait Dialogue,” *Xinhua*, August 20, 2013, at [http://http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Second_Period_Briefing](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Second_Period_Briefing).

Huangpu Military Academy Alumni Association (黄埔军校同学会) often highlights the importance of the “Huangpu Spirit” in promoting cross-Strait unification. The Huangpu Association has hosted counterparts from the ROC New Alliance (同乡会), which was established in 1993. The honorary chairman of the New Alliance is retired ROC Political Warfare Department Deputy Director LTG Hsu Li-nong. Among various sources, see “Xin Qi: The Spirit of Huangpu Will Shine in the Trend toward Cross-Strait Unification” (辛旗: 黄埔精神永放光芒 两岸统一大势所趋), *Huangpu Association News Release*, August 30, 2010, at [http://www.huangpu.org.cn/zt/bagui/bagui3/bagui4/201206/t20120612_27015782971.htm](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/zt/bagui/bagui3/bagui4/201206/t20120612_27015782971.htm).


Tailian Director, Wang Yifu, met with Lien Chan during his February 2013 visit to Beijing. For reference to the Lien Chan visit, see [http://www.tailian.org.cn/n1080/n1110/n1444/n1506/1288438.html](http://www.tailian.org.cn/n1080/n1110/n1444/n1506/1288438.html). One other prominent *Tailian* authority is Liang Guoyang (梁国扬; b. 1951).

For background on COFA, see its website at: [http://www.cofa.org.cn/](http://www.cofa.org.cn/). For an example of link with GPD/LD-affiliated platforms, see [http://cn.cfculture.co/benyuannews/120.html](http://cn.cfculture.co/benyuannews/120.html).

For reporting on the founding of the Council for Promotion of Chinese Strategic Culture (中国战略文化促进会) and reference to Luo Yuan, see “Jointly Promote Peaceful Development – China Strategic Culture Society Established” (共建和平发展——中国战略文化促进会在京成立), *China Taiwan Network*, January 5, 2011, at [http://www.china.ttwrk/xzdt/201101/t20110106_1677968.htm](http://www.china.ttwrk/xzdt/201101/t20110106_1677968.htm). Also see the Council for Promotion of Chinese Strategic Culture website, at [http://www.for-peace.org.cn/index.php](http://www.for-peace.org.cn/index.php), Zheng Wantong was selected as CPPCC Vice Chairman in 2008. Huang Jiashu (黄嘉树), a Taiwan affairs authority and professor at Renmin University, serves as Deputy Director, along with Yu Lian (于连).

Explaining the PLA's "Hawkish Faction" (Part 2), Revolutionary KMT Committee press release, March 4, 2013, at http://www.minge.gov.cn/txt/2013-03/04/content_5770860.htm. Other advisors and board members include Shanghai Taiwan Institute's Yu Xintian (俞新天).


233 Current CLGPIW director is Liu Yunshan (刘云山; b. 1947). Liu’s son, Liu Lefei, heads CITIC Private Equity Funds Management, and has been named by Fortune Magazine as one of the 25 most powerful business people in Asia. The younger Liu is married to Jia Lijing, daughter of former Minister of State Security, Jia Chunwang. Liu Yunshan also is a member of the TALSG, and is likely to retire in 2017 due to age limitations. The CCPPD is directed by Politburo member Liu Qibao (刘奇葆; b. 1953), who was appointed in November 2012. He formerly was Sichuan Province party committee secretary. Wang Weiguang (王伟光; b. 1950) replaced Chen Kuiyuan as CASS director in 2013. For further background, see Cheng Li, China’s Top Future Leaders to Watch: Biographical Sketches of Possible Members of the Post-2012 Politburo (Part 2), China Leadership Monitor, No. 38, August 6, 2012, at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM38CL.pdf; and “Propaganda Department Scion Liu Lefei Makes A Killing In Finance,” China Want Times, April 10, 2012, at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=201204100000051&cid=1601.

234 The current deputy director of the CCP Propaganda Department (and concurrently director of the Central External Propaganda Office) is Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照; b. 1955). A former GPD propaganda cadre, Cai spent most of his career with Xinhua. He appears to have replaced Wang Chen (王晨; b. 1950).


238 For excellent assessments of the role of academics, such as Luo Yuan and Dai Xu (戴旭; b. 1964), in the propaganda system, see Andrew Chubb, “Propaganda as Policy? Explaining the PLA’s “Hawkish Faction” (Part Two), Jamestown China Brief, Volume: 13 Issue: 16, August 9, 2013, at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41254&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=256cHash=57de84de08f84ac12c7955a4afdfbce#.UgeNPj98BkE; Andrew Chubb, Propaganda as Policy? Explaining the PLA’s “Hawkish Faction” (Part One), Jamestown China Brief, Vol 13, Issue: 15, July 25, 2013, at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41175&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid

