THE ALLIANCE
TOWARD A STRONGER U.S.-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP

U.S.-Japan Exchange Program
Capstone Report
The Alliance: Toward a Stronger U.S.-Japan Partnership

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About the Project 2049 Institute

The Project 2049 Institute seeks to guide decision makers toward a more secure Asia by the century’s mid-point. Located in Arlington, Virginia, the organization fills a gap in the public policy realm through forward-looking, region-specific research on alternative security and policy solutions. Its interdisciplinary approach draws on rigorous analysis of socioeconomic, governance, military, environmental, technological and political trends, and input from key players in the region, with an eye toward educating the public and informing policy debate.

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This paper is the final capstone to the two-year Leaders Program exchange initiated by the Project 2049 Institute in Washington, D.C. and Tokyo. This program aimed to promote a greater understanding of Japan’s foreign policy and its global role among U.S. and Japanese policymakers, experts, and future leaders through extensive research, people-to-people exchanges, and forums to generate a future-oriented alliance strategy for the United States and Japan.

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Introduction

For the first time in the history of our nation, the Asia-Pacific is more important for the United States than any other region of the world. That is today. Tomorrow it will be even more vital. Indeed, the Asia-Pacific is the new epicenter of global affairs, and it is here that profound strategic changes are unfolding that will transform the international system. As one of the region’s most prosperous, powerful and pivotally located countries, Japan will play a key role in steering the trajectory of future developments in the region.¹

The impact that Japan will have on the strategic architecture that comes to frame and define the Asia-Pacific in the years ahead cannot be overstated. Decisions made in Tokyo will ripple into policymaking calculations across the region, and indeed the world. How Japan conceptualizes its place in the nascent U.S. rebalance to Asia, and how it perceives its role in the U.S.-Japan alliance, will influence and shape much. More important in the near-term may be the extent to which Japanese leaders are able to implement recent changes to their national defense guidelines and find freedom from the self-imposed political constraints currently in place under Article Nine of Japan’s constitution.

Constitutional constraints notwithstanding, trends in the regional security environment are likely to drive Tokyo’s national defense strategy, compelling decisions regarding roles and missions that will in turn alter the course of capability development. Foremost among its security challenges, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) military modernization program is attended by tremendous uncertainties and risks for neighboring Japan. These uncertainties and risks have increased at a remarkable pace over the past ten years as China’s military build-up continues to surpass expectations and Beijing’s assertiveness over disputed territories grows. Likewise, North Korean behavior remains unstable and provocative, while its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs mature. The threats posed by both nations have catalyzed reconsiderations of Japan’s defense posture. The specter of natural disaster, international terrorism, pandemic, and Russian incursion remain relevant for Japan, but now represent more distant second order problems for the nation’s security in light of the challenges posed by China and North Korea.

The most important aspect of Japan’s national security strategy is its defensive alliance with the United States. Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. security commitment to Japan has served as an anchor stabilizing the region and enabling

¹ See Ian Easton and Randall Schriver, Assessing Japan’s National Defense: Toward a New Paradigm in the Asia-Pacific (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, June 2013), pp. 3-6, at http://project2049.net/documents/assessing_japan_national_defense_easton_schriver.pdf. Unless otherwise noted, the following section draws from this study.
growth. The stunning political and economic transformation of post-war Japan created the world’s second most prosperous country after the United States and a model for other aspiring regional powers to follow. Arguably, democracy and prosperity would not have flourished in South Korea and Taiwan in the absence of the U.S.-Japan alliance; Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong would not enjoy their current standards of living; and China would not be an emerging great power. In ways large and small the U.S.-Japan alliance has served as a pillar supporting the dramatic rise of the Asia-Pacific on the world stage.

Yet there have been times when policymakers in Washington and Tokyo disregarded the central importance of their alliance. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to a gradual drift in the U.S.-Japan relationship. This drift saw something of a course correction following by the 9-11 terrorist attacks, as Japan strongly supported the ensuing U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of East Africa. However, the alliance was also beset by basing relocation issues, the global financial recession, and a season of political contrarianism in Tokyo. The successful joint humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission following the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011 served to “buy time” for the alliance, but it wasn’t until the U.S. began to redefine and refocus its role in the region that new life was injected into the U.S.-Japan relationship. Further improving prospects for a stronger U.S.-Japan alliance, the Abe administration has begun pursuing deeper defense ties with Washington while expanding Tokyo’s contributions to regional and global security.

This paper will explore Japan’s renewed engagement in Asia and explain how it is contributing to a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance. To begin, we will examine the evolving security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for the alliance and the region. Next, we will provide an overview of the key challenges and opportunities that exist for Washington and Tokyo. Following this, we will discuss Japan’s international outreach and regional presence: including Tokyo’s diplomatic relations, emerging security and economic partnerships, and overseas developmental assistance work with key partners. We will then conclude with recommendations for a future-orientated and collaborative strategy for the U.S.-Japan alliance in the short and long-term as Washington and Tokyo continue working to strengthen their alliance.
Evolving Security Environment

The manner in which the Asia-Pacific regional security environment evolves over the coming years will be contingent upon broader trends that may already be discernible. One such trend is the rapid proliferation of technologies that can undermine the ability of modern militaries – such as those fielded by the United States and Japan – to maintain regional dominance. Driven by advances in integrated circuit technologies that allow for exponentially more powerful chip performance, modern conventional weapons systems are becoming capable of strategic effects that until recently could only be achieved through the use of nuclear weapons. This has had a flattening effect on power asymmetries, allowing relatively weak states to threaten more powerful adversaries with weapons that cost a mere fraction of the cutting-edge platforms they seek to counter. At the low end of the spectrum, Hezbollah in its 2006 war with Israel showed the world how a small force could defeat an otherwise overwhelming opponent though the application of tactics that optimize the employment of guided rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles (G-RAMM). At the high end of the spectrum, China is developing advanced ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, submarines, and cyber warfare capabilities that have the potential to rapidly erode the preponderance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the Western Pacific.

