

# Upgrading the Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines: Toward a New Phase of Operational Coordination

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The Japan-U.S. alliance has unique organizational characteristics compared to other major U.S. military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.-ROK (Republic of Korea) alliance. While these two alliances have a single integrated command and control (C2) structure for wartime coalition operation, the Japan-U.S. alliance lacks a permanent institution for combined operation. In the event of a military contingency, Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) and U.S. military forces must operate separately. In the absence of a C2 structure, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (hereafter “Defense Guidelines”) in effect embody procedures for operational coordination for the Japan-U.S. alliance. The Defense Guidelines complement the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty by specifying roles and mission for the two countries’ militaries and determine procedures for operational coordination.

The first Defense Guidelines was signed in 1978 and then revised in 1997.<sup>1</sup> The 1997 revision was done in part to adapt the alliance to the post-Cold War security environment. The 1997 revision introduced the concept of “situations in areas surrounding Japan (SIASJ)” to expand roles and missions for the SDF in case of a regional contingency in addition to the defense of Japan’s national security.

Sixteen years have passed

since this last revision of the Defense Guidelines. Since then the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region has transformed significantly. While there have been some significant developments in alliance cooperation, such as the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the changes in the region’s security environment require Japan and the United States to upgrade the Defense Guidelines and create a more robust structure for operational cooperation. This paper outlines the issues and challenges that should be discussed to strengthen operational cooperation in the Japan-U.S. alliance.

## **Role of the Defense Guidelines: Fulfilling the Gap for Operational Cooperation**

### **(1) Structure of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and Role of Defense Guidelines**

The Japan-U.S. alliance is one of the major military alliances for the United States, yet the alliance lacks a structure for a unified and integrated C2 for coalition operation. This gap stems from the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty itself. Compared to the NATO Treaty and the U.S.-ROK Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty describes limited military obligation for Japan. As Article Five and Article Six of the treaty explicitly states, Japan provides bases for the U.S. military and in return the United States offers

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security guarantee for Japan.<sup>2</sup> As the result, Japan's military commitment to the United States is limited to defend U.S. forces in Japan.

In short, the Japan-U.S. security treaty is built on asymmetrical obligations. The main component of this Security Treaty obligates Japan to provide real estate rather than military commitment, and therefore the alliance did not require the development of a permanent organization for combined military operations like the Supreme Allied Command in NATO and Combined Forces Command in the U.S.-ROK alliance.

The structural division of labor is also reflected in Japan's constitutional restraint, which prohibits the SDF from operations involving the use of force in a situation other than in the defense of Japan. In addition, at the time of signing the current Security Treaty in 1960, Japan's military capability was such that it would not be able to provide significant military contribution even without constitutional restraint.

Over the decades following the treaty, SDF capabilities developed in tandem with the rapid growth of Japan's economy. Consequently, in the late 1970s Japan's defense policy began to gradually change. With a significantly larger defense budget, the GOJ began to take more responsibility for its defense policy. The first Defense White Paper was published in 1972, and then the first National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) – which describes a plan of future force structure for the SDF – was released in 1976. In parallel with these processes, Japan and the United States began discussions on developing operational

cooperation and the Defense Guidelines was signed in 1978.

The original Defense Guidelines clarifies the division of labor between Japan and the United States. This is the most important function of the Defense Guidelines. The Guidelines is authorized by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), which is the highest decision-making body in the alliance. Through this committee, the political leadership of the two countries gave the green light for military planners to start the process of planning for combined operations. Consequently, the 1978 Defense Guidelines is a critical watershed in the history of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Since the 1978 Defense Guidelines, the two countries have worked to develop interoperability and combined contingency planning. However, the 1978 format did not work in the post-Cold War era. In the 1991 Gulf War, Japan could not send its troops to the Persian Gulf, and after the Korean Peninsula crisis in 1994-1995, the GOJ realized that there are no effective framework to support U.S. military operation near Japan, much less in an area far off, such as the Persian Gulf.