State Councilor Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪; b. 1950) currently directs the FALSG Office. He replaced Dai Bingguo in this position. A career diplomat who focuses on American affairs, Yang was a second and first secretary for the Chinese Embassy in the United States in the mid 1980s. In 1983, he was promoted to counselor at the embassy. After returning to China, Yang served briefly in the translation and interpretation department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He became division director and then deputy director-general at the American and Oceania Affairs Department at the ministry in 1990, remaining there for three years. In 1993, he traveled back to the United States to assume minister and deputy chief of mission responsibilities at the Chinese Embassy. In 2001 he became ambassador to the United States. From 2005-2007 he served as vice minister of Foreign Affairs. He became minister in 2007, replacing Li Zhaoxing (李肇星; b. 1940), and promoted to State Councilor in 2012. Former TALSG Office Director Wang Yi replaced Yang as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Another key player in the external affairs system is Politburo member Wang Huning (王沪宁); b. 1955). A GSD Second Department officer, Chen Xiaogong, previously served as deputy director of the FALSG Office before assignment as Second Department director and subsequently Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff.

Li Zhaoxing was ambassador to the United States in 1998 and foreign minister in 2003. He is dual hatted as chairman of the newly established China Public Diplomacy Association. Yang Zhenya (杨振亚) concurrently serves as deputy director of the China Society for People’s Friendship Studies (CSPFS; 中国国际友人研究会; 友研会). Zhang Deguang (张德广; b. 1941) is one of the PRC’s leading authorities on Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia. He served as ambassador to Russia from 2001 to 2003.

For example, SCOL Wang Qingqian (王庆前) supposedly was assigned to the PRC Embassy in Tokyo in 2001 under MOFA cover. He had been a member of CAIFC since 1980, specializing in Japan affairs. He allegedly was arrested on suspicion of leaking classified information while assigned to the PRC Embassy in Tokyo.


See Anne Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China, p. 200.

For Li Xiaolin’s official biography, see http://en.cpaaffc.org.cn/content/details34-627.html.


For background on CIPRA (中国国际公共关系协会), see its website at http://www.cipra.org.cn/.

11, 1998, at http://forums.chinatimes.com/report/trackll/87651101.htm. In addition to CMC Chairman Xi Jinping, current TALSG members include Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声; b. 1945); TALSG secretary general Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪; b. 1950), and Zhang Zhijun (张志军; b. 1953).

249 In August 1991, a senior GPD/LD officer, Liu Jingyao (刘景耀), accompanied TAO Assistant to the Director Li Qingzhou (李庆洲) and the Nanjing MR Liaison Department Director Yang Yuhui (杨玉辉) to Xikou, the ancestral home of Chiang Kai-shek. After transfer to Fujian, Li Qingzhou served as mishu to Chen Mingyi (陈明义; b. 1940), He Guoqiang (贺国强; b. 1943), and Xi Jinping (习近平; b. 1953). He concurrently directed the Fujian Government Affairs Office and Fujian Association of International Friendly Contact. Among various sources, see Wang Chuo-chen, “Communist Chinese Military Influence on Taiwan Policy Grows” (对台决策 共军影响力增强), China Times, July 29, 2000, at http://gb.chinatimes.com/gate/gb/forums.chinatimes.com.tw/report/bargain/htm/89072910.asp; and “Record of Fenghua’s Opening and Reform (奉化改革开放 30周年纪事), Fenghua City Government, 2003. Another PLA general officer who served within TAO is Miao Pengsheng (苗鹏生; b. 1946), who directed the Research Bureau. He was subsequently assigned as director of a UI GSD Second Department bureau. http://blog.sina.com.cn/liaohonglei.

250 Among various sources, see “Beijing Forum Concludes, To Be Held Next Year in Hong Kong” (北京會談閉幕 明年香港會談接棒), June 22, 2013, at http://www.zhgpl.com/erm-webapp/touch/detail.jsp?coluid=1&kindid=0&docid=102593343; and “Conference Report, Overseas Chinese World Conference for Promotion of China’s Peaceful Unification, Washington Assembly” (全球華僑華人促進中國和平統一華盛頓大會文獻彙編), National Association for China’s Peaceful Unification, Washington DC, September 17, 2011, at http://nacpu.org/articles/Xin-Hai-100/2011Global-forum.html. Xin Qi accompanied TAO Deputy Director Li Yafei (李亚飞; b. 1955) to Washington DC in 2011. During the Beijing Forum event in June 2013, Xin Qi was a keynote speaker alongside TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafei and TAO Research Bureau Director Huang Wentao, along with CASS Taiwan Institute Director, Yu Zhengsheng (杨建昌); b. 1952). GPD/LD officers have also appeared alongside assistant to the TAO director, Long Mingbiao (龙明彪; b. 1962). A graduate of the Southwest Political and Legal University (西南政法大学), Long Mingbiao worked within the Discipline Inspection Commission up to 2007, when he was assigned to the TAO. Between March 1996 and February 1997, he did a short stint in the Xiamen City Party Committee. He became mishuju director in 2005.