Broadly speaking, the global commons of international water, air, space and cyberspace that were once the sole purview of the superpowers are now increasingly congested and contested by a multitude of actors. This situation creates new challenges for the defense of Japan while also promising significant advantages that may reduce some past vulnerabilities. For example, as an island nation that is highly dependent upon seaborne trade and energy supplies, Japan is justifiably concerned about China’s growing maritime threats to its shipping fleet. On the other hand, given the development of technology-enabled shore defense systems, Japan may soon be in a position to radically undercut concerns about an amphibious assault against its islands. However, despite some positive aspects to these trends, Japanese defense planners describe their overall security situation as one in decline. According to then-Japanese Defense Minister, Satoshi Morimoto, “the security environment surrounding [Japan] is becoming increasingly harsh.”

What follows is an overview of weapons technology proliferation trends that are negatively impacting upon Japan’s security. These trends are worrisome because they increasingly allow countries such as China and – to a much lesser degree – North Korea to expose critical vulnerabilities in Japan’s defense posture, while at the same time

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eroding the dominance of Japan’s ally the United States. Because the entire territory of Japan is within the potential “threat envelope” of many of the adversary weapons being fielded, and because there is no completely reliable defense against these weapons, there is a concern that they could serve to undermine or at the very least complicate the U.S.-Japan alliance. Also of concern is the destabilizing nature of the weapons themselves. Many of the weapons being deployed are primed for offensive first strikes. They therefore encourage potentially escalatory responses in times of conflict. As such, their deployment represents a nettlesome problem for the long-term maintenance of regional stability.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC)⁴

There has been a clear trend in recent years toward an increased PRC presence and assertiveness in its surrounding waters or “near seas.” This trend reflects the culmination of numerous factors, but at its most essential level can be explained by the evolving strategic needs of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in Beijing. As an unelected political organization, the CCP’s claim to legitimacy has traditionally been based upon its delivery of economic success, its protection of China’s territorial sovereignty, and its championship of national pride. However, for a number of years there have been growing doubts about the CCP’s ability to maintain domestic stability, and more recently observers have raised serious questions about China’s economic health. These challenges appear to have driven the CCP to resort to the exploitation of territorial sovereignty issues in the East and South China Seas to shore up its tenuous legitimacy and bolster nationalistic sentiment.

⁴ Unless otherwise noted, this section draws from Ian Easton, China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Arlington VA: Project 2049 Institute, February 2014), pp. 4-6.
At the same time, the PRC may be seeking to exploit maritime security issues, especially those in the East China Sea, as part of its Taiwan policy. Indeed, the PRC's approach has been centered on fostering a sense of shared external threat with the Republic of China (ROC) by conflating their respective territorial sovereignty claims. This strategy appears to have been a key (if largely under-noticed) driver of China’s gambit in the East China Sea. For this reason, the Japan-Taiwan fisheries agreement in 2013 – viewed by many as a major diplomatic achievement – demonstrated Japan’s capacity to cement an official de-conflating of the PRC and ROC campaigns to assert sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyu Dao in China, and Diaoyu Tai in Taiwan).

Beijing’s maritime political maneuvering also appears to be driven by perceptions of a U.S.-Japan security alliance that is in relative decline when compared to the ascendant capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Though still far behind in terms of naval and aircraft hardware – and critical operational software – the PLA has an advantage that the U.S. military and the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) cannot match: theater missiles. In recent years, the PLA’s strategic missile force, the Second Artillery, has begun deploying long-range precision strike weapons that the U.S. and Japan appear ill-equipped to defend against. These weapons include anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) as well as growing fleets of ballistic missiles and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) for attacking land-based targets. The Chinese military is also investing heavily in anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and drones for attacking maritime and air targets, while rapidly improving its space and cyber weapons.
In addition, the past decade has seen the PLA Navy (PLAN) deploy the world’s largest fleet of modern diesel-electric submarines for operations around the Asian littoral. China has also deployed a large network of radars and signals intelligence stations for monitoring naval and air activity in the Western Pacific. Likewise, elements of the PLA and the Chinese Coast Guard have fielded a growing fleet of maritime surveillance ships that covertly collect intelligence while ostensibly engaged in benign activities such as fishing and environmental research. Chinese military and security officials are bolstering this network of aircraft, satellites, submarines, radars and ships with unmanned drones specifically designed for maritime surveillance missions. They also appear to be developing near space vehicles for maritime ISR collection missions.

In sum, China’s growing military capabilities present the U.S. and Japan with a considerable challenge. Beijing’s military modernization program is especially problematic because it is centered on offensive missiles systems optimized for large “surprise-attack” raids. The PLA’s long-range precision strike forces have little defensive utility; they therefore engender a sense of vulnerability when not used at the opening of a conflict. During crisis situations it can be expected that the PLA will thus be tempted to maintain a more aggressive posture than might otherwise be the case. During peacetime, the PLA’s strike capabilities also require intelligence collection efforts to “prepare the battlefield.” As a result, the PLA’s reconnaissance operations have begun intruding into American and Japanese territorial waters and airspace. Moreover, recent Chinese maritime operations have been conducted in a fashion that suggests the PLA seeks to heighten the possibility of unintended incidents and increased regional tensions in order to extract concessions from its neighbors.5

China’s reconnaissance-strike capabilities are also potentially destabilizing to regional security because they encourage geostrategic competition. For example, the largest of the uninhabited Senkaku Islands, Uotsuri-shima, is capped with a hill that towers 363 meters (1190 feet) above the East China Sea. Japanese military strategists and intelligence officials worry that the PLA could invade the island in order to establish a radar station on that strategic highpoint. Given the elevation, a notional radar station on the island would drastically improve the Chinese ISR “picture” of the East China Sea, and give the PLA continuous coverage into part of the Philippine Sea. While this

scenario seems unlikely given the high level of vigilance Japan has demonstrated in maintaining its control over the Senkaku Islands, nations bordering the South China Sea have not been as fortunate. Indeed, the PLA has constructed radar stations and other electronic intelligence collection platforms on a number of geographic features in the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands that both Vietnam and the Philippines claim as their territory. This has raised Chinese tensions with Hanoi and Manila, while also stoking worries in Tokyo that Japan could be next.