In 1995, the GOJ released the new NDPG and the two governments agreed to start to review the Defense Guidelines in the 1996 summit between Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton. In 1997, the SCC agreed to the revised Defense Guidelines.

## **(2) Implications of 1997 Defense Guidelines: SIASJ and BCM**

The end of the Cold War brought about

a vastly different global strategic landscape. Under the terms of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan cooperated with the United States by allowing American military forces to be stationed in Japan as well as bases in Japanese territory to be utilized for “peace and stability in the Far East” (Article Six of the Security Treaty); and the United States cooperated with Japan by upholding its defense commitment to Tokyo during the Cold War (Article Five of the Security Treaty).

Yet the events that tested the alliance after the end of the Cold War, such as in the Persian Gulf and in the Korean Peninsula, were not directly related to a scenario classified as the “defense of Japan” and the 1978 Defense Guidelines could not be applied to these situations. To adapt the alliance for the post-Cold War geostrategic environment, the Defense Guidelines should be revised to expand the scope of defense cooperation for scenarios beyond “defense of Japan.”

Adapting the alliance for the post-Cold War era will reshape the alliance’s strategic rationale for a world without the threat of invasion from the Soviet Union and redirect the focus of operational cooperation from the “defense of Japan” to broader regional security. The 1997 Defense Guidelines was the most important product that has helped to move the alliance toward this goal.

Japan and the United States agreed to a new division of labor under the 1997 Defense Guidelines (See Appendix 1), which was authorized by the SCC political leadership on September 1997. This SCC authorization lends political legitimacy for the two militaries to develop operational planning based on the

prescribed division of labor. In addition, important derivatives of the 1997 Defense Guidelines are the concept of a “situation in area surrounding Japan” (SIASJ) and the establishment of a bilateral coordination mechanism (BCM). SIASJ is a concept designed to expand the roles and missions of the SDF in bilateral military operation, which enables “rear area support” by the SDF for U.S. military forces. This concept paves the way for operational cooperation in the alliance in situations other than for the “defense of Japan.” BCM is a formal coordination mechanism for coalition operation including relevant government agencies other than the SDF.

Prior to the 1997 Defense Guidelines, the Japan-U.S. alliance lacked a formal mechanism for combined operation. After 1997, BCM was set to be activated in case of a SIASJ and an armed attack against Japan. While BCM is not a permanent body for coordination, it fills an institutional gap and represents a great leap in Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.

### **Post-1997 Defense Guidelines Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation**

#### **(1) Operational Cooperation after the September 11th and DPRI**

After the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in 2001, Japan immediately made the decision to support the United States and enacted the Special Measures Law for Anti-Terrorism as the legal basis for undertaking maritime refueling operations in support of US forces and other coalition partners in the Indian Ocean. In 2004, Japan sent ground troops to

Iraq for reconstruction based on the Special Measures Law for Iraq Reconstruction. While these operations were not based on the 1997 Defense Guidelines and the 1999 SIASJ Law, the SIASJ Law served as the basic template for the two special measures laws after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks.

Through operational cooperation in the Indian Ocean and Iraq, Japan and the United States were able to deepen military-to-military cooperation. At the December 2002 SCC Meeting, the two governments agreed to start the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI),<sup>3</sup> which is the Asia-Pacific component of the Global Posture Review undertaken by the George W. Bush administration. While the main purpose of DPRI is to realign U.S. military presence in Japan, this process has implications for operational cooperation as well.

The GOJ's thoughts on DPRI were summarized in the 2004 NDPG, which is Japan's key defense strategic document.<sup>4</sup> The 2004 NDPG defines two objectives for Japan's security policy: (a) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it to minimize damage; and (b) to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chance of any threat reaching Japan at all.

The 2004 NDPG states that Japan should achieve the aforementioned two objectives by combining three approaches: (a) Japan's own efforts, (b) cooperation with the United States, and (c) cooperation with the international community. During the DPRI process in which the realignment of US forces was discussed, planners on the Japanese side were keenly aware of the need to

contribute to achieving these two objectives. Furthermore, the 2004 NDPG explicitly laid out the process for carrying out consultations regarding the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan by stating: "Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives."