251 Members have included Cao Xiaoheng (曹小衡; b. 1955), Xu Bodong (徐博士; b. 1944), Zhang Mingqing (张铭清), Liu Hong (刘红), and Geng Jun (耿军). Among various sources, see (演讲人简历), Huaxia Network, August 14, 2007, at http://www.huaxia.com/zt/jll/07-076/580688.html. As an aside, there has been some consideration of subordinating the TAO under a new State Peaceful Unification Commission (国台办和平统一委员会). Other organizations that would be merged under the new commission include the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, State Administration for Religious Affairs, and State Ethnic Affairs Commission.


254 Meng Jianzhu (孟建柱; b. 1947) currently serves as secretary of the Central Political Legal Committee. A graduate of the Shanghai Mechanical Engineering Institute., Meng has roots in Shanghai City party structure and rose to serve as a deputy mishuzhang in the Shanghai government (1992-93), then vice-mayor and deputy secretary of the municipal party committee. In 2007, he was appointed as Minister of Public Security. In 2008, he was promoted to State Councillor rank. Meng Jianzhu is likely to retire in 2017 due to age limitations. Guo Shengkun (郭声琨; b. 1954) replaced Meng as Minister of Public Security in 2012. Wang Yongqing (汪永清; b. 1959) serves as Central Political Legal Committee secretary general.

255 Dual hatted as Zhou Enlai’s mishu, Yang Yindong (杨荫东; 1922-2005) had emerged from the Social Work system. After the office was reorganized in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping, Yang Yindong became office deputy director, then
reappointed director in 1982. He retired in 1985, and performed second line cadre mission as deputy director and secretary general of the Huangpu Alumni Association. In November 1969, the CID was placed under military control. Luo Qingchang (罗青长), father of outspoken AMS authority Luo Yuan, served as a Taiwan Work Office senior authority and CID director from 1975 until formation of the MSS in 1983.

250 Dual hatted as Zhou Enlai’s mishu and a veteran member of the Social Work system, Yang Yindong (杨荫东; 1922-2005), directed the Taiwan Work Office, which was housed within Central Investigation Department spaces. Other prominent players included Li Kenong (李克农), Public Security Director Luo Ruiqing (罗瑞卿), GPD’s Gan Siqi (甘泗淇), propaganda and United Front authority Liao Chengzhi (廖承志; 1908-1983), Xu Bing (徐冰), Zhang Hanfu (章汉夫, also known as 谢启泰), Zhang Banshi (张邦时), and Cao Juren (曹聚仁). Second-level authorities included UFWD Secretary General (童小鹏), CID Deputy Director Luo Qingchang (罗青长), and GPD’s Yang Side, and Security Deputy Minister (凌元), Propaganda Department Deputy Director (姚榛), and Overseas Chinese Committee authority (吴济生). (王宏儒) and Yang Yindong (杨荫东) also played important roles.


253 Established in 1984, former CICEC (中国国际文化交流中心) executive vice chairman, Li Liyun (林丽娟; b. 1933), was born in Taiwan. Wang Zhaoguo was a former executive director. MSS Director Geng Huichang (耿惠昌) formerly served as the center’s executive vice chairman from 1990 to 1993 (he concurrently served with CICIR). Ding Kuisong (丁奎淞) is a former CICIR expert on the U.S. and now serves as CICEC secretary general. Another prominent figure is Tao Dawei (陶大为; b. 1949).


266 In addition to associations that stress cultural and civilizational commonalities, relatively liberal organizations such as the Boyuan Foundation promote concepts of modernity in China’s development. Established in Hong Kong in 2007, Boyuan Council Chairman Qin Xiao’s sister is alleged to be married to the son of Chen Yi. Other key players include He Di (何迪), son of reformist former agricultural minister, and Chen Xiaolu (陈小鲁; b. 1946), son of Chen Yi. Chen Xiaolu is alleged to have sided with other prominent reformists, such as Hu Yaobang’s son Hu Deping (胡德平) and Ye Xuanning, in calling for the removal of Bo Xilai and reappraisal of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. Other reformers are said to include Lu De (陆德; 1942), son of Lu Dingyi (陆定一; 1906-1996); and Ma Xiaoli (马晓力), daughter of Xi Zhongxun political ally, Ma Wenrui (马文瑞; 1912-2004). See, for example, David Kelly, “Chinese Political Transition: Split in the Princeling Camp?,” *East Asia Forum*, March 21st, 2011, at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/03/21/chinese-political-transition-split-in-the-princeling-camp/; John Garnaut, “Elites Fight Secret Battle for China’s Soul,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 12, 2012, at http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-politics/elites-fight-secret-battle-for-chinas-soul-20121111-296a1.html; and Joseph Kahn, “Among China’s Elite, Talk of ‘Democracy’,” *New York Times*, April 19, 2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/19/world/asia/19iht-china.5.5364015.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.