**The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; or North Korea)**

The DPRK government is unstable and unpredictable. The poor leadership record of Kim Jong-un has convinced many observers that regime collapse is probable in the near-to-mid future. In the interim, it is possible that the DPRK could engage in unprovoked acts of hostility against Japan. Most worrisome are the DPRK’s nuclear warhead and ballistic missile programs. While timelines are uncertain, the DPRK continues to engage in a nuclear weapons development and testing program that, with sufficient improvement, could eventually result in a warhead capable of threatening Japan. To demonstrate its weapons delivery capabilities, North Korea has repeatedly fired ballistic missiles over Japanese air space.

North Korea has developed two ballistic missiles with ranges that suggest that their primary target is Japan. The *Nodong* is a road mobile missile that has been deployed in active service since the mid-1990s. As of 2013, it was estimated that North Korea had deployed almost 50 *Nodong* missile launchers.  

6 North Korea has also been developing the *Taepodong*-1 ballistic missile for Japan-related missions. While both the *Nodong* and the *Taepodong*-1 could strike targets across Japan, their lack of advanced guidance make them weapons of terror rather than precision-strike weapons that could reliably target military facilities. For this reason, it appears likely that North Korea intends to use them as delivery platforms for nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, rather than conventional warheads.  

7 Unlike comparable Chinese systems, the *Nodong* and *Taepodong* missiles are both liquid-fueled, limiting their operational readiness and

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flexibility. In further contrast with China, it does not appear that North Korea has the technological capacity to develop methods for defeating ballistic missile defense systems.

Aside from missiles, the DPRK could use maritime assets to threaten Japanese interests. North Korea’s navy has approximately 20 Romeo-class submarines and 60 midget submarines. While its submarines are outdated, they could pose a significant challenge in coastal areas. An example of this can be seen in the March 26, 2010 sinking of the South Korean naval patrol ship Cheonan. An international survey group concluded that a small North Korean submarines sunk the Cheonan with a torpedo. Of concern to Japan, North Korea could alternatively use its submarines to infiltrate special operations forces into coastal areas for sabotage, abduction, guerilla warfare and intelligence gathering missions.\(^8\)

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U.S.-Japan Alliance

In a February 2013 speech in Washington DC, Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated, “I make a pledge. I will bring back a strong Japan, strong enough to do even more good for the betterment of the world.” Much of what we have witnessed over the past year represents Prime Minister Abe’s concrete efforts to make good on that pledge. Complimenting his efforts to restore Japan’s core economic strength through “Abenomics” and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are steps the Japanese leadership believe are necessary to best position Japan to deal with its worsening security environment and to sustain a leadership role in the region.

Japan’s Three Policy Documents

In mid-December 2013 the Government of Japan unveiled three important policy documents, its: 1) National Security Strategy; 2) National Defense Program Guidelines; and 3) Mid-Term Defense Program. These three documents represent the consensus opinion of the highest levels of the Japanese government, and are intended to serve a number of functions. Domestically, these three documents are meant to provide a future vision for Tokyo’s foreign and defense policymaking community and a pathway for achieving specific goals; including the maintenance of strategic stability in an era of increased uncertainty and the streamlining of decision-making during crises. Internationally, these documents are intended to increase transparency and reassure Japan’s friends, security partners, and treaty ally (the United States), while signaling Tokyo’s resolve to potential adversaries (China and North Korea).

These documents come amidst a series of initiatives the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is taking to shore up Japan’s security situation. The first such initiative occurred in late November 2013 when Japan’s legislature enacted a law that established a national security council. This new law was closely followed in early December with the passage of a national secrecy bill aimed at allowing Tokyo to better protect its bilateral intelligence sharing and defense technology development programs with the United States. Taken together, these developments represent a watershed in Japanese defense affairs that will significantly contribute to a strengthened U.S.-Japan’s alliance in the years ahead.

Japan’s three policy documents are all significant to the overall policy direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance and merit careful examination. To understand the three policy documents and, more to the point, to understand the implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is helpful to first analyze the main drivers which led to this set of policy decisions. A main driver (if not the most important) is uncertainty regarding the trajectory of China. Japan’s leaders have watched for nearly two decades as China’s military budgets have grown at double digit percentage rates annually. As a result, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has acquired capabilities that can impact regional
security as well as create new complications for alliance contingency planning. In particular, the PLA reliance on increasingly lethal and accurate ballistic and cruise missiles call into question the safety of Japanese and U.S. military facilities in Japan. Equally troubling is the steady pattern of Chinese assertiveness in the region, and Beijing’s frequent habit of infringing on Japan’s interests. China’s behavior in the East China Sea and in the areas surrounding the Senkakus alone is sufficient for many in Japan to want to invest more in defense. While Japan’s policy documents were likely near complete before the Chinese announcement of its new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, such a provocative act will surely sustain the momentum as Japan enters the implementation phase of its defense program.

North Korea is also a driver for Japan’s national security strategy and defense policy. While this has been true rhetorically for many decades, the DPRK has often been used as a cover in the past for the planning and acquisitions that are really oriented toward China. However, at the current juncture, security professionals in both the U.S. and Japan genuinely see a window of risk and vulnerability associated with North Korea, and they understand that meeting the challenges Pyongyang presents requires exploring new policy approaches. Japan’s interest in strengthening ballistic missile defense (BMD) and developing an independent counterstrike capability are rooted in near term concerns about North Korea. Japan also well understands the stakes at play for the United States as an alliance partner to South Korea and the role Japan will continue to be assigned in the event of a military contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, despite an overall re-orientation of Japan’s defense to the southwestern islands, Japan’s security professionals appreciate the need to sustain attention and capabilities to the north as volatile politics in the DPRK unfold.