In other words, Japan will seek: First, to agree on a position on strategic thinking common to both countries that is tailored to meet the current situation; Second, to work out an arrangement for sharing roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC) between U.S. forces in Japan and Japan's SDF; and third, to realign U.S. bases in Japan in accordance with such strategic thinking.

For starters, the two countries agreed to "Common Strategic Objectives" at the February 2005 SCC meeting.<sup>5</sup> "Common Strategic Objectives" is assumed as the foundation to develop cooperation in RMC and the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan (USFJ). On October 29, 2005, the SCC agreed to a new document, "The Japan-US Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future."<sup>6</sup> The 2005 October SCC Document consists of two parts: RMC and realignment of USFJ. The SCC Document examines RMC in the context of (a) defense of Japan as well as responses to SIASJ and (b) efforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in international peace cooperation

activities. (See Appendix 2)

There are two overarching objectives set forth in the 2004 NDPG: (1) preventing as well as defending against threats to Japan, and (2) improving the security environment. The similarity in content of the two documents is testament to the fact that they are closely related and complement one another. The 2005 September SCC Document, following the two objectives for the security policy of Japan as defined in the 2004 NDPG, contains areas for cooperation both globally and in Northeast Asia:

(a) First, post-September 11 operational cooperation in Indian Ocean and Middle East demonstrated that bilateral cooperation in global security has become an important element of the alliance.

In this context, the section referring to RMC within the 2005 September SCC document covers various areas for cooperation not just for the “defense of Japan” and regional security but also for global security, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), humanitarian relief efforts, reconstruction assistance operations, and mutual logistics support activities (such as supply, maintenance, and transportation, including mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling)—as part of 15 examples of cooperation.

(b) Second, the September 2005 SCC document reaffirms role and mission sharing and the mechanism for the defense of Japan and regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. In this context, this SCC document lists the following seven specific areas as measures essential to strengthening

the posture of bilateral security and defense cooperation: (1) close and continuous policy and operational coordination; (2) accelerating bilateral contingency planning; (3) improving information-sharing and intelligence-gathering; (4) enhancing interoperability; (5) increasing training opportunities in Japan and the United States; (6) shared use of facilities by the SDF and US forces; and (7) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).

## **(2) Operational Cooperation in Ballistic Missile Defense**

The DPRI process concluded in the September 2006 SCC meeting on a “roadmap” for USFJ realignment, including the relocation of Futenma Air Station. In this agreement, the two countries agreed to install a forward-based X-band radar at the ASDF’s Shariki Garrison in Aomori Prefecture, and a PAC-3 unit under the 94<sup>th</sup> Army Air and Missile Defense Command in Okinawa the following October.<sup>7</sup> In addition, following its retrofit with BMD capabilities, the Aegis-guided missile destroyer *USS Shiloh* arrived at Yokosuka to take up its duty as an element of U.S. forward deployed forces in the West Pacific. Through close cooperation with the SDF, the U.S. military’s BMD will play a significant role in the defense of Japan.

The SDF deployed the BMD system in parallel with the United States. On December 2003, the GOJ made the decision to deploy PAC-3 and the SM-3 Block IA. With these interceptors, the Japanese BMD shield includes six Aegis vessels, four PAC-3 groups, four newly developed ground-based X-band radar sets (FPS-5), upgrades of seven radar

systems (upgraded FPS-3), and modification of the Japan Air-Defense Ground Environment (JADGE), an automated integrated air-defense system, to augment Japan's BMD capabilities.

The parallel deployment of BMD capabilities between SDF and U.S. forces has a positive effect on coalition operation. Such actions require seamless operational cooperation between the two country's BMD systems. Indeed, the effectiveness of missile intercept capabilities would be bolstered if information on targeted missiles can be shared between U.S. and Japanese BMD networks. For Japan, since Japanese satellites lack early warning capability, information from U.S. early warning satellite systems is important. Moreover, the U.S. missile defense assets can intercept missiles more effectively with target acquisition data from ground-based sensors in Japan.