Another driver for Japan is to fulfill its vision of becoming a more capable and flexible alliance partner to the United States. For decades, many in Japan have felt unease or even embarrassment at the thought that while Washington would be fully committed to the defense of Japan if the need were to arise, Tokyo offered little in return to its ally other than use of Japan’s sovereign territory for basing. There are also deeper concerns in some quarters about potential “abandonment” should Japan fail to prove its value to the United States over time. This has not solely been a matter of constitutional/policy restrictions – it also stems from the recognition that Japan’s limited defense spending, its self-imposed restrictions on the type of weapons it has historically procured, and how it is organized bureaucratically all combine to place hard limits on how capable a partner Tokyo can be to Washington. Furthermore, after decades of U.S. encouragement to Japanese leaders to do more to bolster Japan’s defenses, taking the concrete steps as outlined in the policy documents will allow Tokyo to put forward tangible evidence that it is responsive to the alliance managers on the eastern side of the Pacific, and that Japan is prepared to be a stronger and more capable partner for Washington.
A fourth driver for Tokyo’s defense policy guidance is the need to implement Prime Minister Abe’s vision for Japan to become a regional leader in the Asia Pacific. Throughout Japan’s national security strategy one finds mention of Japan’s vision to be a strong leader in Asia. But in these documents, one finds more than a rhetorical nod at seeking to claim that mantle. Through Tokyo’s new policy guidance, Japanese leaders are speaking explicitly and specifically about the manner in which Japan intends to lead. “Proactive Pacifism” recognizes a role for Japan in helping to secure stability and peace throughout the region. Tokyo seeks new types of partnerships through which to make the vision a reality. More specifically, Japan’s leadership envisions a larger role in helping secure the global commons of the maritime, space and cyber domains. Moreover, Japan and its military assets could play a larger role in meeting the challenge of natural disasters in the region going forward. And Japan’s leaders also state their intent to further explore a variety of activities that may now be possible given the establishment of their new principles for arms exports.

Finally, the context for understanding these documents should not only include events of the recent past and Japan’s evolution to this point in time. Fully defining the context for these policy documents is only possible if one also considers steps that Tokyo plans to take in the very near future. Thus, a major driver for the Japanese government is to set the stage for major policy decisions that will unfold in the year ahead. In 2014 it is expected that Japan and the United States will release new joint defense guidelines. The U.S-Japan joint defense guidelines will then inform a serious discussion about future roles and missions for the alliance partners, and a new orientation for contingency planning. Furthermore, it is very likely that Prime Minister Abe will soon seek a formal reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to eliminate the prohibition on collective self-defense. These steps will be all the more meaningful having been preceded by the three policy documents released in late 2013. By stating that Tokyo will spend more on defense, will take a more pro-active role in promoting regional peace and stability, will position itself to be a more capable partner to the United States, and will be better prepared for China’s capabilities in the non-traditional domains, Japan will ultimately be better positioned to explain its vision of becoming a more “normal” country after reinterpreting Article 9.
The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meetings)

Japan and the U.S. continue to strengthen the alliance relationship in concrete ways in concert with Prime Minister Abe’s activist vision of a Japanese economic revival at home and an expanded international role for Japan independently and as a full partner in U.S.-Japan security and defense cooperation. In October 2013, both nations took a significant step forward with the recent Security Consultative Committee/2+2 meetings held, importantly, for the first time in Japan with both the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State present. The symbolism and substance of the 2+2 sent important messages to the region, China and North Korea in particular, about the will and intention of the U.S. to remain closely engaged with Japan and its key allies and to modernize its alliance relationships to tackle future security challenges.

The U.S. remains strongly supportive of Prime Minister Abe’s initiatives to undertake a revamping of Japan’s national security process—first with the work to craft a National Security Strategy to set the foundation for the nation’s more activist posture, and also to pursue the creation of a National Security Council to coordinate and streamline decision-making. Along with Prime Minister Abe’s increases in defense spending after 11 years of steady decline, and the reexamination of the legal basis for Japan to exercise the collective right of self-defense, U.S. policymakers recognize that the alliance relationship is on the brink of a new departure and now has the potential to reach greater levels of enhanced strategic capability.

The 2+2 ministers laid out a comprehensive vision of enhanced and expanded cooperation over a wide range of defense and security initiatives. The SCC statement and administration background briefings made clear that the historic first step would be the plan to revise the 1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines. The updating of the Guidelines would create the overarching framework for effectively implementing a broad range of initiatives that would reflect a redefinition of roles and modes of interoperability based on new missions and requirements generated by the current security environment. Signal steps forward in this process would be the inclusion of cyber and space domains, and Japan’s growing global and regional outreach on such issues.

U.S. officials have highlighted the SCC’s announcement of a ballistic missile defense initiative, specifying the location of a second ballistic missile defense radar that will provide Japan better warning of North Korean threats, and fill gaps in coverage regarding protection of the U.S. homeland. The third area emphasized by officials was the joint commitment to expand and enhance regional engagement, building security capacity with partners in the region and cooperative relationships to respond to threats and complex contingencies such as natural disasters. Trilateral consultations,
particularly with Australia and the ROK were singled out for special mention as priorities in addressing the major threats most likely to pose challenges in the region.

An additional area highlighted in the SCC statement as an area of progress and ongoing work was the long running effort toward the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. The ministers signed the protocol to formally revise the Guam International Agreement, reflecting the adjusted budgetary requirements for the planned transfer of some 5,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam, which U.S. briefers said would “probably begin in the mid-2020s.” Reference was made to Japan’s commitment of $3.1 billion to support that move, and ongoing work to determine specific funding responsibilities between the two allies as plans move forward. Also discussed in some detail were the various actions the U.S. would take to ensure that the realignment actions are politically sustainable, including actions to mitigate negative impact on Japanese communities and the environment as preparations continue for overall realignment. Accelerated land returns to Japan and relocation of some training exercises were noted in the statement and by U.S. officials as part of this effort. The ministers also affirmed that the agreement to locate the Futenma replacement facility (FRF) at Henoko remained the “only solution.”
Finally, briefers highlighted the continuing provision of more advanced military capabilities and systems to Japan. The SCC statement specified, as among other actions, that the U.S. intention to deploy advanced capabilities to Japan including:

- Two MV-22 aircraft squadrons to replace the Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter;
- The first deployment of U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft outside the U.S. beginning early 2014;
- U.S. Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aircraft on a rotational basis beginning spring 2014; and
- U.S. Marine Corps F-35B aircraft in 2017 – the first to be forward deployed outside of the United States.

Washington-based analysts by and large were favorably impressed by this past year’s SCC/2+2 work, particularly because the 2+2 sent such a strong signal of U.S. commitment to the “rebalance” strategy when so much domestic political dysfunction at home had begun to feed doubts about Washington’s ability to sustain any strategic spending over the long term, whether at home or on foreign policy initiatives. As a solid reassurance to a key ally, the SCC was viewed as an important success and signal of strong support to Prime Minister Abe.

**Economics and Trade**

Tokyo’s win in its bid for the 2020 Summer Olympics has served to generate excitement and encourage Japan’s recovering economy. This follows an on-going series of domestic economic reforms referred to as Abenomics. The first two arrows of the Abenomics reform policy are designed to address deflation and stimulate Japan’s stagnant economy through fiscal and monetary reforms. The last arrow consists of structural reforms in key Japanese industries. Indeed, the traditional organization of Japanese economic power has been centered on large multinational conglomerates, a phenomenon known as Japan, Inc. However, with the early 1990s burst of the Japanese financial bubble and two “lost decades”, Japan, Inc has lost some of its allure. The implications of Japan’s ongoing economic changes could mean a potentially dismantled large business sector. Going forward, the distribution of assets and liabilities in the Japanese economy are likely to be reshuffled to allow small-to-medium sized enterprises more prominent roles in the economy.

Under Prime Minister Abe’s leadership, Tokyo officially agreed to partake in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks, becoming the twelfth member of the negotiations after Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Abe’s move to join the talks exhibits a sign of readiness from Japan and indicates that Japanese political leaders are serious about regional economic integration, and are favorable towards adopting trade liberalization despite foreseeable challenges. Just as the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas helps to define
regional interactions, the TPP is expected to set a standard for regional trade that will help to shape the growth of multiple economies and bring about greater prosperity. While the TPP framework is expected to provide relatively high and difficult trade standards for governments to adhere to, countries are willing to participate in the hopes that these efforts will help their economies in the long run to achieve greater growth.

U.S.-Japan bilateral talks through the TPP framework, however, show signs of difficulty as both sides hold different interests in respective domestic trade sectors. Domestic opposition against the TPP exists in both countries and is represented by powerful sectors of the economy and related interest groups. In Japan, rice, beef, pork, wheat and sugar producers fear the inflow of American products that are likely to challenge their traditional market advantages. For the U.S., the auto industry is a major sector that fears the potential effects of the TPP – a de facto bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and Japan – on American automobiles. As such, American and Japanese negotiators and lawmakers have an obligation to continue narrowing the gap of differences in order to reach mutually acceptable terms. While political will exists to push TPP talks on both sides, reaching consensus will require more negotiations to meet the baseline of both sides’ expectations. The level of U.S.-Japan cooperation in the TPP talks and subsequent trade liberalization changes will serve as a precedent for negotiations with other Asian economies that may be interested in joining the TPP in the future – including Taiwan, South Korea, and China. As the harbinger of how far the TPP regional trade framework can go, U.S.-Japan cooperation is essential.

Energy Security

Over the past three years major developments have taken place in the Asia-Pacific region that have significantly impacted Japan’s energy security picture. The March 11, 2011 triple disaster in Japan raised questions on the role of nuclear energy; the shale gas revolution in North America pushed forward prospects for new strategic energy partnerships; and geopolitical tensions in the East China Sea have signaled what may be the start of a new era of resource nationalism. These major developments add an even greater sense of urgency for those working to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Today Japan, like many countries of the Asia-Pacific, is at a critical energy security and development crossroads. Reliance on energy imports exposes countries to insecurities resulting from physical disruptions in the global market. In particular, Northeast Asia’s reliance on Middle Eastern energy resources was enabled by the development and protection of infrastructure and critical shipping lanes in the South China Sea via the chokepoint Strait of Malacca. The latter, which sees more tanker traffic than the Suez or Panama Canals, is a geographical bottleneck only 1.7 miles wide at its narrowest point.

As Asia’s energy demand grows, maritime traffic through this strategic waterway is forecasted to rise. Approximately half of the oil bound for Northeast Asia passes through the Strait of Malacca and it is predicted that by 2030 two-thirds of Asia’s total oil imports will move through the Strait. Therefore, any disruption of maritime transport in Southeast Asia due to interception, blockage, or geopolitical upheaval would heighten supply insecurity in Northeast Asia, and raise the cost of energy. However, while all would be affected, the ramifications of supply shortages would be greater in highly import-dependent countries like Japan.

Increased global dependence on Persian Gulf energy supplies and higher flows of energy from the Middle East to Asia will increase the importance of protecting the global commons. Japanese naval vessels began antipiracy missions off of Somalia in 2009, and despite higher oil demand requirements for power generation after the March 11 disasters, Japan reduced its imports of oil from Iran by one-third over the first five months of 2012 in cooperation with U.S.-led sanctions. Going forward, Tokyo’s increased participation in multinational efforts to combat piracy, protect Persian Gulf shipping, confront threats to regional peace, such as those currently posed by Iran’s nuclear program, and secure sea-lanes will be needed and welcomed. Indeed, as Asia’s most capable naval power and America’s closest ally in the region, Japan will play a pivotal role in securing the Asia-Pacific’s maritime commons. Japan’s investments into more helicopter carriers, advanced submarines, amphibious ships, and maritime
intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) assets reflect the growing role Tokyo intends to play.

Looking ahead, the U.S. Navy is likely to see the erosion of its role as the guardian of the global maritime commons as it enters into a period of budgetary austerity. This situation will force trade-offs, with more ships, submarines, and aircraft dedicated to patrol missions along the corridor that runs from the Persian Gulf to Northeastern Asia – and far fewer available for other parts of the world. The U.S. and Japan are also beginning to enhance initiatives to build the capacities of allied and partner navies. One such initiative already underway has been equipping the Philippines with coastal patrol cutters so that Manila can do more to assure maritime security in its surrounding waters. Recognizing that the U.S. and Japanese navies will not have enough resources to patrol everywhere, it will be important for Washington and Tokyo to accelerate bilateral and multilateral efforts to enable maritime security partners with the equipment and training they need to meet their growing responsibilities.