On the other hand, if such capabilities are not accompanied by robust coordination under effective C2, there is greater potential for redundant responses or failed intercepts.

To tackle this challenge, Japan and the United States created a system for collaboration in C2 and a real-time information sharing system. A significant step was taken in this direction in the 2005 September SCC document.<sup>8</sup> This includes an agreement to establish the Bilateral Joint Operation Coordination Center (BJOCC), with the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Force Headquarters to the Yokota Air Base, where the USFJ headquarters is located. Establishment of BJOCC at the Yokota Air Base will enhance operational integration between SDF and U.S. Forces, while the

command structure continues to be separated.

### **Current Challenges to the Japan-US Alliance: Need to Revise the Defense Guidelines?**

#### **(1) Transformation of Security Environment since 1997: Need of "Revisit" and "Review" Defense Guidelines**

The current Defense Guidelines reflects the security environment in the late 1990s. More than 16 years have passed since the signing of that agreement. The degree of operational cooperation in the alliance has greatly improved compared to the pre-1997 Defense Guidelines era. Yet the 1997 Defense Guidelines should also evolve to fit the demands of operational cooperation in the new security environment, in accordance with the changes that occurred in the last 16 years.

#### **A: Emerging Gray-zone Crisis: Dynamic Deterrence and Dynamic Defense Cooperation**

As stated, NDPG is the capstone document for Japan's defense strategy. The most recent version was released in December 2010. The GOJ is currently reviewing the NDPG and is scheduled to complete a new NDPG by the end of 2013.

The most important thing for this NDPG 2010 is the introduction of the concept of "Dynamic Defense Force," which consists of the concepts of readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility reinforced by advanced military technology and intelligence capabilities.

The underlying idea in the concept of “Dynamic Defense Force” is recognizing the transition from roles and missions based on a dichotomy of peacetime and wartime, to the gray-zone between peacetime and wartime.

Indeed, the security challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region are unfolding in the gray-zone. Even with two big security challenges in the Asia-Pacific—North Korea and a rising China—it is unlikely that conventional high-end military conflict will break out – at least in coming five years. Even in the Taiwan Strait, the current situation is relatively stable. However, this does not mean that East Asia is peaceful – far from it. North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapon capabilities and ballistic missiles. With robust deterrence in conventional conflict by the US-ROK alliance, a Korean War based on conventional invasion is nearly inconceivable. However, military provocation at a lower level, such as the Cheonan Incident and Yeonpyeongdo artillery fire in 2010, may happen again. In the case of China, although large-scaled conventional amphibious invasion against Japan is unlikely to happen, low intensity incursions are constantly occurring in the East China Sea. If Japan shows a “windows of opportunity” or allows a sense of “power vacuum” in the East China Sea, China may take advantage of such a situation without having to escalate to military conflict. Consequently, the NDPG 2010 strongly focused on military operations in the gray-zone somewhere between wartime and peacetime, with emphasis on the importance of continuous steady-state operation.

With the Dynamic Defense Force concept, NDPG 2010 introduced the notion of “dynamic deterrence.” This concept was developed precisely as a result of concerns over gray-zone crisis, which happens at a lower spectrum of intensity than traditional deterrence posture. In the dynamic deterrence concept, the objective is not to deter conventional “invasion” or “armed attack,” but it is geared towards challenges that cannot be easily assigned to one or the other of the two traditional categories of peacetime and wartime.

According to deterrence theory, there are some “windows of deterrence” when deterrence rarely works, including *fait accompli* and *probing*. *Fait accompli* is a situation in which the adversary adopts a strategy that attempts to change the *status quo* without giving enough time for a deterrer to react. *Probing* is a situation in which the adversary challenges the *status quo* to find out the lower ceiling of deterrence commitment.

While the concept of dynamic deterrence was rolled out in 2010, the ongoing situation in the East China Sea is exactly what dynamic deterrence is intended to counter. In particular, the main objectives of dynamic deterrence are to cope with the two types of situations mentioned above where conventional deterrence would be ineffective (i.e., *fait accompli* and *probing*). This may be done through continuous steady-state intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), information gathering, military exercises. In these ways, dynamic deterrence differs considerably from traditional deterrence in that it comes into being through actual military force operation.

In the context of alliance cooperation, the concern over gray-zone crisis is reflected in the concept of “dynamic defense cooperation.” For the United States, its concern is demonstrated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which described that, “The future strategic landscape will increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace.”<sup>9</sup>

The synchronization of Japan and U.S. threat assessments is clearly shown in the notion of “dynamic defense cooperation,” which is agreed to in the November 2011 Defense Summit meeting.<sup>10</sup> Through this concept, Japan and the United States agreed to promote dynamic defense cooperation through joint use of facilities, joint training and exercises, and joint ISR activities.

These three pillars of dynamic defense cooperation enhance operational cooperation in the absence of a permanent body for operational coordination or single C2 structure, and it will enhance the alliance’s deterrent against gray-zone crisis.

### **B: Changing Strategic Context of Regional Security Challenges**

In the 2010s, the strategic context of East Asia’s regional security challenges is fundamentally different from the late 1990s, when the current 1997 Defense Guidelines was put in place. The major regional security concerns in the late of 1990s were conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. As the result, the main theme of the 1997 Defense Guidelines was how Japan was to assist U.S. military forces in these potential contingencies and the guidelines developed a mechanism for such cooperation.

In the 2010s, concerns over a

North Korean collapse are more poignant than the threat of a North Korean invasion against South Korea, and a Japan-China showdown in the East China Sea poses a greater threat to regional stability rather than a Taiwan Strait contingency.

In case of changes on the Korean Peninsula, the 1997 Defense Guidelines format will continue to be effective. Regardless of a North Korean invasion scenario or collapse scenario, the assumed role of the SDF is to assist the United States and the SDF will not directly engage a Korean Peninsula scenario. However, a change in the strategic context over a crisis on the Korean Peninsula should not be underestimated. The new context on the Korean Peninsula crisis may require new operational plans.

On the other hand, the East China Sea situation may require a fundamental review of the 1997 Defense Guidelines. First, the current situation is unfolding in the gray-zone. Second, Japan will take care of the current situation by herself as long as it continues to be in gray-zone.<sup>11</sup> However, if it escalates to a military conflict, the situation will drastically change and fall under “Article Five” in the Security Treaty, where the two militaries will cooperate operationally. In this case, the primary player will be the SDF, and assistance from the U.S. to Japan is to be expected.

Since the 1997 Defense Guidelines functioned more within the confines of “Article Six,” and it further developed to form a mechanism for Japan’s assistance for the United States, preparation for the potential escalation of a crisis in the East China Sea may require a fundamentally different format for operational cooperation.

### **C: Development of Operational Cooperation and New Areas for Cooperation**

As the previous section demonstrated, the level of operational cooperation in the present has improved, integrated, and made more inter-operable compared to the late 1990s. In addition to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, missile defense coordinated operation against North Korea's provocation and the Tomodachi Operation during the Great East Japan Earthquake gave invaluable experience for operational cooperation between the two countries.

Achievements and lessons learned through these operations should be institutionalized through revising the Defense Guidelines, which is the key of the operational cooperation in the alliance.

Moreover, new challenges and areas of cooperation have emerged that did not exist in the late-1990s. BMD operational cooperation was not considered in the 1997 Defense Guidelines simply because both countries did not deploy a missile defense system. Other emerging security challenges such as cyber and space are not covered by the 1997 Defense Guidelines. Measures against these new security challenges should be built into the framework of operational cooperation in which the alliance intends to strengthen responsiveness to such emerging challenges. This is another important agenda for reviewing the Defense Guidelines.