**Education and Exchange**

Educational exchanges are a major component of U.S.-Japan cooperation. A key challenge facing the long-term health of the U.S.-Japan alliance is the decline in the volume of bilateral education exchanges that help foster greater cultural and linguistic understanding. Recent years have seen a sharp drop in the number of Japanese students studying in the United States. For example, while in 2000 there were some 46,000 Japanese students enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities,\(^\text{10}\) by the 2012-13 academic year, the number had dropped to 19,600.\(^\text{11}\) The number of U.S. students going to Japan, on the other hand, has steadily increased over the past decade – with an incidental drop in the 2010/2011 academic year, largely due to class cancelations after the 3:11 disasters.\(^\text{12}\) However, the 2011-12 academic year saw only 5,300 American students, or 1.9 percent of total U.S. study abroad students, go to Japan.\(^\text{13}\)

This state of affairs has led many observers to express concern over the future of U.S.-Japan relations. In particular, many Japanese experts are concerned that future generations of U.S. policymakers may be dominated by “China Hands” who have little understanding of Japan and the importance of the alliance. Americans strategists are concerned that rising linguistic and cultural barriers may limit the extent to which U.S. and Japanese troops will be able seamlessly execute bilateral operations. One potential

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\(^{13}\) Ibid.
solution identified by Japan’s recent National Security Strategy is for Tokyo to invest more in promoting Japanese language education abroad, while deepening bilateral exchanges with government, universities, and think tanks. For the U.S., one potential solution could be for policymakers in Washington to promote language education and cultural exchanges as part of its broader strategy to rebalance to Asia. Reforming current policies to offer increased flexibility on visas and immigration could also help attract Japanese students back to American universities.

In the context of an overall decrease in number of Japanese students studying abroad, different government-led initiatives are being implemented to promote more U.S. students studying in Japan and vice versa. The U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (COLCON) – a bilateral advisory panel to the U.S. and Japanese governments – published a report in June 2013 that highlighted the goal to “double the number of Japanese and Americans studying in each other’s countries by 2020.” This initiative, along with others, seeks to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and will be crucial for generating future leaders for the alliance.

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14 http://www.asiamattersforamerica.org/japan/japanese-exchange-students-a-vanishing-species
15 http://culcon.jusfc.gov/education-task-force-2
Political Challenges to the Alliance

Despite many recent successes and a trajectory that is positive overall, the two major political issues that have long challenged the U.S.-Japan alliance – disputes related to South Korea and Okinawa – continue to attract much attention.

Japan-Republc of Korea (ROK) Relations

Improving Tokyo’s relationship with Seoul continues to be a challenge for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The impasse was on clear display at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders Meeting in Bali in October 2013, when Prime Minister Abe and President Park sat next to each other but intentionally refrained from substantial engagement, prompting a Japan Times article titled, “Gone in 60 seconds: Abe-Park talks.” As two major allies of the U.S., conciliation between South Korea and Japan are crucial to regional stability, as leaders from both sides recognize. The security challenges posed by North Korea and China should in effect bring the two U.S. allies closer together. However, historical issues dramatically impede the bilateral relationship, with the “comfort women” issue at the forefront of political contention.

Despite difficulties, Washington has an obligation to continue to encourage political rapprochement between the two sides, especially given mutual security interests and shared values. After Beijing’s November 2013 announcement of its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), Seoul and Tokyo showed signs of alignment as the two sides protested China’s demands requiring all aircraft to file a flight plan with Chinese authorities upon transit through the zone. When Seoul announced the expansion of its own ADIZ, Japan publically acknowledged Korea’s claims despite the partial overlap with Japan’s ADIZ. As such, Japan and South Korea exhibited a united front against China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea and implicitly signaled their ability and willingness to cooperate under strenuous security conditions.

However, observers in Washington also continue to evince increasing consternation that complex and sensitive “history issues” continue to burden Japan-ROK relations. The downturn in relations between Tokyo and Seoul have incurred very real costs to the ability of both nations to maximize the political and operational benefits of closer coordination on the obvious security challenges posed by North Korea and China. U.S. policymakers quietly communicate concerns over the sharp downturn in relations between two close allies, but there is no obvious short term solution to such an emotional and politicized set of historical grievances.

One possible trend that may emerge from the current negative dynamic between Japan and the ROK is the necessary refocusing of diplomatic energies in other directions. President Park Geun-hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping have clearly had more high
level opportunities to engage in strategic and diplomatic consultation over their common agendas than Seoul and Tokyo. The continuation of U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral consultation on North Korea policy may be a comforting sign that, regardless of tense relations between Tokyo and Seoul, the operational necessity of consulting on common threats remains an overriding responsibility that cannot succumb to the emotions of domestic politics.

But there has clearly been a net loss to the strategic positioning of the U.S. as long as Japan and the ROK continue to find it politically difficult to move relations forward. Even Japan’s current discussion of expanding interpretation of how to exercise the right of collective self-defense to the benefit of the U.S. is the target of misdirected and emotionally-charged criticism from some sectors of ROK public opinion. South Koreans worry that such Japanese policy changes would be potentially threatening to their national security. U.S. analysts and commentators have increasingly pointed to a disconnect in U.S.-ROK communications on this complicated subject to the detriment of trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation against the genuine challenges to security in the region.

Okinawa

The Okinawan governor’s approval of a landfill permit to allow construction of a new base in Nago City, Henoko represents a breakthrough after 17 years of negotiations and political stalemate. As part of the controversial MCAS Futenma relocation plan, the landfill agreement was passed amid emotionally-charged politics in Okinawa. With two main leftist media outlets that critically oppose American military presence, Okinawa public opinion is dominated by strong opposition to the relocation plan. However, Tokyo’s persistent outreach to the current governor – whereby Abe reportedly promised to end operations at Futenma within five years, a claim that Abe later refused to confirm – appeared to bear fruit and succeeded in building the governor’s confidence for the relocation plans. While the promise is reassuring for Okinawans who are against U.S. military presence, the reality of it being finished within half a decade is questionable and unlikely. However, given the importance of Futenma relocation in the U.S.-Japan alliance, U.S. forces should work to speed up land returns within the prefecture. Along with these efforts, speeding up the shared-use of facilities between U.S. and Japanese forces will help realign joint posture.

In order to enhance understanding between Japanese and American counterparts in Okinawa, a more balanced local media is sorely needed. Two major leftist news outlets currently dominate Okinawan public perception: Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times.

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17 Informed by officials in MCAS Futenma, November 2013. The completion of relocation is estimated at another 15 years.
As fierce opponents to U.S. military presence and the landfill agreement in Henoko, these two media outlets not only play an important role in shaping local perceptions, but falsely imply to outsiders that most Okinawans share the newspapers’ sentiments. The two sources regularly report on anti-base movements and overshadow the positive efforts and contributions of American forces in the local community as well as in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, U.S. disaster relief operations that deployed from Okinawa to the Philippines in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan were left unreported in these two major news sources. The one-sided bias represented in Okinawa’s mainstream media point to the need for a more balanced news outlet.

U.S. forces in Okinawa read an American news source called *The Pacific Star*, which covers more U.S.-related news and broader regional issues, giving U.S. operations more favorable coverage. The dissonance between the Okinawan and American communities is reflected by the different mindsets represented by local media outlets. Although political tensions are prone to flare up between polarized groups holding different views of American military presence on the island, a more objective news source can play an important role in shaping a constructive middle-ground narrative that recognizes multiple perspectives.

“[The governor’s decision to approve the landfill permit] comes after many years of sustained effort between the United States and Japan, and it is the most significant milestone achieved in these realignment efforts so far”

-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel
Japan’s Regional Engagement

Challenges notwithstanding, evolving security trends in the Asia-Pacific highlight the importance of Japan’s regional engagement efforts. Indeed, outreach to regional actors is becoming increasingly important to the government in Tokyo. China’s rise and rapid military modernization programs throw into sharp relief the importance of strategic posturing for neighboring countries. Cooperation between Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and other regional militaries sends a strong message to Beijing. The unpredictable nature of the DPRK government also points to the need for regional leaders to engage in regular consultations regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Clearly, Japan and the U.S. share mutual interests for peace and stability with other states in the region.

As the Abe administration works to reinterpret the Article 9 in the Constitution – a measure that has restricted Japan from collective self defense – it is being sensitive to regional sentiments and endeavoring to convey its policies and goals clearly. When properly communicated, shared security concerns between Japan and other regional actors can bring them closer together and incentivize cooperation.

Japan-Taiwan

Japan’s relationship with Taiwan – already close as the result of a shared cultural affinity and unique historical bonds – has grown even warmer over the past several years. According to Japanese diplomats, Tokyo was “profoundly touched” by Taipei’s generous response to the 3.11 disaster, when Taiwan made contributions that far exceeded other nations in the region. Japan was also gratified by President Ma’s personal outpouring of sympathy for Japanese disaster victims. The partnership that was created between Japan and Taiwan in the wake of the tragedy has resulted in an elevation of Taiwan’s diplomatic status in Tokyo. For example, Taipei’s ambassador to Japan was received by the Emperor in official ceremony for the first time, and Taiwanese representatives were invited to attend a 3.11 memorial ceremony with full diplomatic status despite the two nations’ “non-official” relationship. These Japanese gestures of respect for Taiwan led to protests from China, but diplomats in Tokyo plan to “continue ignoring” Beijing’s complaints as they work to advance Japan-Taiwan relations. Looking ahead, some Japanese officials see a window of opportunity to build upon the 2013 Japan-Taiwan fisheries agreement to establish a bilateral free trade agreement. Other Japanese observers note the importance of bolstering defense and security ties with Taiwan in light of the common threat the two nations share from China.
Japan-ASEAN

Last year marked the 40th year anniversary of ASEAN-Japan friendship and cooperation dating back to an informal dialogue established in the early 1970’s. To emphasize the shared value of cooperation, a theme emerged from a joint summit meeting in late 2013 commemorating the anniversary – “Hand in hand, facing regional and global challenges” – along with a vision statement and implementation plan that outlined a series of suggestions for cooperation, ranging from traditional to nontraditional topics. Areas of cooperation include maritime security to ensure freedom of navigation, counter-terrorism, cybercrime, trade, development assistance in critical infrastructure, climate and environmental issues, and disaster relief. Japan also participates in regional initiatives such as the implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) to help develop critical infrastructure.

As ASEAN’s second largest trading partner after China and second largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI), Japan stands as an important stakeholder in the development of ASEAN countries, including the Greater Mekong Sub-region and the Brunei-Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). Japan’s contributions to Southeast Asia continue to highlight the importance of overseas development assistance (ODA) in Japan’s foreign policy objectives. In light of territorial tensions in the South China Sea, growing Japan-ASEAN ties demonstrate political will to counter China’s increasingly assertive behavior in territorial contests around the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands. Furthermore, the strong partnership exhibited by Japan and ASEAN illustrate that countries are capable of reconciliation and cooperation with modern-day Japan based on mutual interests.

Japan-Australia

Japan was described as Australia’s “best friend in Asia” by Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott at the October 2013 Japan-Australia summit meeting. Aimed to increase cooperation during peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA), signed in May 2010, continues to serve as a keystone of cooperation between Japan and Australian military forces. Information sharing is also crucial to the bilateral relationship, as signing of the Japan-

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Australia Information Security Agreement (ISA) in May 2012 demonstrates. As the fourth bilateral information sharing agreement signed by Japan – after the U.S., NATO, and France – to safeguard national security interests, the ISA serves to strengthen the legal framework for the exchange of classified information between Australia and Japan and ensures mutual protection of classified information.22 It is in U.S. interest for Japan and Australia to grow in their security and economic partnership, and U.S. policymakers should continue to encourage close cooperation.