#### **(2) Issues for the "Review" of the Defense Guidelines**

Security challenges around the alliance

and the degree of cooperation within the alliance has significantly transformed since the late 1990s, and the 1997 Defense Guidelines should be "revisited" to examine whether it provides a sufficient mechanism for operational coordination in the alliance. Here are some of the issues that need to be discussed:

#### **A. Mechanism for Gray-Zone Cooperation**

The Japan-U.S. alliance lacks a permanent body for operational cooperation. The 1997 Defense Guidelines established BCM to fulfill the institutional gap of the alliance. However, BCM is not a permanent body and it is activated only in an armed attack situation against Japan and SIASJ. Therefore, while BCM can play a critical role in combined operation, it has not been activated. Even at the time of the Tomodachi Operation, when both countries mobilized massive military force for disaster-relief operation and heavy coordination requirements existed, BCM did not activate. Likewise at the time of North Korea's missile launch in 2009, 2012, and 2013.

On the other hand, as the NDPG 2010 and QDR 2010 realized, the security challenges in the contemporary security environment exist in some kind of gray-zone between wartime and peacetime. Therefore, the on-off system like the current BCM is not an effective mechanism to deal with gray-zone security challenges, because it requires a clear command to activate it, even without clear symptoms of escalation in the situation. Also, SIASJ, which is a concept to start SDF rear area support

for American military operation in some situation, should be reconsidered. Such kind of operational support should be conducted in a more steady-state way in order to treat gray-zone crises.

In short, to deal with gray-zone crises, the alliance requires a permanent body for operational cooperation and a new (or no) concept of the situation replacing SIASJ. Actually, this is a logical conclusion of “dynamic defense cooperation” with joint use of facilities, joint training and exercises, and joint ISR activities, which multiply steady-state operational cooperation in normal times without any crisis situation.

Once the alliance builds such institution, everyday coordination will be upgraded and operational effectiveness against North Korea’s provocations and East China Sea situation will be much more improved. This kind of permanent body should be an important topic for “review” of the Defense Guidelines.

### **B. Escalation of North Korea’s Provocation**

After three years of calm in regards to missile and nuclear tests since 2009, North Korea actively restarted a series of missile launch and nuclear test in April 2012. The real progress of North Korean nuclear and missile development are unclear, but these series of events suggest that North Korea has consistently made efforts to develop nuclear-tipped long-range missiles. So, from a defense-planning perspective, Japan and the United States need to upgrade their efforts to deter and defend against such challenges.

From the perspective of the credibility of extended deterrence, North Korea’s success in developing long-range nuclear-tipped missile will not undermine US deterrence commitments for Japan, because if the United States is deterred by just a handful nuclear missile of North Korea, American security guarantee for other countries including NATO would be severely damaged which would accelerate proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. These consequences are not affordable for the U.S.

However, even though North Korea’s nuclear missile deployment will not damage the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, North Korea may perceive that it has a robust deterrent against the U.S. and other regional countries. In this case, North Korea would likely intensify their provocation against ROK, and possibly against Japan as well. To respond to such intensified provocation, the United States and regional allies need to demonstrate their robust deterrence posture in more visible and operational ways.

In this context, the alliance managers should take care of the necessity to develop such visible and operational deterrence mechanisms against North Korea with complacency towards their nuclear deterrent. The Defense Guidelines will provide an important tool to upgrade allied deterrent against such over-confidence.

### **Conclusion: Toward New Defense Guidelines**

Operational cooperation in the Japan-U.S. alliance is reinforced by the

Defense Guidelines, which specifies the division of labor of military operation. The Defense Guidelines is not a mere political document. Rather, it has huge operational implication, not just political implication. Through SCC authorization of this document, which is a body for political decision-making in this alliance, the Defense Guidelines guarantees political commitment to the process of developing a combined operation plan.

Sixteen years from the previous review of the Defense Guidelines has provided many security challenges and operational opportunities. To develop a mechanism for the 2010s East Asian security environment, Japan and the United States should revisit, review and potentially revise the 1997 Defense Guidelines.

The development of operational procedures and mechanisms for handling gray-zone crisis is the most serious challenge presently facing the alliance. This does not only apply to the East China Sea, but gray-zone crisis is also applicable to the South China Sea. Cyber security also falls under such gray-zone challenges because everyday response and preparation is indispensable. In this context, a permanent body for operational cooperation with some expansion of operational domain including cyber and space will be critically important. The development of a permanent body as well as procedures for operational cooperation and coordination will give additional flexibility to deal with challenges in the gray-zone. The Defense Guidelines needs to be upgraded to deal with these new challenges.