**Japan-India**

Japan-India relations are continuously spurred by China’s proximity and economic and military growth and are crucial for the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. At the recent summit between Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Singh, the Mumbai-Ahmedabad corridor was identified as a bullet-train joint venture project to be financed by Japanese investors.23 In addition, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) is an ambitious ongoing project that involves extensive Japanese investment and Indian support. Estimated to affect approximately 180 million people (14 percent of the population),24 the DMIC would reshape Indian infrastructure and economic integration significantly. The TPP and RCEP are two important trade agreements that would help Japan and India to coordinate broad principles for regional economic integration. These multilateral frameworks are purposed to promote transparency in the development of economic architecture.25 U.S. policymakers should continue to encourage both sides toward continued cooperation, as closer relations between Japan and India would help to secure U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. As vibrant democracies, Japan and India have shared values and principles that are important in shaping regional norms of governance and the political and security architecture.

**Japan-Middle East**

As Japan’s post-3.11 energy challenges persist, Prime Minister Abe is busy solidifying ties with key oil suppliers in the Middle East. With 84% of its energy needs imported and nuclear plants suspended from operating, Japan is looking to the Middle East, which supports 90% of its oil and 30% of its natural gas needs.26 In addition to Japan’s energy requirements that are linked to the Middle East, Japanese politicians want to

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24 See more information on the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor at http://delhimumbaiindustrialcorridor.com/
demonstrate that the region is more than just a source of energy, and are pursuing other types of cooperation with Oman, such as anti-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea. In addition, the JSDF currently has an operational base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, Japan’s only such overseas base due to its military restrictions. Japan-Middle East relations are likely to grow stronger in the years to come. As such, U.S. policymakers should regularly consult with Japanese leaders on their long-term goals in the Middle East to increase mutual understanding of core interests and resulting policies.

1. We have entered into a unique window of opportunity to advance and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. A confluence of factors to include political stability in Japan, renewed high-level U.S. political commitment to Asia, and the growing uncertainty regarding China’s trajectory give alliance managers a great deal of latitude for maneuver. However, the opportunities must be seized or they will surely begin to wane and the window will begin to close.

2. The time and attention of senior political leaders is a precious commodity, and thus there will naturally be pressure on alliance managers to prioritize issues. Nonetheless, alliance managers should push for an agenda that is broad, comprehensive and ambitious. Consistent with the aforementioned window of opportunity, as well as Japan’s growing capabilities, the alliance should seek to realize improvements in trade, energy cooperation, military-to-military ties, regional security cooperation, joint protection of the global commons, and management of global security challenges.

3. The challenges presented by a China that is growing in its comprehensive national power, increasingly assertive on regional security matters, and more aggressive in an orchestrated political warfare campaign against Japan and the alliance will dominate alliance affairs for the foreseeable future. For all intents and purposes, addressing the various challenges and opportunities associated with China will serve as the organizing principle for the U.S.-Japan alliance going forward.

4. As such, the United States and Japan should undertake a joint “net assessment” of China’s military trajectory and its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance.

5. Washington and Tokyo have a real stake in peace, especially since a war in the Western Pacific would almost certainly involve the use of highly destructive conventional – and possibly nuclear – weapons. Therefore, it is in the interest of both governments to educate their publics to recognize the common threats they face and seek their support for a stronger U.S.-Japan alliance.

6. The United States and Japan should complete the current roles and missions review, and should regularize a process for dynamic, sustained discussions on roles and missions to enable more timely revisions consistent with the fast evolving security environment.
7. Having completed its QDR, the United States must begin to reconcile resource constraints with rhetorical goals of “rebalancing.” The U.S. must soon be in a position to convey to Japan our specific expectations for the alliance going forward, to include full integration of the JSDF into the Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle concept of operations. To be effective, this would include joint experimentation and training, as well as burden sharing in terms of deep interdiction missions.

8. The United States and Japan should actively seek and pursue opportunities for joint development of future weaponry and related capabilities. The United States should fully exploit the relaxation of Japan’s “three principles on arms exports.”

9. The United States and Japan should pursue joint basing and “hardening” simultaneously. Joint facilities should benefit from mature protection capabilities, to include aircraft shelters, deeply buried command and control facilities, proven rapid runway repair capabilities, redundant communication lines, underground logistical stations, and decoys.

10. Japanese defense planners should actively promote the integration of capabilities appropriate for new battle spaces through the establishment of a joint strategic computing and cyber warfare force. They should also increase cooperation with the United States on unmanned aerial system and space operations.

11. The United States and Japan must adequately counter the ballistic and cruise missile capabilities of the PLA. To address the inherently destabilizing nature of China’s missile force, Washington and Tokyo should strongly advocate for Beijing’s inclusion in the INF Treaty. Should these political efforts initially fail, the United States and Japanese militaries should develop and forward deploy conventional ground-launched missile systems as a means of increasing diplomatic leverage.

12. As Japan embarks on a path to reinterpret and/or revise its constitution, the United States and Japan should create a more ambitious joint training program to reflect greater alliance capacity to deal with highly stressful wartime contingencies. To better enable this effort, Washington should increase the number of American military officers and civilian officials with Japanese language and cultural training.

13. The U.S. and Japan should prioritize U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation as it yields significant strategic benefits for the U.S.-Japan alliance in regards to North Korean brinksmanship and Chinese provocations in East Asia’s air and maritime environments.
14. The overall health of the U.S.-Japan alliance will increasingly be measured by the quality of trade and economic integration. As multiple efforts are currently underway toward trade liberalization in Asia by many of the region’s major economies, it is essential that the U.S. and Japan quickly complete a bilateral agreement under the auspices of the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, and jointly push for the conclusion of the TPP.

15. The United States and Japan should embrace the goal of becoming full “resource” allies. This must envision not only secure and reliable sources of energy in the event of a crisis, but assured supply of other critical resources such as rare earth minerals.