Table 1: Division of Labor in the 1997 Defense Guidelines

| Concept of Operations   |  | SDF   | US Forces  |
|---|--|---|--|
| Operations to Counter Air Attack against Japan                                    |  | Bilaterally conduct operations to counter air attacks against Japan   |  |
|   |  | • Primarily conduct operations for air defense  | • Support SDF's operations   |
|   |  |   | • Conduct operations including those which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement the capabilities of SDF  |
| Operations to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication |  | Bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communication                             |  |
|   |  | • Primarily responsible for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations              | • Support SDF's operations<br>• Conduct operations including those which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of SDF   |
| Operations to Counter Airborne and Seaborne Invasions of Japan                    |  | Bilaterally conduct operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan  |  |
|   |  | • Primarily conduct operations to check and repel airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan  | • Primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of SDF<br>• Introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of the invasion, and support SDF's operations |
| Responses to Other Threats  | Unconventional Attacks (Guerrilla-commando type attacks etc) | • Primarily conduct operations to check and repel attacks at the earliest possible stage<br>• Cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies | • Support SDF in appropriate ways depending on the situation   |
|   | Ballistic Missile Attack                                     | Cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to attacks  |  |
|   |  |   | • Provide Japan with necessary intelligence<br>• Consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power   |

**Table 2: Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved (From SCC Document of October 2005)**

|   |
|---|
| Air defense.  |
| Ballistic missile defense.  |
| Counter-proliferation operations, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  |
| Counter-terrorism.  |
| Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic.   |
| Search and rescue operations.   |
| Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, including increasing capabilities and effectiveness of operations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and maritime patrol aircraft. |
| Humanitarian relief operations.   |
| Reconstruction assistance operations.   |
| Peacekeeping operations and capacity building for other nations' peacekeeping efforts.  |
| Protection of critical infrastructure, including U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.  |
| Response to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including disposal and decontamination of WMD.  |
| Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation.  |
| Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling.  |
| Transportation cooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability provided by high speed vessels (HSV).   |
| Transportation, use of facilities, medical support, and other related activities for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).   |
| Use of seaport and airport facilities, road, water space and airspace, and frequency bands.   |

<sup>1</sup> A bilateral agreement originally concluded in 1978 and revised in 1997, "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," (September 1997) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>> (accessed on April 16, 2012).

<sup>2</sup> The Article Five of the Security Treaty describes: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and

maintain international peace and security.” And the Article Six describes: “For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.”

- 3 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Statement” (December 16, 2002), <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html>> (accessed on May 25, 2013).
- 4 Government of Japan, “Heisei 17 Nendo Iko ni Kakaru Boei Keikaku no Taiko ni Tsuite, (National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2005 and after),” (December 2004).
- 5 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Statement” (February 19, 2005) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/joint0502.pdf>> (accessed on May 27, 2013).
- 6 Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister for Foreign Affairs Machimura, and Minister of State for Defense Ohno, Security Consultative Committee Document, “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” <[www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html)> (accessed on May 27, 2013).
- 7 The National Institute for Defense Studies, “East Asia Strategic Review 2008,” pp.204-205 . <[www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/e2008.html](http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/e2008.html)> (accessed on May 25, 2013).
- 8 “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.”
- 9 Department of Defense “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” (February 2010), p.73 <[http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR\\_as\\_of\\_12Feb10\\_1000.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf)> (accessed on May 27, 2013).
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- 11 Prime Minister Abe mentions about Senkaku issue in his speech at the Washington DC on February 20, 2013) in this way. “We intend to protect our territory. Senkaku is inherently Japanese territory, and we intend to continue to protect our own territory well into the future.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Statesmen’s Forum: Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan” (February 2013) <[http://csis.org/files/attachements/132202\\_PM\\_Abe\\_TS.pdf](http://csis.org/files/attachements/132202_PM_Abe_TS.pdf)> (accessed on May 25, 2013).